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George Koumanakos

In the Korean War

A Forgotten War, an Unknown Hero.

Gleaning

A life dedicated in the service of homeland. What is written and said by those who have known him

Athens 2018

In memory of those who served and those who gave their life preserving the freedom in Korea in 1950 – 1953

Rain on the Iron Triangle

It was no rain drops coming down from the sky.
But artillery and mortar cells, warm invitation for death,
To brave men, who had decided to die
And keep their name honoree and their oath in faith.
(Refrain)

There were Tom, Dick, Harry and the Eagle's nest the CAN DO Regimental Combat Team defending sectors Where its units participated to the Death Fest With their brave soldiers to be the actors. (Refrain)

It was on June of Nineteen fifty three.
When Hellenes and Americans fighting side by side
Ignored "haros" and remained free
Saving their positions and pride.

(Refrain)

Refrain:

The ground for days was not wet from the rain function. But from the blood of heroic soldiers Killed In Action..

> Andreas Koumanakos Ret. Col Eng. Corp, Greek Army.

Sec. Lt. Nikolaidis Nik. besides a signe in the front of the Greek Battalion C.P. February 1953.



The translation is as follows:

"Passerby... Give the message to be heard in Greece, that we are fighting here, faithful to her rules."

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How this book got its name.

By June 1953 the Korean War, had settled into position warfare. At this point both sides were fighting to win a peace, to achieve incremental advantages that could be translated into gains at the peace negotiations in Panmunjom. These last days of the war saw savage battles for control of important local terrain features, especially in the trench warfare of IRON TRIANGLE which the 15th regement, III I DV was charged to defend




From Jan. 1953 until July 27 of that year, day that the ceasefire agreement was signed, Greek Battalion, known as Spartan's Battalion, under the Commanding of Lt Col George Koumanakos, was attached to 15th reg that had the mission to defend the four Sectors of the Iron Triangle, TOM, DICK, HARRY and NEST OF THE EAGLE. Then the Regimental Commander assigned the Greek Battalion to defend the last sector called "Nest of the eagle." On 25th of March 1953, the Regimental Commander Akers, Jr. writes in his report. (See page 93)

".. Colonel Koumanakos is my Eagle. He goes to his battle position high above his soldiers each evening..." This is why I called this book... "The Eagle of the Iron Triangle."

The Iron Triangle is the area that connects Comhwa, Pyonggang and Chorwon. This area had the highest number of casualties during the Korean War, and this battlefield was prohibited to the public after 1953, when the war ended in a ceasefire. The Iron Triangle Battlefield was the head-quarters and frontline of the North Korean Army. This area had the unique natural advantage of being a difficult target for Allied forces to attack; but remained an easy area for North Koreans to defend. At this battlefield is the 2nd tunnel, 108km north from Seoul... that was made by North Koreans who were planning to invade South Korea.

The Iron Triangle is crossed by the Main Line of Resistance (MLR) and and its defence from the beginning of 1953 until the July of 1953 that the Korean war ended, was a responsibility of the "CAN DO" RCT of the 3rd Infantry Division USArmy. The "CAN DO" RCT under the Commanding of Lt Col Akers Jn, was consisted from the 15th regiment USArmy, the Spartan's battalion of the Greek Expebditionary Forces (GEF) under the Commanding of Lt Col. George Koumanakos, one battalion of the 5th RCT, one reconnaissance company one company of heavy tanks and one company of 10th Engineer.





Lt. Col George Koumanakos Commanding Officer of the Greek Battalion, (GEF) from 4-1-1953 until 20-7-1953.

I Preface

This gleaning was made in memory of Greek Army General George Koumanakos who passed away on May 23, 2000. As he had not written any book about his very stormy life, I decided to do this book. This is not the history of the Korean War, but the history of the Greek Battalion in Korea (known as Spartan's Battalion) from January 1953 until July 1953, the month that the armistice was signed. At this period, General George Koumanakos was assigned as the Commanding Officer of that Battalion of the Greek Expeditionary Forces (GEF). However, at the beginning, there is after that preface, a concise outline of the Korean War, for those readers who have no idea about this war. This outline was prepared by Lt. General Koumanakos Elias.¹

So actually I start from page 55 with the introduction and the report of Col Rubens F. Akers Jr. as it covers exactly the mentioned time period. Subsequently I mention events, and iclude documents, memories and letters of people, who had met Col. Koumanakos. I am sure that there are many more but unfortunately, I can't mention them as I haven't their work. Therefore I confine myself to that official documents and statements of named people who have met him.

I also, was met personally with Captain Skaltsas Kostas for several times but unfortunately, very soon, things became obvious that we could not communicate on a realistic base of the historic events of the Korean War that was engaged the Greek Battalion at the period of the Commanding of Lt. Col. Koumanakos George. I write in

¹ Lt General Koumanakos Elias passed away on April 12, 2010 before the issue of this book. He had sent to me the Chapter II, as he finally corrected it.

this book (Chapter V) our disagreements we had with Captain Skaltsas. To the contrary I am fully obliged to Captain Mike Perimenis, adjutant of Geor. Koumanakos charged with the S2 and S3 Sections of GEF. As such, his willing cooperation was highly informative and valuable to me.

If by chance, something is not correct in that book, the fault is mine. I make this book in good faith. If there is some different opinion, I am ready to hear it and correct any fault in any future edition. Also, I'm still waiting for any new experience, document or photo, from anybody, about Lt. Col George Koumanakos or about the Greek Battalion. It will be greatly welcomed.

As any research project reflects the contribution of many persons and it becomes quite obvious, especially when the project concern to a forgotten War and to unknown persons. Sixty years are too many. The most participators to the Korean War have gone and their work is scattered in the hands of indifferent people. So... I consider it necessary to express from the opening, my sincere thanks to those who willingly contributed effectively to the truth and the completion of this essay. I mention first, Lt General Elias Koumanakos, my brother, who covered the chapter I and he passed away on April 12, 2010 and he will not see that book finished. Then, I mention Captain Martin Marcley, Commanding of K Company, who was the first that responded to my request and sent me many e-mails, photos and documents.

I also have to mention Ret. Col. Zisimopoulos Spyros, Master Sergeant of N Company during June uf 1953 and he participated at the counter attack of N Company against CCF on the night of June 17/18 1953, at the

Harry Sector. He asked me to translate his testimony in English and I did it keeping his will.

I also consider it necessary, even I don't know them and I didn't have any mean to communicate with them, all the following.

- The team of the Engineers Officers for the nice picture.
- Ernie Cramer for his nice story where he remembered the happening with the Greek soldiers.
- First Lieutenant James C. Hafer who has posted his experience as Platoon Leader of the 4th platoon, 3rd Infantry Division, 15th Regiment Heavy Tank Company during the defence of Outpost Harry.
- Lt Leonard A. Spirito. The brave confighter of Hellines, for his sincere amd truthful memories on the night of the counter attack of Greeks.
- Emory Walker of Denver, Colorado. Korean War Veteran of the United States Army, for his memories involved with Greek soldiers on IRON TRIANGLE during those critical days.
- Second Lt Fakos and Second Lt Tsausidis, interpreters for the needs of GEF. They were with Col. Koumanakos until the armistice was signed.
- Greek Army Corporal Nick Meletis, 3rd Company, 493 Communication Battalion, who went to Korea on February, 1953.

Andreas Koumanakos

Preface of the second edition.

Despite of my desire to publish this book every June, many things have changed since the time of the first edition, which did not allow me to be consistent. Eight years passed to proceed to the re-publishing of the book and to include as much information as I thought it was serving its purpose.

Sixty-five years have passed since the Korean War up today and only few of the protagonists are alive. Among the letters I have received, I stay to a letter that I received at the beginning of this year, from General Dimitris Arvanitis. He is at 94 years of age and he enjoy a good health.

He was a warrior on the height of Harry with the rank of lieutenant in "O" co, GEF Battalion, under the commanding of Lt. Co. George Kumanakos. After his return from Korea he was posted to the Military School for Officers, where I was a Cadet. You can read his letter on page 181. So I republish this book to honor him.

Andreas Koumanakos.

II. THE WAR IN KOREA

JUNE 25, 1950 TO JULY 27, 1953

The following text is based to:

- -The article "The War in Korea" published in a Special edition of Pacific "Stars and Stripes".
- -The description of Martin Markley posted at the Internet.
- -The report of the Commanding of the "CAN DO" RCT of the U.S.A. Col Ackers, Jn. to the 3rd ID.

Elias Koumanakos Ret. Lt General, Greek Army

1. The invasion.



The Korean War, touched off on June 25, 1950, by the sudden, treacherous attack upon the tiny Republic of Korea by Communist North Korean forces, brought together forces of more than a score of free countries under the battle flag of the United Nations. For more than two and a half years, these land, sea, and air

forces have fought the Communists on the divided Korean peninsula as part of the United Nations Command.

First United States troops rushed to the battle zone from Japan in early July, 1950, were from the 24th Infantry Division. "Task Force Smith," commanded by Lt. Col. Charles B. Smith, consisting of elements of Companies B and C, 21st Infantry Regiment, a battery of 105 howitzers from the 52d Field Artillery Battalion, plus some mortars, 2.36-inch bazookas, and recoilless rifles, reached Pusan on July 2, 1950, and moved up to meet the Korean Communist forces pouring down from the north. Overwhelming numbers of well-armed, well-trained North Korean soldiers, spearheaded by Russian-made T-34 tanks, hit the small U.S. force on the morning of July 5 and forced a withdrawal. By this time, other elements of the 24th had reached Korea and joined "Task Force Smith" in its efforts to halt the North Korean advance.

The enemy was demonstrating surprising strength by this time. He had plenty of tanks, artillery, and mortars; his infantry was well-trained, tough, and aggressive, and his tactics were well-planned and executed. In the face of this superiority in numbers and offensive weapons, U.S. troops fought back valiantly, withdrawing only when threatened with encirclement and making the enemy pay for every inch of yielded ground.

These delaying tactics gained time for the arrival of other U.S. units in Korea, and while the enemy was not stopped, he was forced to slow down his timetable, which called for seizure of the entire peninsula within weeks of his first break across the 38th parallel.

On July 7, 1950, the commanding general of Eighth Army, Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, arrived in Taejon. On July 12, Gen. Walker was named by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as ground commander in Korea, and on July 13, EUSAK—Eighth United States Army Korea—was established. Before that date, the United States Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK) was commanded by Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, commander of the 24th Division. On July 24, 1950, Gen. MacArthur, with the authority vested in him by President Truman in response to a resolution of the United Nations Security Council, established the United Nations Command with headquarters in Tokyo. Meanwhile, other U.S. divisions were being dispatched to Korea. By July 15 all combat elements of the 25th Division were either in or going to Korea. The 1st Cavalry Division landed at Pohang-dong on the east coast of Korea on July 18, 1950, to join the fighting. The North Koreans crossed the Kum River despite all efforts to stop them and, on July 20, the key city of Taejon fell into enemy hands.

Gen. Dean, who was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his part in this fight, was wounded and taken prisoner while defending Taejon. U.S. and

Republic of Korea forces were able to blast the enemy's tank spearheads with the newly-arrived 3.5 inch-bazooka and resist frontal attacks, but the enveloping and infiltration tactics skillfully employed by the enemy kept compressing the defending troops into a smaller and smaller area. The desperate stand by U.S. and R.O.K. units during this period was marked by innumerable acts of individual heroism and sacrifice. Time was running out for the North Koreans. With each day of battle that passed, their chances of driving the defenders of freedom into the sea lessened, for reinforcements and new weapons were on their way to embattled Eighth Army.

Two battalions of the 29th Infantry Regiment arrived in Korea from Okinawa on July 25 and were thrown into the line against the Reds. Six days later, the 5th Regimental Combat Team came from Hawaii. A full strength, battle-ready division, the 2d Infantry, was on its way from the ZI, while the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was also headed for the Korean battlefront.

In order to establish stronger defensive positions, the Eighth Army broke contact with the enemy on the night of July 31 and withdrew to positions inside the natural defenses offered by the Naktong River. By August 4, the withdrawal was complete. The 25th Division took up positions on the left south flank of the line in the Masan area. The 24th Division extended from the Naktong-Nam River junction to the north. The 1st Cavalry was on the right of the 24th, its right flank west of Taegu. From there

the line curved to the north and then east, anchoring on the coast at Yongdok. The ROK 1st, 6th, 8th, Capitol, and 3d Divisions held the northern sector in that order. It was on this line, known as the Pusan Perimeter, that Gen. Walker issued his famed "Stand or Die" ultimatum.

The six weeks that the Eighth Army spent inside the Pusan Perimeter was a period of fighting brush fires with an inadequate number of firemen. The forces under Gen. Walker's command were too small even to man the defense lines completely. To offset this situation and to put out the fires along the perimeter, great mobility was required. This mobility was provided by a rail and road net maintained and operated by U.S. service troops.

The enemy's main effort against the Pusan Perimeter was made along the Taejon-Taegu axis. A diversionary attack was ordered toward Chinju to ease the pressure on Taegu and on Aug. 7, "Task Force Kean," led by Maj. Gen. William H. Kean and composed of elements of his 25th Division; the newly arrived 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, and the 5th RCT, undertook the first U.S. and ROK offensive of the war. Although hampered by enemy infiltration, the task force nevertheless pushed the North Koreans back to Chinju by Aug. 11, defeating the North Korean 6th Division and eliminating a serious threat to the U.N. command. A series of fanatic attacks by the North Koreans continued throughout the entire period as Eighth Army clung desperately to its last toe hold on the Korean peninsula. The enemy forced a crossing of the

Naktong in the 24th Division area but was contained and finally forced back on August 17 by efforts of the 24th Division, the 9th Regiment of the 2d Division, and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. Fierce fighting raged on the north flank as the ROK divisions lost, then regained, Pohang-gong. Taegu was threatened in mid-August when the North Koreans attempted to storm down the "Bowling Alley," as the straight stretch of valley from Waegwan to Taegun became known. The 1st Cavalry Division assisted by the 27th Infantry Regiment, 25th Division, beat back all the furious enemy assaults down the "Bowling Alley" and by Aug. 23 this threat to Taegu was removed. The British 27th Brigade, which had arrived in Pusan on August 29 from Hong Kong, went into the line on the left of the 1st Cavalry Division.

This brigade, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 24th Division, and the ROK 1st Division were organized as the U.S. I Corps. The heaviest attack of all the North Korean efforts to push the U.N. into the sea hit the perimeter on the night of August 31 and continued during the next week of September. This all-out attempt was launched in two phases—a drive on the extreme left flank on Aug. 31 and on the extreme right of the Eighth Army on the night of September 3. The enemy threw everything he had left, but by masterly use of reserves, and by sheer courage and determination, the U.N. forces withstood the enemy offensiveness. Time ran out for the North Korean Communists in mid-September.

2. The U.N. Takes the Offensive



On September 15, 1950, in one of the most successful and certainly the most delicately timed amphibious operations ever conducted, U.S. Marines of the 1st Marine Division, following in the wake of a terrific naval bombardment, stormed ashore deep in enemy territory at Inchon. Enemy defenses were no match for the

terrific concentration of naval, air, and infantry power, and within hours the port of Inchon fell. By Sept. 17, the entire 1st Marine Division was ashore and the 7th Infantry Division was being landed. Under the command of Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, ground elements, now designated X Corps rapidly consolidated the entire area. On the morning of Sept. 24, regiments of the 1st Marines and the 7th Division pushed across the Han River against fierce enemy resistance and forced their way into the streets of Seoul. The battle for Seoul raged until Sept. 26 when Gen. MacArthur announced the fall of the city, formally restoring the battered capital to South Korean President Rhee on Sept. 29.

A coordinated overland drive by Eighth Army, free now from the Pusan Perimeter, netted thousands of

enemy prisoners. It had a large area to capture, but by Sept. 22 the principal enemy resistance was overcome and all units began to fan out rapidly. On that date, too, IX Corps became operational, taking over the U.S. 2d and 25th Divisions. A task force from the 1st Cavalry Division, racing northward through enemy territory, made contact with elements of the 7th Division from X Corps on the evening of Sept. 26 slightly south of Suwon. This juncture of forces sealed the fate of North Korean forces to the south and resulted in the breaking of organized enemy resistance generally south of Seoul.



By the end of September, the enemy had relinquished control of practically all territory south of the 38th parallel. The retreat of the North Korean army had degenerated gradually into a rout; the U.N. forces by the end of the month controlled a territory over four times greater than they had held at the time

of the Inchon landing. During the latter part of September, Eighth Army was reinforced by a battalion each of Philippine and Australian troops, and early in October the U.S. 3d Infantry Division arrived in the Far East Command



U.N. forces drove north of the 38th Parallel in early October, with the ROK 3d Division crossing on the east coast on Oct. 1 and the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division penetrating North Korean territory above Kaesong on October 9. A planned amphibious encirclebe launched ment to Wonsan resulted the

withdrawal of X Corps forces from the ground action in early October, with Eighth Army taking over across the entire peninsula. Advances during October were so rapid that Pyongyang, the enemy capital, fell on Oct. 19. The day after Pyongyang fell, U.N. forces made the first paratroop attack of the war, when the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team dropped at Sukchon and Sumchon, 25 miles north of Pyongyang.


ROK forces advancing up the east coast had made phenomenal gains, capturing the port of Wonsan on Oct. 10 and taking Hamhung and Hungnam on Oct. 18, and on Oct. 26, U.S. Marines landed at Wonsan against no resistance. Three days later the U.S. 7th Division went ashore at Iwon under similar conditions. All units drove inland or northward: the Marines striking toward the Cho Shin reservoir, the 7th Division to the northwest, while the Capitol and ROK 3d Divisions swept toward the

Manchurian border. By the morning of Nov. 21, a small task force of the 17th Infantry Regiment, 7th Division, had reached the Yalu River at Hyesanjin. Three weeks earlier, the 7th Regiment of the ROK 6th Division had reached the Yalu at Chosan. Elsewhere in Korea, units of Eighth Army by mid-November had moved northward



across the western half of Korea and reached close to Yalu river. An attack was under preparation for Nov. 24. In the east coast areas, units of X Corps, the 1st U.S.Mar. Div, the 7th and the newly arrived 3rd Division, and ROK Divisions, were cutting their way towords the northern borders of Korea.

3. The Chinese Attack



During the latter part of October and throughout November, reports had been received of Chinese troops operating within Korea as "volunteers." It was known troops that these were Yalu crossing the in increasing numbers, but it was believed that they were merely a token force and that the Chinese Communist forces, known to be present

in Manchuria, would not intervene on a large scale.

The U.N. attack of Nov. 24 forced the Chinese hand. They struck at advancing Eighth Army and X Corps troops in full force. By Nov. 28, 30 Chinese Communist divisions had slammed into U.N. forces across the entire front. So great was their numerical strength—literally hundreds of thousands of fresh, well-equipped troops—that U.N. divisions were forced to fall back to avoid complete encirclement and destruction. On the east coast, X Corps came under heavy attack by 12 Chinese divisions, compelling it to withdraw all its units into a

bridgehead area around Hamhung and Hungnam. This left Eighth Army's right flank unprotected and presented the grave danger of CCF moving around it to cut off all

escape routes to the south. It was a new war.



In the face ofthese developments, Eighth Army withdrew rapidly and broke contact with the new enemy. At 0630 on Dec. 5, the Royal Ulster Rifles Battalion of the United Kingdom Brigade, the last friendly unit to evacuate Pyongyang, fell back across the Taedong River running through that city and continued rear guard

action. Every effort was made to destroy supplies and equipment north of the Taedong which could not be brought with the retreating forces.

While Eighth Army had been withdrawing, X Corps had been making preparations for evacuation by water from their precarious positions around Hamhung. The U.S. 1st Marine Division, which had been trapped by large Chinese forces, made a valiant fighting debauchment during the bitter sub-zero weather of early December. They were joined by elements of the U.S. 7th Division, also fighting off entrapment. Together these forces fought

their way south through the swarming Chinese to Hamhung.

It was one of the most dramatic actions of the war, provoking the now famous retort of Marines'



commander, Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith, "Retreat, hell! We're only attacking in another direction." With the U.S. 3d Division holding the final perimeter, and land and naval gunfire hitting the attacking

enemy, X Corps completed the evacuation of 105,000 military personnel, 91,000 civilian refugees, 17,500 vehicles and 350,000 tons of equipment by Dec. 24. X Corps was placed under control of Eighth Army upon its debarkation in South Korea. Final elements of this Corps closed in South Korea on Christmas Day.



Gen. Walker, Eighth Army commander, was killed in a jeep accident on Dec. 23. He was replaced by Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgeway, who arrived in Korea to assume

command of Eighth Army on Dec. 26, 1950.

Although Eighth Army had extricated its forces from the threat of envelopment by falling back 150 miles and had taken up positions across the peninsula south of the 38th parallel, the situation was still dangerous. There weren't enough troops to span the peninsula, and the enemy was building up for an all-out attack to smash Eighth Army. Late on New Year's Eve, the enemy's long awaited general offensive began with a series of attacks against the ROK 6th Division south of Yonchon. The enemy gathered momentum and forced the Eighth Army back all along the front. Seoul fell to the Chinese on Jan. 4. For the rest of the month it was touch and go, with the U.N. fighting men stiffening their resistance daily and with desperate battles for such key communications centers as Wonju marking the first weeks of the New Year. But Eighth Army held, and the enemy was unable to achieve his objectives.


Despite the many tactical reverses they had suffered since the entry of CCF units into the Korean War, the fighting spirit of U.N. troops never wavered. That spirit was strengthened and increased with each yielded foot of ground until, by mid-January, 1951.



Gen. Ridgeway, Eighth Army commander, set the stage for the next months of combat operation by his army when he said, in initiating the first coordinated offensive by forces under his command, "We are not interested in real estate. We are interested only in inflicting maximum casualties to the enemy with minimum casualties to ourselves. To do this we must wage a war of maneuver—slashing at the enemy when he withdraws and fighting delaying action when he attacks."

Eighth Army did just that. And with great success. During the 18 days of this first new offensive until the Han River line was regained on Feb. 12, Eighth Army inflicted an estimated 70,000 casualties on the enemy. But casualties notwithstanding, the enemy was still a formidable fighting machine. On Feb. 11, in sub-zero weather, the Chinese struck hard at the central sector toward Wonju, which was held by the 187th RCT: a battalion of the 17th Infantry, 7th Division; and the ROK 18th Regiment, ROK 3d Division, attempting to force that strong point and split the U.N. forces down the center. To the west of this point they struck also at Chipyongni, an isolated pocket manned by the 2d Division's 23d RCT and the French battalion. Attack after attack against these areas was beaten back through the heroic efforts of the gallant men of these units. The Air Force gave outstanding aid to the ground troops by air drops and by night and day tactical support. The key area was held, and Chinese units in the fight were annihilated. Taking full advantage of the enemy's weakened condition after their abortive assault; Gen. Ridgeway ordered his forces forward along the entire

front in "Operation Killer." This operation swept the Chinese and North Koreans back, taking a great toll of their men and equipment. By the end of February, Eighth Army was back on a line overlooking the Han River and preparing to advance again. Throughout March, U.N. forces continued to gain ground methodically as the enemy retired in disorder, making an occasional stand, but losing heavily in men and supply. On Mar. 15, the 15th Regiment of the ROK 1st Division sent patrols into Seoul and raised the flag of the Republic of Korea over the capitol. The 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, pushed into Chunchon on Mar. 22, and the following day the 187th RCT jumped into the Munsan area in an attempt to cut off any enemy forces still south of the river. The enemy, scurrying northward, was becoming hard to find, and by the end of March some U.N. units had again crossed the 38th Parallel. The absence of enemy contact was taken as an indication that the enemy was merely licking his wounds and that he was building up for a counter-offensive at the first opening. This obvious build-up in rear areas made it imperative to keep him off balance by establishing a strong line from which punishing sorties could be made. Gen. Ridgeway, therefore, ordered his troops to move forward to a line running along the commanding terrain just north of the 38th Parallel. This line, 115 miles long, included 14 miles of tidal area on its left flank and a 12-mile expanse of the Hwachon Reservoir in the center. The terrain on the right flank was extremely rugged.



The Iron Triangle

The Iron Triangle practically devoid of roads and difficult for both friend and foe to traverse. This shortened the line and permitted greater depth for U.N. attack or defense operations.

Once this line was gained, in a series of steady, unspectacular gains with maximum casualties being inflicted on the Reds, an operation was initiated to continue the Army's offensive in the west. This operation was calculated to neutralize the famed "Iron Triangle," an

enemy supply and communications center enclosed within a triangular area formed by the three cities of Chorwon-Pyonggang-Kumhwa. The fight toward Chorwon by Eighth Army was a foot-by-foot, hand-to-hand struggle. Determined enemy delaying forces were overcome with grenades and bayonets in close-in fighting as the advance on the "Iron Triangle" continued. In the center of the line, U.N. forces fought to Hwachon and captured the reservoir. Before withdrawing, the Chinese opened the flood gates in a fruitless effort to swell the Pukhan River and thereby form a water barrier in the west-central sector



The Iron Triangle.

By April 20, U.N. forces had reached a predestinated phase line immediately south of the triangle, and Eighth Army troops in the center and on the east coast began

coming up on the line. Enemy supply installations within the triangle were neutralized and destroyed.



On Apr. 11, Gen. Ridgway had been named Commander Chief, United Nations in Command, taking over from Gen. MacArthur, and Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet had succeeded him as Eighth army commander The Korean conflict continued he to fought with the tactics perfected during the winter

months, and U.N. forces continued to move slowly but relentlessly forward with greatest possible lateral security, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. But the Reds were far from being whipped.

On Apr. 22, 1951, Gen. Van Fleet held his first press conference. In discussing the enemy's capabilities, he said, "The enemy is closer and in greater numbers than ever before. We can expect the attack at any minute." That night the Communists struck with full force. So great was the initial power of the enemy's attack that a deep penetration of U.N. lines in the west-central section was achieved in its early stages, forcing Eighth Army to withdraw as much as 40 miles to maintain maximum security of forces. The enemy was never able to exploit

his gains, however, and, in the face of coldly efficient killing tactics employed by a rejuvenated Eighth Army, each enemy threat was reduced and overcome. When the enemy attack sputtered out on Apr 29, the U.N. lines formed an arc just north of Seoul, stretching due east for 20 miles, then northeast to the coast near Yang yang. This offensive, which the enemy loudly proclaimed as his Fifth Phase offensive, had failed, but Red capabilities were still considerable.



The Eighth Army had met an attack by ofquarter a million Communist troops, but by combination of air support, tank and artillery fire, and infantry inflicted tenacity, had 20,000 enemy casualties and maintained its lines intact. For the next week, strong patrols roamed 10 to 12

miles in front of U.N. lines, attempting to contact the



enemy, generally with negligible results. By early May, limited offensives were again being conducted by Eighth Army and steady methodical advances were made against enemy delaying forces that resisted fanatically one day and vanished the next.

Again, this lack of general enemy

contact and the tenor of incoming intelligence reports indicated that the enemy was still hopeful of driving the U.N. out of Korea with another surge of its Fifth Phase offensive. On May 16, the Chinese made their final play. Five CCF armies struck along the boundary of U.S. X Corps and ROK III Corps. The impact of the enemy's blow wedged his troops between these units and created a situation which for several days was precarious. The penetration along the Corps boundaries subjected the U.S. 2nd Division to attack from two sides, severed the MSR, and established a roadblock behind its 23rd and 38th regiments. The 9th regiment of the 2nd plunged northward to reduce the roadblock, and the two sister regiments with their attached French and Netherlands Battalions fought southward along the MSR, broke the trap, and organized a defense line south of Hangye—a line which the enemy was never able to breach. On other sectors of the front, lesser enemy attacks were contained more easily until the enemy, exhausted, casualty ridden, and in serious supply difficulties, reduced the pressure, and then began to withdraw. An immediate Eighth Army counterattack which developed into a pursuit, caught the enemy in his withdrawal, disorganized his forces, and caused him tremendous losses in personnel. The much-vaunted Fifth Phase offensive ended in a smashing defeat for the Communists and broke their offensive power for months to come. By May 27, Inje and Hwachon were again in U.N. hands and

the enemy's main escape route from the area south of the Hwachon reservoir was severed. But a combination of rain, mud, and enemy delaying action impeded the closing of many other escape routes and prevented the complete destruction or seizure of the enemy's supply bases. Nevertheless, the initiative on the field of battle was now with the Eighth Army and remained there for the rest of 1951. By the end of May, all ground lost as a result of enemy drives had been retaken and it had been clearly demonstrated that the Communists did not have the power to defeat the Eighth Army.



On June 13, two tank-infantry task forces, one from the U.S. 3rd Division, another from the 25th Division, advanced from Chorwon and Kumhwa, respectively, and affected a link-up in city the Pvonggang that afternoon. Except for a few rounds of mortar fire along the Kumhwa-Pyonggang road, no enemy

activity was encountered. It was evident that the enemy had evacuated his supplies and equipment and, in keeping with his tactical doctrine, had relinquished the territory to Eighth Army.

4. Negotiation

Coincidentally with the reversal of Communist fortunes on the field of battle in Korea, came a strong indication that the enemy was prepared to settle the problem of a unified Korea through negotiation rather than through fighting. In a radio speech, Russian delegate to U.N., Jacob A. Malik, on June 14, 1951, hinted that the Soviet Union favored settlement in Korea through arbitration. Since the United Nations was also of the opinion that solution through conference was immeasurably better, if it could be achieved, than continued waste of human lives, and since it was hoped there might be some grain of sincerity behind the Communist offer, arrangements were made for a meeting of representatives of both sides with the mission of settling by arbitration an issue which one year of bitter combat had failed to resolve.

On July 10, 1951, the first plenary session of delegates from the U.N., headed by Adm. C. Turner Joy, Commander Naval Forces Far East, and from the Chinese and North Korean Communists, headed by North Korean Gen. Nam II, met at the city of Kaesong. Since that date, in the face of all efforts and concessions made by the United Nations Command, the Communists have succeeded in delaying and stalling on the negotiations until, in the final analysis, no armistice was possible. Employing every deceitful device in their well-stocked bag of tricks, the Communist negotiators have falsified,

equivocated, propagandized, threatened, pouted, and raged. Not once in over 100 plenary sessions at Kaesong and later at Panmunjom did they demonstrate the slightest concrete evidence of good faith in the negotiations or of a real willingness to bring an end of the conflict on any but their own terms. Certain superficial agreements they made were forced on them or obtained by the U.N. through concession.

When all else failed and it appeared that the pressure of world-wide public opinion might force the Reds to come to an agreement, they took refuge behind a vociferous refusal to condone the U.N.'s humanitarian policies with regard to repatriation of prisoners of war, a sandbar in the river of agreement. Belying their loudly professed regard for the welfare of these prisoners, the Communists until March, 1953, insisted that prisoners must be forced to return to their control without regard for the individual's wishes in the matter, a principle which the U.N. would not tolerate. Their patience stretched to the breaking point, Allied delegates, then headed by Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, on Oct. 8, 1952, notified their Communist counterparts that they would attend no more meetings until the Reds agreed with the U.N. plan calling for prisoner repatriation according to each POW's wishes, or until the Communists came up with some other acceptable plan.

During the ensuing deadlock, the Western world's concern for human misery and individual rights further

manifested itself on Dec. 13, 1952, when the League of Red Cross Societies in Geneva urged both sides in the conflict to exchange seriously sick and wounded POWs. (A move repeatedly requested by the U.N. delegates to the peace talks in the past.) Gen. Mark W. Clark followed up the Red Cross action when he wrote the Red leaders in Korea on Feb. 22, 1953, that the UNC was prepared to make the suggested exchange. But before Gen. Clark's letter was answered, the world's newspapers were filled with the story of Soviet Premier Josef Stalin's death and the subsequent re-arranging of the USSR hierarchy. Then, on Mar. 28, 1953, North Korean Premier Gen. Kim Il Sung and Chinese Gen. Peng Tch-huai answered Gen. Clark's letter with one of their own in which they agreed to the exchange of sick and wounded war prisoners.

Communist China's foreign minister Chou En-lai, just returned from Stalin's funeral at Moscow, further raised hope for removing the POW-return roadblock by announcing that China might be willing to compromise on the forcible repatriation issue. He suggested that those prisoners who did not want to return to their homelands might be sent to a "neutral" country.

Hope for an early settlement again rose in the opposing armed camps, and the recent bitter fighting for such terrain promontories as Old Baldy and Vegas Hills subsided again to patrol action. During the period from the beginning of armistice negotiations in July, 1951, until April, 1953, no major ground offensives were

launched by either side. Both sides, however, initiated limited offensives for key terrain features, resulting in some of the fiercest and bloodiest battles of modern history. Such actions as Bloody and Heartbreak Ridge, the see-saw battles for T-Bone, Vegas, Old Baldy, Kelly Hills and dozens of other localized combat operations since July, 1951. Taking advantage of the comparative respite induced by the negotiations, the Communists built up their depleted ground forces, strengthened their defenses, created vast stocks of supplies, and made great strides in increasing their artillery and air potentials.

In December, 1951, action was begun to move to Korea two fresh U.S. divisions, the 40th and the 45th Divisions, National Guard units which had been training in Japan. The new units were placed in the line by increment, with the 45th completely replacing the 1st Cavalry Division by Dec. 29, 1951, and the 40th Division taking over from the 24th Division by Feb. 3, 1952 both the 1st Cavalry and the 24th were returned to Japan. Gen. Van Fleet relinquished command of his beloved Army to an old comrade-in-arms, Lt. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, on February 11, 1953.

5. The U.N. Fighting Team

Member nations of the United Nations other than the United States furnished troops to the United Nations Command throughout the campaign.

- The British Commonwealth 27th Brigade was the first non-U.S., non-ROK unit to arrive and see action in Korea. It landed on Aug. 29, 1950, and went into the line on the Naktong River west of Taegu.
- The 3d Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, reached Korea on Sept. 28, 1950, and was attached to the 27th Brigade.
- The United Kingdom 29th Brigade, which arrived in November, 1950, covered the January, 1951, evacuation of Seoul and counter-attacked vigorously before being ordered back across the Han
- Canada's 2d Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, landed on Dec. 18, 1950, joining the 27th Brigade in February on the west central front. In May, 1951, additional units from Canada arrived and the Canadian 25th Infantry Brigade Group entered combat in Korea. Also present from Commonwealth forces was the New Zealand Artillery Battalion, which had arrived on Dec. 31, 1950. The 28th Infantry Brigade replaced the 27th Brigade in April, 1951. In late July, 1951, all units of the British Commonwealth were united to form the Commonwealth 1st Division.

- **The Philippine Expeditionary Force** (a battalion combat team) reached Korea on Sept. 19, 1950, and was attached to the U.S. 45th Division.
- **The Turkish Brigade** was first committed east of Kunu-ri when the Chinese attacked in late November.
- The Thailand Battalion landed on Nov. 7, 1950, and on Nov. 24, moved to the Pyongyang area where it was attached to the 187th RCT and later to the 1st Cavalry Division and U.S. 2d Division.
- The Netherlands Battalion arrived on Nov. 23, 1950, and saw its first engagement early in January with the U.S. 38th Regiment at Wonju.

The French Battalion arrived on Nov. 29 and with the U.S. 23d Regiment fought valiantly at Chip-lying-in.

- The Greek Battalion landed on Dec. 9, 1950 and went into action on the western front during the first week of February, 1951, with the 1st Cavalry Division.
- **A battalion from Belgium** and Luxembourg arrived on Jan. 31, 1951, and was attached to the United Kingdom's 29th Brigade and then was fighting with the U.S. 3d Division.
- The Ethiopian Battalion arrived on May 6, 1951, followed a month later by the Colombian Battalion which disembarked in Korea on June 14, 1951, and both were attached to the 7th Division

- A recapitulation of United Nations forces furnished by member nations of the U.N. other than U.S. or R.O.K. follows:

Ground Forces

Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, **Greece,** France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Ethiopia, United Kingdom, Turkey and Thailand.

Air Force Units

Australia, Greece, Thailand and the Union of S. Africa.

Naval Units

Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, Netherlands, New Zealand and Thailand.

Medical Units

Denmark, India, Italy, Norway and Sweden.



The Eighth Army front line during the July 1953.



Greek Expeditionary Force



Soldiers of the first unit of the Greek expeditionary forces with the flag of the United Nations on parade in Athens, before their departure.

6. The Hellenic Forces



The Patch of the Greek Military Forces

The Hellenic Ground Forces were known as GEF (Greek Expeditionary Forces) and later as Spartan's Battalion, was a fully Organized Battalion with Hq, three Rifle Companies (N, O and P.) a Heavy Weapons Company (Q Company) and a Headquarters Section, (R Company). GEF, from January 1953 untill the end of the war (July 27, 1953) was attached to the 15 reg. III IDV.

GEF, for all this time, as a part of the 5th Regimental Combat Team, defended the IRON TRIANGLE, initially on the Sector "THE EAGLE'S NEST", then on the Sector "DICK" and from June 16, 1953 GEF moved on

Sector "HARRY". The night of 17/18 of June, Greek Battalion under the Commanding of Lt Col Koumanakos George, won a great vitory against the attacked CCF with strength of one regiment. Finally, on June 18th, the enemy forces called off their attack due to horrible loses inflected by the defending units.

Awards and Recognition of GEF

-The 13th Flight received a U.S. Presidential Citation for its participation in the evacuation of US Marines at Hagaru-ri in December 1950. The GEF battalion received its first U.S. Presidential Citation in February 1952 for the capture of Scotch Hill.

-The Greek company involved in the defense of Outpost Harry received the following U.S. Presidential Citation: "DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Washington D. C., 10 March 1955 GENERAL ORDERS 18 DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION Company P Greek Expeditionary Forces Battalion (Second Award) is cited for extraordinary heroism and outstanding performance of duty in action against an armed enemy in the vicinity of Surang-Ni, Korea during the period 17 June to 18 June 1953. Assigned the defense of a vital outpost position (Harry), the company encountered a major enemy assault on the evening of June 17. After an intense concentration

of enemy mortar and artillery fire, the hostile forces, this had taken up an attack position on the northeast and northwest side of the outpost, moved rapidly through their own and friendly artillery fire to gain a foothold on the northern slope of the position. Refusing to withdraw, Company P closed in and met the attackers in a furious hand to hand struggle in which many of the enemy were driven off. The aggressors regrouped, quickly attacked a second time, and again gained the friendly trenches. Immediately, the Greek Forces launched a series of counterattacks, simultaneously dispatching a diversionary force to the east of the outpost which successfully channeled the enemy thrusts. After 2 hours of close in fighting, the aggressors were again routed and the friendly positions restored. The outstanding conduct and exemplary courage exhibited by members of Company P, Greek Expeditionary Forces Battalion, reflects great credit on themselves and are in keeping with the finest traditions of the military service and the Greece." The Greeks won six U.S. Distinguished Service Crosses, 32 Silver Stars, 110 Bronze Stars. 19 members of 13th Flight received the U.S. Air Force Air Medal (for the Hagaru-ri evacuation operation in December 1950)

49

The Five Greek Commanding Officers of GEF during the war period. (December 1950- July 27 1953.

Οι Διοικηταί του ΕΚΣΕ στη Κορέα κατά την πολεμική περίοδο. (από Δεκέμβριο 1950 έως Ιούλιο 1953)



Αντ/ης Πεζ. Αρμπούζης Διονύσιος Νοε. 1950-Αύγ. 1951



Αντ/ης Πεζ. Σπυλιόπουλος Κυριάκος Αύγ. 1951-Απρ. 1952



Αντ/ης Πεζ. Ταμβακάς Νικόλαος Απρ. 1952-Ιαν. 1953



Αντ/ης Πεζ. Κουμανάκος Γεώργιος Ιαν. 1953-Ιούλ. 1953



Actually, the last Commanding Officer of GEF of the war period, was Lt Col George Koumanakos as Hlias Prokos was Co Officer only for one week. (Jul. 20- Jul. 27, 1953)




7. Lt Colonel Koumanakos George.



Lt Col.George Koumanakos took over the Commanding of the Greek Battalion (GEF) on January 4, 1953. At that time GEF and the 15th Regiment and a Battalion of the 5th RBT were asummed to defend the Sectors TOM, Dick, HARRY and NEST OF THE EAGLE on the IRON TRIANGLE.

A quick Biography of Lt Col. Koumanakos George.

George Koumanakos was given birth in year 1914 in Gythion of Laconia, in Greece and he died in 2000 in Athens Greece. He came from a military family, his father however was a landowner in Laconia District. He himself, after he has finished High school in Gythion, in age of 17 years, with his own decision, after examinations entered the Military Academy of Athens and he graduated from this school in 1935 with the rank of Second Lieutenant.



From the 4th of Jan. 1953, Commander of GEF is Lt. Col. George Koumanakos. In the picture the New Commander of Spartans' Battalion (on the Left) accepting the congratulations of the previous Commander, Lt. Col. Tamvakas Nikolas.

I wish to point out that General George Koumanakos was a real Spartan by origin and it was known to the Americans, and this is why they called the Greek Battalion as Spartan's Battalion, during the period he was the Commanding Officer of the Greek Expeditionary Forces inKorea. (Jan.-July 1953)

On 1940-41, during the WW II, general G. Koumanakos as a First Lt. fought in Albania and he was promoted to Captain.

On 1941, after the occupation of Greece by Germans, George and his brother Elias (a captain of war aviation) escapade to Egypt. Then George as a company Commander of the Greek brigade fought against the Africa Corp. of Rommel. In the battle of El Alamein, he lost his brother Elias. On 1942 he was met

1943: G. Koumanakos in N. Africa

On 1945 he returned to Greece and was promoted to Major. At this time Greece was in civil war with guerillas (communist) and George as a Battalion commander had to fight for four years as battalion commander... He has won several fights until November 1949 when this war came to an end. Then he was promoted to Lt. Colonel.

there with the American General Mark Clark

In this year he got married with Nina, an attractive lady who was already a professional lawyer and she helped him a lot later, (on 1967, with his problems with the junta.)

On 1951-1952, he and his family were sent to the USA. There, George attended the faculty of staff officers for two years where he was distinguished for his records. This school is considered to be the higher military school in the USA (Command Staff of Defense, something like that). At that time the pair acquired their first daughter, who is American citizen and today, she is serving as a secretary of press in the Greek embassy in Romania.

On December 1952 he was sent as a Commanding officer to the Greek Battalion of GEF. It was the Battalion known as Spartans' Battalion. He stayed in Korea until the end of September of 1953.

In Korea he has won several medals and among them the U.S. Silver Star and Legion of Merit. When he came back to Greece he served as a professor to several military schools and as a Commanding Officer to several military units all over the country and Cyprus. In the decade from 1955-1966 he took in succession his degrees of Colonel and Brigadier General.

In 1967, the known junta that made the coup in Greece and occupied the power, approached him and asked him to collaborate. Then he denied and when the coup happened, George Koumanakos was arrested and up to 1974 he was between the prison and the exile.

In between, he acquired two more children, a girl and a boy. The girl is now ambassador to the Greek Embassy in Sofia, Bulgaria and the boy is a doctor in Athens, Greece.

In 1974, with the restoration of democracy in Greece, George Koumanakos was restored too as a three stars General, but because of his age, it was no longer possible to return to active service. He was assigned as chairman of various government agencies and then, together with other generals from around the world he was giving lectures for the abolition of nuclear weapons. In 1986 he did a film with other Generals with the title "The Generals"

Elias Koumanakos Lt. General, Greek Army.



General Elias Koumanakos beyond of his career as a regular officer in the Greek Army had a diploma in mathematics from Athens University and also a Diploma from Technical University of Athens as a Mechanical Engineer.

He was not lucky to see this book to be edited, as he passed away on April 12, 2010

III. HOW THIS BOOK STARTED.

1. A request.

On July 10, 2006 I posted a request on the web, (http://www.warfoto.com/3rdpersonalsearch81.htm) that was as follow:

Date: July 10, 2006 REQUEST #3833

Name: Andreas Koumanakos


Address: 8 Ermou str. 145 78 EKALI, GREECE

E-mail: andreas@fastmail.ca

Subject: Information-Lt. Col. George Koumanakos Comments: Request: information regarding the Lt. Col. George Koumanakos, commander of the Greek Expeditionary Forces (GEF) in Korean War from Jan. 4th 1953 to Jul. 20th 1953.

"Lt. Col. George Koumanakos is my uncle and he died as a General on April 5, 2003 in Athens, Greece. I'm writing a book for him and I am trying to gather any information I can get concerning his military activities during the period of his service in KOREAN WAR. He was commander of the Greek Expeditionary Forces (GEF) from Jan 4th 1953 to Jul. 20th 1953. I know, he was on OP HARRY and elsewhere. If anybody can help in anyway, please respond by e-mailing me back. Thank you in advance."

Several co-fighters of his from Greece and two from abroad, had the kindness to respond to my request. I will answer to them by writing about them, in the next pages.



COLONEL RUSSELL F. AKERS, JR. Regimental Commander: 21 March 1953 to 13 September 1953

The entire report of Col R. F. Akers was included because the struggle of the 15th regiment described in there, is precisely the struggle of the Greek Battalion from the beginning of Jan. 1953 until the end of July 1953, with Commander Col. Koumanakos.

2. The Greek battalion (GEF) from January to July 1953.

As I have written in my preface, this book is not the history of Korean War or the history of the Greek Battalion during the same war. Simply it is a gleaning of what was written or told from several fellows, who have met the Commanding of Spartan's Battalion, Lt Col George Koumanakos.

It was a great attempt for me, and it took to me four years to concentrate the several documents. During this time, two unfortunate events contributed to the delay in issuing this book. The death of the wife of General George Koumanakos, as well as the death of my brother Lt General Elias Koumanakos, who used to help me.

On the other hand, it worked well and I was able to find more good stuff and original documents as the record of Col Akers Jr. issued on October 1953 and covers exactly the period from January to July of the same year. So I am going to start with it.

(The following text is a detachment from the Year Book for 1953 of Colonel Russell P. Akers, Commanding of the 15th Inf. Regiment. Actually this detachment covers the above time period, during of which Lt Col George Koumanakos was the Commanding officer of the Greek Battalion.)

INTRODUCTION

The decision to publish a 1953 year book of the 15th" Can Do" Regiment was made during the bitter fight to halt the Chinese Kumsong offensive in late July. At that time the regiment had been in continuous contact with the enemy for almost six months. It was felt that a brief summary of this phase of the regiment's history, with pictures of the men who did the fighting, would be the simplest means of remembering our comrades and preserving for our families a record of this part of our lives. This book contains a brief history of the 15th Infantry Regiment since the day it was first organized. But it is primarily the story of the men who fought under its colors during the last six months of the shooting war in Korea. It is the story of Tom, Dick, Harry, of the Eagle's Nest, Old Charlie, and finally Kumsong. It is the story of men who believed in the magic of the two words "Can Do". I shall always feel a sense of humility and pride when I think back on those days. You men of the 15th, inspired and humbled me simultaneously. I shall never forget your courage when the enemy concentrated as many as 25,000 artillery and mortar rounds on a single objective, and then followed up those devastating barrages with wave after wave of trained assault troops. You stood your ground, and even when your bunkers had been destroyed you fought with your bare hands. I shall never forget your loyalty to the regiment or your loyalty to your buddies. Typical of the latter was the four-hour battle you fought in the Chorwon Valley to recover two comrades who had been wounded in a patrol engagement You suffered patiently through the bitter cold of the early months of 1953. through the overpowering dust, the rains that flooded our positions. and finally set about building new positions in the extreme heat of July. All this is behind us. We have said good bye to our buddies who fell in the Korean hills. We are proud of the history of our regiment and honor the men who created the tradition we inherited Yet we can feel that by our actions we, too, have added glory, tradition, and lame to the can Do" regiment. To All of you-Americans, Greek and KATUSAS, I hope that this book will serve to remind you of some of the incidents which brought forth the unselfish devotion of man for man. Rarely, except in war, does one man lay down his life that another may live, Yet all of you were prepared to do this for your buddy and in a larger sense for your country.

God bless you all. R.F.AKERS, JR. (Signature)

...By mid-December 1952 the 3rd Division, with the 15th Infantry was again off line and entered into an intense training period.

As the year 1953 began, the 15th Infantry Regiment made preparations for a nine-week training program. Colonel Richard C. Stilwell, commanding, expressed a desire that the training be conducted in the same indomitable spirit as the defense of LINE MISSOURI had been in the previous three months. The regiment reorganized to accomplish its training mission with great success. Special regimental schools were initiated and put into operation during the first week of training, to include radio, wire, drivers and mechanic's schools. A forward observer school was initiated by the 39th Field Artillery Battalion, which was in direct support of the regiment, and trained approximately sixty observers from subordinate units.

Training continued until 28 January when the Third Infantry Division was ordered to relieve the Twenty-Fifth Infantry Division on LINE MISSOURI. The order directed the Fifteenth Infantry with attachments: GEF Battalion (Greek Expeditionary Force), Heavy Mortar Company (minus one platoon) of the 7th Infantry Regiment, and the 3rd Reconnaissance Company to relieve elements of the Thirty-Fifth and Fourteenth Infantry Regiments. Heavy Mortar Company and Tank Company of the 15th were positioned to support the

various battalions on line. By 0500 hours², 29 January 1953, Colonel Stilwell accepted responsibility for the regimental sector of LINE MISSOURI.

This sector included the new famous trio of outputs: TOM, DICK, and HARRY, and extended right (east). From the vicinity of Chorwon, Korea, at the base of the strategic "IRON TRIANGLE" in the east-central portion of the 155 mile Eighth Army line across Korea.

The regiment then occupied a four battalion sector³ with the 1st Battalion occupying the left sector with responsibility for Outpost TOM (sometimes called Hill 270), the 3rd Battalion occupying the left-central sector with responsibility for Outpost DICK, the 2nd Battalion occupying the right- central sector with responsibility for Outpost HARRY, and the GEF Battalion occupying the right sector with no outpost as such, but with an extremely rugged section of the Main Line of Resistance, including the "EAGLE'S NEST" to defend.

Third Reconnaissance Company attached to the 1st Battalion, occupied the right portion of the CHORWON VALLEY and the 1 Battalion was then given the mission of regimental reserve, utilizing one rifle company. In

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² 0500 hours: The army system is used throughout the narrative-12:00 midnight is 2400 hours, 12:00 hours is 1200 hours.

³ Four Battalion Sector: See picture of page 75.

accordance with the regimental policy of rotating companies on forward outposts, Company "A " relieves Company "C " on Outpost TOM, and Company "E" relieved Company's F " on Outpost HARRY on 12 February, and this policy of rotating the companies continued, to include Outpost DICK and the Main Line of Resistance positions.

Most of the time spent during daylight and darkness was utilized to rebuild and strengthen the front-line positions and the outposts. For the front-line trooper this meant dig, dig and dig. All of the outposts were reconstructed and strengthened by deepening the trenches and improving the fighting positions with overhead cover and larger structural supports. Company "B" 10th Engineer. C Battalion, in direct support of the 15th Infantry, aided materially with trained demolition teams and prefabricated bunkers, while a 24-hour construction program maintained by the line battalions, mover the Main Line of Resistance out of the swampy ground onto more tenable hill masses, requiring the construction of thousands of yards of trench and hundreds of new automatic weapons positions.

Patrol contacts during this period were limited to small skirmishes between small bands of CCF (Chinese Communist Forces) marauders and friendly ambush and reconnaissance patrols.

During the month of February, an intensive program of harassing and interdicting fires coordinating all of the

weapons available in the regimental sector was successfully employed to inflict extensive damage on the enemy. This program was built-up until it reached proportions unheard of it previous conflicts.

On 20 February 1953, General Maxwell D. Taylor, Commanding General of the Eighth Army visited the 15th Infantry Regiment. After a briefing by the regimental commander, General Taylor inspected Company "G" at its front-line position on LINE MISSOURI. Accompanying General Taylor on his visit were Lieutenant General Reuben E. Jenkins, Commanding General, IX Corps, and Major General George W. Smythe, Commanding General, 3rd Infantry Division.

The regiment was opposed at this time by elements of the 211th and 212th Regiments, 71 s CCF Division, 24th CCF Army. The 21 1st Regiment occupied positions on a hill mass known a CAMEL'S BACK and Hill 391, and a hill mass known as JACKSON HEIGHTS. The 212th Regimen had one battalion on line from Hill 472 to the STAR masses, with the other battalion on Hill 716. The enemy had dug extensive communications trenches on all key terrain, forward to the two main outposts in the area, DICK and HARRY. The majority of the enemy artillery fire fell on the three outposts, TOM, DICK, and HARRY and consisted of 76 mm, 105 mm, 120 mm and 82 mm rounds some harassing fire fell on front-line positions and important road junctions.

On 6 March 1953, the regimental CP and the GEF Battalion were visited by General Marl Clark, Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor, Lieutenant General Reuben E Jenkins, and Major General George W. Smythe. The visiting generals were briefed on the local tactical situation by the commanding officer, GEF Battalion Lt Col Koumanakos.

On March 10, 1953 Company E was relieved on Outpost HARRY by Company "G" and on 14 March Company "I" relieved Company "K" on Outpost DICK.

On 21 March, Colonel Russell P. Akers Jr. assumed command of the 15th Infantry Regiment, replacing Colonel Richard G. Stilwell, who had been regimental commander since 4 November 1952. Between 21 March and 24 March, a total of 3157 rounds of mixed mortar and artillery fell in the regimental sector. This marked a very definite increase in the enemy shelling which had been averaging 50 rounds per day during the month. Enemy shelling was concentrated on Outposts TOM and DICK.

During the month of March the Regimental Battle Patrol was organized as a volunteer force composed of 2 officers and 48 enlisted men. The mission of this special unit was to provide the regiment with a specially trained and equipped volunteer force capable of effective destruction of the enemy and for gaining vital enemy information. During the month, the battle patrol was

organized, trained, and employed with success on tactical missions.

During the month of March inclement weather provided an obstacle to movement and transportation in the regimental sector. Also, rain and melting snows took their toll of defensive works along the MLR, causing both trench-work and bunkers to collapse. Colonel Akers, the regimental commander instituted a rigorous Reconstruction schedule in his area with particular emphasis upon offsetting natural and enemy destruction. On 20 March, the high water on Hant'an-Ch'on River caused the bridge to be closed to vehicular traffic. On the same day, the 6th Cargo Helicopter Company transported loads of material and supplies to the forward areas. This was the first use of a cargo helicopter company by the Army in Korea to supply a front-line regiment.

On 23 March at 0500 hours, preceded by 86 rounds of 76 mm and 60 mm, a CCF platoon probed Outpost DICK, held by Company I. An intense firefight ensued which lasted 15 minutes. The results ware 7 CCF counted dead and 1 prisoner taken. This was the first prisoner of war taken by the division since the previous summer. April opened with elements of the 1st Battalion the left, commanded by Ma;. Avery; 3rd Battalion on the left center, commanded by Lt Col L.W. Shoeshine; 2nd Battalion on the right center, commanded by Maj. J.K Singlaub and the GEF Battalion on the right, commanded by Lt Col Koumanakos. The 2nd

Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment was made available as a regimental reserve force. On 1 April, Company "C", 10th Engineer (C) Battalion, relieved Company "B" 10th Engineer (C) Battalion, as the direct support engineer company.

On 3 April at about 0100 hours, intensive enemy artillery and mortar barrages began failing on Company "G", then occupying Outpost HARRY, the 2nd Battalion sector of the MLR. At 0105 hours, a strong enemy force assaulted Outpost HARRY; after a 3-hour-and-40-minute firefight, the enemy was forced to withdraw. Enemy casualties known and estimated were as follows: 95 KIA (Killed in Action), and 83 WIA (Wounded in Action). Two prisoners were taken. Between 1800 hours 2 April and 1800 hours 3 April, a total of 3329 rounds of mixed mortar and artillery fell across the regimental front. At 1905 hours the same day,

Company "F" relieved Company G on Outpost HARRY and assumed responsibility for the outpost mission, with Company G assuming responsibility for the 2nd Battalion right company sector of the MLR.

On 10 April at 0501 hours, Company "A" relieved Company "C" and assumed responsibility for Outpost TOM and MLR positions of the right company sector of the 1st Battalion. At 0900 hours the same day, Company C" became regimental reserve.

Enemy activity become much more pronounced after the first enemy attempt on Outpost HARRY, and it

became obvious that the enemy was about to make a concerted effort to improve his positions along the "IRON TRIANGLE" with the aim of making the present positions along LINE MISSOURI held by UN Forces untenable. Outposts TOM and HARRY were declared major outposts by Eighth US Army to be held at all costs, for both of these hills commanded approach routes to the southern accesses to Seoul and southern Korea.

On 16 April at 2185 hours, a reconnaissance patrol from Company "C" made contact with an estimated reinforced enemy company. During the resulting 7-hourand-14-minute fire fight, the friendly force inflicted the following casualties on the enemy: One KIA, twenty-five estimated KIA, and forty-five estimated WIA. On the same night, just after midnight, an estimated reinforced enemy platoon engaged two listening posts near Outpost TOM in a small arms and automatic weapons firefight.

After a 1-hour-and-5 minute firefight the enemy withdrew, leaving 2 KIA and 11 WIA.

On 20 April Company "C" relieved Company "B" on the MLR with Company "B" relieving Company "A" on Outpost TOM, and Company "A" assuming responsibility for the regimental reserve.

The second attempt against Outpost HARRY came at 2300 hours on 24 April when an estimated 800 round

TOT4 hit the outpost then occupied by Company "F". At 2304 hours an estimated CCF battalion engaged friendly forces in an intense small arms, automatic weapons and hand grenade firefight on the outpost. At 0100 hours on 25 April, a composite platoon from Headquarters Company, 2nd Battalion, and one platoon of Company "F" designated counterattacking force, closed Outpost HARRY. At 0130 hours the 2nd Platoon, Company "A" closed Outpost HARRY to assist in ejecting the enemy from the outpost. At 0215 hours the enemy disengaged and the firefight ceased. Immediately prior to and during the action, approximately 2000 rounds of mixed mortar and artillery were received on Outpost HARRY. A total of 4000 rounds of mixed mortar and artillery were received during the period. Enemy casualties were as follows: 35 counted KIA; 40 estimated KIA; 125 estimated WIA. Colonel Russell F. Akers Jr, the regimental commander, immediately took steps to insure that Outpost HARRY would continue to be held. On 25 April, Company "A" was attached to the 2nd Battalion, and at 1600 hours that day relieved Company" E "on the MLR so that Company "E" could relieve Company "F" on the outpost. Company "E" remained off line until 30 April, assimilating replacements and reorganizing, when they relieved Company "A" on the

⁴ TOT Time on Target; massed artillery fires.

MLR, assuming responsibility for the left sector in rear of Outpost HARRY. The burden of rebuilding the damaged outpost and sections of the MLR fell mainly on the infantry assisted by engineer specialist teams from Companies B and "C" of the 10th Engineer C Battalion. Outpost TOM came under major remodeling and rebuilding at this time, and the 3rd Platoon of Company "C", 10 Engineers assisted the 1st Battalion.

With the continued warm weather, the patrol actions increased in both size and intensity. Approximately at midnight on the 9th of May, a friendly patrol engaged an estimated 30 CCF in 15-minute small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenade firefight on the right side of Outpost TOM. The friendly patrol was forced to withdraw with two wounded, while the Chinese left four dead and took ten wounded from the field. On 10 May a friendly patrol dispatched to the left of Outpost TOM was engaged by an estimated two platoon CCF force in a 1 hour and 15 minute intense small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenade firefight. The patrol was reinforced by one squad from the Main Line of Resistance at 2210 hours, and both the patrol and reinforcing group were forced to withdraw to the MLR with the firefight continuing as they withdrew. Friendly casualties were 3 KIA and 5 WIA; enemy casualties were 50 WIA. The same night, after midnight, a 45 man screening force was dispatched to screen the site of the patrol action, and this group engaged an estimated CCF

squad in a short firefight, forcing the enemy from the field. Patrol actions continued in the CHORWON VALLEY and in the valley on the right side of Outpost HARRY. On 16 May a large number of Chinese were sighted moving in the vicinity of STAR HILL. Just after midnight an estimated enemy platoon-to-company-size force was sighted moving from STAR HILL to Outpost HARRY. A friendly artillery TOT was placed and all the defensive fires around Output HARRY were fired. No actual contact was made on HARRY, but approximately 500 rounds of enemy mortar and artillery fell on the outpost. Friendly artillery fires by the 39th Field Artillery Battalion, the 58th FA Battalion, the 9th Medium and 10th FA Battalions, and the 937th FA Battalion consisted of three TOTs on STAR HILL. Total enemy moving toward HARRY were estimated at 250 CCF. As a result of the devastating artillery and accurate small arms fire, the enemy lost 50 dead and 75 wounded, with friendly casualties at 6 dead and 2 wounded. This abortive attempt on the outpost guarding the right of the CHORWON VALLEY proved to the enemy that he must launch a massive attack if he wished to dislodge the 15th United States Infantry from this vital hill. During the night of 15-16 May, the regiment effected relief of the 2nd Battalion, 15th Infantry. With the 2nd Battalion, 65th Infantry, this was under operational control of the 15th On the night of 17-18 May the GEF for relief. Battalion relieved the 3rd Battalion in sector of

Outpost DICK. The 3rd Battalion reverted to regimental reserve for a short training program and work on the LINE WYOMING.

On 21 May a screening patrol accompanied by a war dog team was dispatched to the left side of Outpost TOM. This patrol preceded a company size raid, conducted by Company "B", which was dispatched from Outpost TOM with the mission of intercepting and destroying the enemy. At 2311 hours the screening patrol became engaged in a long range skirmish with the Chinese in the valley. The enemy withdrew with no one injured on either side. Again, just after midnight, Company "B" became engaged in a 20-minute firelight with an enemy platoon, forcing the enemy to withdraw, leaving two wounded on the field, who were captured. At the same time, other elements of Company "B" engaged another enemy platoon approaching their position from north and east. The firefight lasted approximately one hour, with the enemy withdrawing to the vicinity of JACKSON HEIGHTS. The enemy stragglers and small groups continued to harass until about 0400 hours. At 0220 hours the screening patrol turned into an ambush patrol and intercepted 40 to 50 CCF, and this firelight continued for an hour and 35 minutes. The total number of Chinese engaged thus amounted to a reinforced Chinese company. All of the separate actions, some proceeding at the same time as others, were supported by both friendly and enemy mortar and artillery fires, with

529 enemy rounds landing in the sector during the engagements. Friendly casualties for the complete action were 3 killed and 39 wounded, while enemy casualties were 14 counted dead, 24 estimated dead, 3 counted wounded and 40 to 50 estimated wounded. Nine CCF bodies were recovered. During this period the GEF Battalion occupied Outpost DICK, completing extensive work on automatic weapons positions, trench lines and overhead cover.

Early in the morning of 26 May, a friendly raiding party composed of elements of the 3rd Battalion commanded by Lt. Col. L. W. Shropshire, engaged an estimated 40 CCF on OLD CHARLIE, a Chinese outpost immediately in front of and on the same hill mass as the friendly outpost, DICK Supported by friendly artillery, mortar, and tank fire, the raiding party withdrew according to plan after twenty-five minutes, having destroyed the ammunition supply point and damaged or destroyed seven bunkers. Enemy casualties were 13 counted killed, 4 estimated killed, and 11 estimated wounded. The raiding party suffered three casualties, all lightly wounded. As this raid was supported by elements of all battalions of the regiment, and required the closest possible coordination, Colonel Akers, regimental commander, and Lt. Col. Shropshire, CO., 3rd Battalion, established forward Cps in a front-line position just opposite the objective and personally supervised this operation. Many psychological most successful

broadcasts were made to the Chinese during the month of May, with friendly artillery, mortar, and tank fire used to supplement and support the broadcasts. The weather continued excellent and supplies into the month of June, with occasional heavy rainfalls followed by extremely warm weather. The roads in the regimental area were well maintained by the 10th Engineer (C) Battalion and the status of supply was excellent.

After a short lapse, O.P. TOM was receiving small arms fire from the left-front, and the right-front. Defensive fires were placed around the outpost, and it was estimated that a Chinese company was in the vicinity of TOM. It was estimated that 35 to 40 enemies were killed by these fires. Three prisoners were taken during this action, two being seriously wounded, and one lightly wounded. Nine CCF bodies were recovered. A total of 680 rounds of enemy artillery and mortar fire fell on Outpost TOM during the night's action. During the night of 7 June, the 2nd Battalion, 15th Infantry, relieved the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, in the CHORWON sector.

On the evening of the second of June, Company P (Greek Expeditionary Force) ambush patrol engaged 30 to 35 CCF in a small arms firefight in the vicinity of OLD CHARLIE. After a 20-minute fight, the enemy withdrew and the friendly withdrew, regrouped, redistributed ammunition and returned. One Greek was wounded, while the Chinese suffered

four killed and five wounded. On the same evening and in the early morning hours of 3 June, a listening post from Outpost TOM engaged approximately three enemy squads in a small arms firelight, and the listening post was reinforced to three-squad size. The enemy disengaged and the listening post returned to the outpost



This picture was taken lately from the google/earth and shows the sector of 15th regiment and its sector Harry as they are today.

3. The SECTOR HARRY.

During the period 16 May to 5 June, the 15th Infantry had been relieved of responsibility for the Outpost HARRY sector by the reappearance of the 65th Infantry in the center of the 3rd Division sector. When reports from various higher staff sections had been correlated and evaluated, and the higher commanders were assured

beyond any reasonable doubt that Outpost HARRY was to be attacked by numerically superior Chinese force, it was ordered that the 15th Infantry Regiment, a more experienced and battle tried unit, be made responsible for the Outpost HARRY sector no later than the 6th of June. This was accomplished by relieving the 2nd Battalion, 65th Infantry, with the 3rd Battalion, 15th Infantry. The regiment prepared to meet the onslaught of the Chinese.

Following is a physical description of Outpost HARRY, for most of the action from 10-18 June centered around this vital hill

Outpost HARRY is situated some 425 yards northeast of the friendly MLR which is on a general southeast-northwest line from the CHORWON VALLEY to the KUMWHA VALLEY. The hill is approximately 1280 feet high and is located about 320 yards south, and part of a larger hill mass occupied by the enemy, referred to as STAR HILL. The outpost commands a good view of the enemy terrain and his avenues of approach to the MLR position. Since the elevation of the outpost is greater than that of any friendly-held terrain within an area of a mile, the position affords early warning of enemy approach to the main battle line



The road approach to the outpost from the MLR runs north along an intermittent stream to the rear of the outpost, where the supply point is located. From here, movements to the position must be accomplished dismounted.

The position itself contains a communication trench which runs from the supply point forward some 315 yards to the forward observer bunker on the northernmost slope. Here this trench joins another trench which makes a complete circle around the forward position of the outpost: this portion of the outpost is usually referred to as The Loop. Approximately 80 yards to the rear of The Loop, along a finger of the ridge running to the right side of the outpost, an additional trench extends for approximately 110 yards. This finger is mutually supporting with The Loop position and helps protect the

probable avenues of enemy approach into position. The left side of the outpost is steep enough to afford a natural barrier to the attacking enemv force. Aerial reconnaissance from 1 June to 8 June showed much increased enemy activity. This activity included construction of new anti-aircraft artillery positions, selfpropelled gun revetments, artillery positions, supply bunkers, personnel bunkers, a new bridge and road improvements along the enemy main supply route. An enemy offensive was obvious.

During the same period prior to the attack of 10 June, increased personnel sightings were reported during daylight hours. During periods of darkness, an increasing number of vehicle lights were reported, generally in the rear areas moving south and southwest toward the enemy's main battle positions. Prior to the attack CCF artillery battalions positioned to fire into the 3rd Infantry Division sector increased from an estimated 13% battalions with 108 pieces, to an estimated 15 battalions with 126 pieces; of these, 126 pieces were capable of firing into the division sector; 117 were either in position or were displaced forward so as to be in position to fire into the sector of the 15th Infantry Regiment. In addition, shell fragments picked up in the 15th Infantry sector disclosed the enemy to be employing the 102 mm rocket for the first time in this area. Also evident during the period was increased enemy counter battery fire on friendly artillery positions. Prior to this time, the enemy

had concentrated on harassing and interdicting fire on the main supply routes, friendly positions on the outpost line of resistance and on the main line of resistance. Incoming artillery and mortar rounds reported in the regimental sector increased from an average of 275 per day to 670 per day, during the 4 to 5 days prior to the initial attack on the outpost. During the attacks on HARRY, a tremendous volume of rounds fell in the entire regimental sector, including service units and regimental headquarters.

The enemy dispositions at this time were not pinpointed; however; it was well known that there were in contact two unidentified battalions of the 222nd Regiment, 74th Division, in the left sector, and two unidentified battalions of the 221st Regiment, 74th Division, in the right portion of the 15th regimental sector. The 221st Regiment, 74th Division was located in the sector immediately opposite Outpost HARRY. Reserves capable of intervention in the Outpost HARRY action were the two reserve battalions of regiments in contact with the 15th Infantry in the left sector, as well as three battalions of the 220th Regiment, unallocated, which were the 74th Division reserve.

Then began the concerted enemy drive which was to last for a week and was to cost the Chinese dearly for every engaged minute. At 1950 hours on the night of 10 June the first CCF sightings were reported, and each sighting was engaged by mortar and artillery

fire. At 2130 hours an ambush patrol west of Outpost DICK in the sector of the GEF Battalion reported Chinese numbering approximately 250 coming off JACKSON HEIGHTS (in front of Outpost TOM). Mortar and artillery began failing on the 15th Infantry MLR as well as Outposts DICK and HARRY. After a short but intense firefight in the vicinity of Outpost DICK, including 2,000 rounds of enemy artillery and mortar fire, the enemy withdrew. This was recognized as a probable enemy feint, and all units were alerted. At 2245, while attention was still focused on Outpost DICK, word came that the CCF were in the trenches on Outpost HARRY. Bitter hand to hand fighting was engaged in by members of Company "K", 15th Infantry, and the Chinese were killed or driven from the trenches. The Chinese reinforced their attack four more times during the early morning hours, and as late as 0430 hours, 11 June, were in the trench on the northern side of the outpost. In addition to a composite local reserve committed by the 3rd Battalion commander, Companies "I" and "C" 15th Infantry, were committed to reinforce. One platoon of tanks from Heavy Tank Company, 15th Infantry, and one platoon of infantry were committed to the valley east of Outpost HARRY as a diversionary force. This tankinfantry team proved to be of great value in canalizing the enemy attack. About 0530 the morning of the 11th, a daylight CCF attack in battalion strength was repulsed by

elements of the outpost. Art hour later, evacuation of wounded and dead began. This continued through the daylight hours. Colonel Russell F. Akers Jr, regimental commander, reorganized, placing Company "B", 15th Infantry, on the outpost, and placing responsibility for defense of this section on the 1st Battalion. The day continued with intermittent shelling of the outpost.

On 12 June at 0005 hours, intense mortar and artillery fire started along the MLR and on Outpost HARRY. At 0015 hours the Chinese moving through their own arid friendly artillery gained the trenches on the rear of the outpost; hand to hand fighting followed. At 0032 hours the CCF gained the trench on the northern slope of the outpost while friendly forces held the southern trench. Bitter fighting ensued and the CCF made numerous attempts to reinforce through the protective artillery ring. Company "B", 5th Regimental Combat Team, was used to reinforce. One platoon of Heavy Tanks Company, 15th Infantry, and one rifle platoon were dispatched to the valley east of Outpost HARRY as a diversionary force, and again this team was highly successful in canalizing the enemy attack. At daybreak, about 0545, the enemy withdrew and all action ceased. Evacuation of the wounded and dead was begun and Colonel Akers took immediate steps to reorganize for renewed attacks, placing Company "A", 5th Regimental Combat Team on the outpost.

On the night of 12 June at 2200 hours, enemy artillery and mortar fire preceded a CCF attack on the outpost which was broken up by friendly defensive fires. CCF were in the trench for a short time but were forced to withdraw. Fighting ceased at 2247. However, at 0208 the CCF attacked from the north, northeast, and northwest of the outpost. Bitter hand to hand fighting ensued as the enemy gained the trench art the northern slope of the outpost. Company "L", 15th Infantry, reinforced and by 0450 hours the enemy was driven from the trenches and was forced to withdraw. A platoon of tanks from the 64th Tank Battalion plus one platoon of infantry were dispatched to the valley east of Outpost HARRY and operated successfully as a diversionary force. All action ceased with the exception of friendly counter battery and counter mortar fire. Evacuation of wounded and dead was begun, and the regimental commander took immediate steps to reorganize for renewed attacks, placing Company "C" 15th Infantry, on the outpost.

Daylight hours were utilized to clean the trenches and refurbish the weapons' positions in anticipation of another attack during the hours of darkness. On the night of 13-14 June, at approximately 0255, enemy artillery and mortar fire preceded a CCF screening action against the outpost from the east and west for the purpose of protecting recovery of their dead. This screening force was broken up by friendly defensive fires. Action became sporadic, with light enemy artillery and mortar fire failing

on the outpost and the MLR. By 0440 the enemy withdrew and all action ceased. The regimental commander took immediate steps to reorganize for renewed attacks, placing Company "G" 15th Infantry, on the outpost.

During the night of I4-15 June, at about 0125, the Chinese moving through friendly artillery and defensive fires, gained the trenches on the rear of the outpost, and intense hand to hand fighting followed. At 0222 hours, friendly forces held the Outpost with the enemy reinforcing in the bitter hand to hand action. Company "E" 15th Infantry, was committed to reinforce. One platoon of tanks from Heavy Tank Company and one platoon of infantry were again dispatched as a diversionary force. At 0345 the enemy withdrew and all ceased; regimental commander action the reorganizing for new attacks, placed Company "A" 15th Infantry, on the outpost.

The night of 15-16 June was a quiet night on the outpost, and on the following morning the regimental commander placed the GEF Battalion (which had been relieved by elements of the 38th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Division, in the DICK sector)⁵ in the

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⁵ The red colour of letters is used from the author to show that from 10-15 of June, the Regimental Commander Col. Akers Jn. Was acting like a Battalion Commander sending on the O.P. HARRY a Company to defend the O.P. It was a fault of him. The O.P. itself was a defendind point for an Infatry company, but it couldn't resist alone in the Sector Harrry, Sector Harry was a Battalion Defending Sector

Outpost HARRY sector in order that his US battalions, all of which had suffered heavy casualties, could refit and reorganize. During the night of 16-17 June, there was no significant action, permitting much needed engineer work on the outpost to be accomplished by Company "P", GEF Battalion, and elements of Company "B" 10th Engineer (C) Battalion.

On the night of 17-18 June, the Chinese returned at about 0032 hours, moving through their own and friendly artillery and mortar fire to attack Outpost HARRY from the northeast and northwest. The enemy was repelled and was forced to withdraw, but stayed in the area. At 0240 the enemy attacked from the north under intense artillery and mortar fire. The CCF gained the trenches of the outpost on the northern slope at 0313. Bitter hand to hand fighting ensued with the enemy making numerous attempts to reinforce through the protective artillery ring. Company "N". GEF Battalion was committed to reinforce. One platoon of tanks from Heavy Tank Company, 15th Infantry Regiment, and one platoon of Greek Infantry were dispatched to the valley east of Outpost HARRY as a diversionary force. By 0402

and Col. Ackers saw that afterfive days and on the 15th of June asked from the Greek Commander Lt Col. George Koumanakos to go with Spartan's Battalion to cover the entire Sector Harry. And then came the wonder. Greeks won the CCF and kept the O.P. without deads.

hours the enemy was forced out of the trenches on the outpost, and all action ceased with the enemy withdrawing, having fired 22,000 rounds in support of his attack. Evacuation of the wounded and dead was begun and the regimental commander took immediate steps to reorganize for renewed attacks, which did not materialize. The enemy forces employed against Outpost HARRY during the period 10-18 June were tabulated by Intelligence Sections to be substantially as in the following table:

10-11 June A reinforced CCF regiment (appr. 3,600).

11-12 June A CCF regiment (approx. 2,850 CCF).

12-13 June A reinforced CCF regiment.

13-14 June An estimated 100 CCF.

14-15 June An estimated 120 CCF.

15-16 June Negative

16-17 June Negative

17-18 June A CCF regiment

During this period the entire 74th CCF Division was utilized against the position on and around Outpost HARRY; and at the end of the engagements, the 74th CCF: Division was considered to be combating ineffective. Enemy casualties for the period were 223 counted dead, 1,450 estimated dead, and 3,800 estimated wounded; while friendly casualties for the same action were 102 dead, 533 wounded, and 44 missing in action. Enemy rounds fired in support of their attack during the

period 10-18 June amounted to 88,810 rounds over 81 mm size; friendly mortar and artillery units, in conjunction with friendly tank fires were 368,185 rounds over 81 mm size.



The Map of the Regimental defending Secctor Was taken from the Google.

Due to the fact every line company of the 15th Infantry Regiment plus 3 line companies of the operationally attached 1st Battalion, 5th Regimental Combat Team, were utilized in the defense of Outpost HARRY, evacuation and casualty reporting was a major problem. With the large number of units involved and the necessity for rapid evacuation of the seriously wounded, the casualty reporting teams, in addition to gathering casualty information on the spot, covered every medical evacuation station as well as the helicopter evacuation service, which evacuated over 50 percent of the wounded

the first day. By staying abreast of the medical evacuation information, and comparing these figures by name with casualty reports of engaged units, maximum possible accuracy in reporting was achieved. In addition, clerical personnel were stationed at the Graves' Registration Section throughout this action to further assist in casualty reporting. The action ended with Company" N", GEF Battalion, on Outpost HARRY, and at 1730 hours on the 18th of June, the 2nd Battalion was moved into a reserve area. From this time until the Greek Battalion was relieved, they carried on an intense construction program on the outpost, which made it an almost impregnable bastion. During this period the 2nd Division was moved into the CHORWON area and assumed responsibility for what had been the two left battalion sectors of the 15th Infantry. The 3rd Battalion, 15th Infantry, moved into a blocking position behind the 65th Infantry. On 21 June, Company "O", GEF Battalion, relieved Company "N" on Outpost HARRY and assumed responsibility for the outpost mission. On 22 June, Company "K", 15th Infantry, relieved Company "F" 15th Infantry, in the left company sector behind HARRY on the MLR. Upon completion of the relief, Company "K' passed to operational control of the commanding officer, GEF Battalion, and Company "F" reverted to operational control of the 2nd Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment. At 0140, 25 June, the 2nd Battalion, 15th Infantry, relieved 3rd Battalion, the 65th Infantry, and assumed

responsibility for the assigned sector of the MLR (the sector to the immediate right or east of Outpost HARRY) with the 3rd Reconnaissance Company reverting to operational control of the 2nd Battalion, 15th Infantry. At 1200 hours on 25 June, the 3rd Battalion (-), 15th Infantry, closed into a new area and assumed responsibility for a blocking mission in the sector. At 2310 hours, 26 June, Company "F", 15th Infantry, relieved 3rd Reconnaissance Company and assumed responsibility for the sector mission.


On 3 July, the GEF Battalion which still had the responsibility for the Outpost HARRY sector, changed companies on the outpost, with Company "N" relieving Company "O" on the hill. On 8 July the process was reversed and Company "O" returned to the outpost. The night of 10 July had four CCF engaging Company "G" Listening Post Number Two in a three-minute small arms, automatic weapons and hand grenade firefight. The enemy withdrew, and there were no friendly or enemy casualties. At 2340 hours on 13 July, the Netherlands Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment, 2nd US Division, relieved the 3rd Battalion(-), 15th Infantry Regiment, and assumed responsibility for the blocking mission. At the same time Company "K", 15th Infantry, was released from control of Commanding Officer GEF Battalion and returned to control of its parent unit. At 0244 hours on 14 July, the 2nd Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment relieved the 2nd Battalion, 15 Infantry

Regiment, and assumed responsibility for the sector mission. At 0845 hours, on 14 July, Co "C", 23rd INF relieved Company "O", GEF Battalion and assumed responsibility for the outpost mission. At 0928 the 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry, relieved the GEF Battalion and assumed responsibility for the sector mission. At the same time the Commanding Officer 23rd Infantry, assumed responsibility for the GEF portion of the regimental sector, relieving the 15th Infantry.

Before the regiment was completely off line, and while some elements were still on the road to the new bivouac area, orders came to Colonel Russell F. Akers Jr. to move his "Can Do" Regiment again. A massive Chinese (estimated initial Chinese attack force committed: seven CCF Divisions) smashed against the front of the Capitol ROK (Republic of Korea) Division which was holding the right flank of the IX Corps in the KUMSONG sector. The attack started on the night of 13-14 July. By the morning of 14 July, the Capitol ROK Division had suffered heavy casualties and complete disruption of communication. The IX Corps Commander! Lieutenant General Reuben P. Jenkins decided to commit elements of the 3rd US Division in order to hold his right flank. At 0830 on 14 July the 15th Infantry Regiment was ordered to occupy blocking positions in the sector of the Capital ROK Division generally south a highway 117A establish contact with II ROK Corps units on the right! and protect the IX Corps' right (east) flank. By 1150,

leading elements of the 15th Infantry Regiment crossed their initial point of movement on the way to the blocking positions on LINE WYOMING (a supplemental line, giving depth to the position and a secondary line of defense.) The area occupied by the Capitol ROK, later to be known as the Kumsong Salient! was approximately 16 to 18 road miles east of the area from which the regiment had just been relieved. The last three to four miles of this road was being interdicted by the enemy, and the incoming artillery was taking a toll of ROK vehicles moving in the area.

Despite the hazards and difficulties encountered, the tactical Command Post was operating by 1500 hours the same afternoon. The battalions were quickly positioned on the unfamiliar terrain, with many of the units having no knowledge of the situation on the right or left flanks or to their front. However, after the 3rd Battalion closed their sector at 1645, 1 St Battalion closed at 2100 hours, and the GEF was in position by 2400 hours, with 2d Battalion in a blocking position by 1700 hours, 14 July. the right flank of the IX Corps sector had been anchored and secured. In order to obtain more information of the enemy, many patrols were dispatched from the position occupied by the battalions. (* See the map inside the cover.)



The four sectors of the 15th regiment on April 1953, with GEF defending the right sector, (the Nest of Eagle).

On 16 July, a friendly patrol engaged 6 CCF in a 5minute small arms firefight. The enemy withdrew. There were no friendly or enemy casualties. Early on the morning of the 17th of July, Companies "B" and "C" were attacked on the MLR by estimated 2 CCF reinforced companies. After an 1-hour-and-35-minute small arms and automatic weapons are fight, the enemy withdrew. Enemy casualties were: 40 counted killed. There was one prisoner taken. About 1505 the afternoon of the same day, 200 CCF were sighted about 500 yards to the front of Companies "E" and "F". Artillery and mortar fire was placed. One platoon of Company "P", GEF Battalion, was dispatched to the vicinity of the Chinese. A sporadic firefight followed which lasted until 1730, when all action ceased. Enemy casualties resulting from artillery and mortar fire and the GEF contact were 95 counted dead. There were 14 prisoners taken by the GEF Battalion in the action.

On 18 July Company "I " placed under operational control of the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, and on 19 July, Company "G" relieved Company "E" on the MLR and assumed responsibility for the sector mission. On 19 July also, the Capitol ROK Division came under control of the commanding officer, 15th Infantry Regiment, for the purpose of relief of a portion of the 15th Regimental sector. On the morning of 20 July, the 2nd Battalion was relieved by elements of the Cavalry Regiment, Capitol ROK Division, and responsibility for the sector mission passed to the relieving unit. A few minutes later, the GEF Battalion was relieved by elements of Cavalry Regiment and responsibility for the sector mission passed to the relieving unit.

Early on the morning, of the 22nd July, the 1St Battalion MLR positions were engaged in a long-range small arms firefight with an estimated CCF Company. By 0242 the CCF were attempting to disengage and the firing became sporadic. By 0320 the enemy disengaged and all firing ceased. At 1545, 22 July, the 2nd Battalion closed into a. blocking position south of KUMWHA, and came under the operational control of the commanding general, 3rd US Division.

At 1930 hours on 22 July, the GEF Battalion began relief of the 1st Battalion, and at 2323 hours, Company "P" GEF Battalion, patrol was engaged by an unknown number of CCF in a long-range small

arms firefight, in which both friendly and enemy employed artillery and mortar fire. After a 1 hour and 2 minute firefight, the enemy withdrew. The Greek patrol screened the area with negative results. At 0150, 23 July, the GEF Battalion completed relief of the 1st Battalion and assumed responsibility for the sector mission, and the 1st Battalion moved into a blocking position.

On the afternoon of 24 July, Company "K" reconnaissance patrol engaged 9 CCF in a 3 minute firefight. The patrol withdrew and called in friendly artillery fires. Enemy casualties were: I killed and I wounded. At 2250 hours on 25 July, an estimated Chinese battalion engaged Companies "K" and "I" 15th Infantry, on their MLR positions in a small arms, automatic weapons and hand grenade firefight with both sides employing artillery and mortar fire. An hour later the enemy withdrew and all friendly positions were secure. The enemy attack was launched simultaneously from the front, left and right. Friendly casualties were killed and 23 wounded. Enemy casualties were 20 counted dead, 40 estimated dead, and 100 estimated wounded. This was the most significant action in the 15th Infantry sector immediately preceding the effective date of the armistice.

At 0047 hours on 26 July, an estimated 20 CCF engaged 40 from Company "I" 15th Infantry, in a 3 minute firefight. Friendly troops were supported by


artillery and mortar fire. At 0050 the enemy withdrew. Friendly casualties were one wounded, while the enemy left one dead and fifteen wounded. This was the last action involving enemy contact in the 15th infantry Regimental sector prior to the effective date of the armistice. Four hours before the end of hostilities the 2nd Battalion reverted to control of the commanding officer, 15th Infantry, having been released by the commanding general, 3rd Division. Two hours later, the 2nd Battalion assumed responsibility far a sector mission.

At 2145 hours, 15 minutes before the effective time of the ceasefire, all of the 15th Infantry Regiment ceased firing. Heavy incoming artillery and mortar fire continued until 2150 hours on 27 July. The regiment then relieved elements of the Capitol ROK Division and again assumed responsibility for the sector between the Mule Trail, and Goat Trail including responsibility for the mission of construction of the new line, clearing the buffer zone of all military installations and equipment, and operating checkpoints on the edge of the demilitarized zone. This mission continued until 5 August when the regiment was relieved on the new line by the 160th Regiment, 40th US Division; and then the 15th Infantry Regiment, less Heavy Tank Company, which stayed until 12 August in support of the 160th Regiment, moved into a reserve area with its parent unit, for rehabilitation and training.

The infantryman may never relax his vigil nor his state of preparedness. In full realization of this fact, Colonel Russell P. Akers, commanding officer of the 15th Infantry Regiment instituted an intensive and rigorous training program designed to maintain the unit at the peak of combat readiness. The 15th United States Infantry Regiment has been called on many times in the past to defend our way of life against those who thought they could override and crush our institutions. Since it entered Canada in 1812 until its present tour in Korea as part of the United Nations effort, the 15th Regiment has typified the pride of American manhood and the American Army. Young men from every state in the nation, its territories and possessions have joined together in this great fighting outfit to give their all and share their common burden as defenders of their individual liberty. There is in the world today a force of such magnitude and power that it threatens the very existence of the Free World. That force made a bid for the country of Korea, and was frustrated in the attempt. That force, beyond a doubt will try again to engulf and destroy other sovereign nations, to enslave more millions to a false god and ideology, and will destroy individual freedoms so that the peoples may be subjugated to the State. When the attempt is made, the peoples of the Free World will again rise to defend their rights.

Colonel Russell F. Akers Jr Regimental commander.

Akers had an excellent view of the Lt. Colonel Koumanakos and at every opportunity he had to



COLONEL RUSSELL F. AKERS, JR. Regimental Commander: 21 March 1953 to 13 September 1953

show it. On the Greek anniversary of March 25, 1953, in a special report, he has written... (See the detachment on the next page)

But Koumanakos's greatest fame as a soldier came in the mountains of Korea in exploits that inspired his U.S. comrades. In an official report of March 25, 1953, Koumanakos's American superior officer, Col. R. E. Akers Jr. said:

"The Greeks are truly fierce soldiers... yet all their individual courage and resolution is best symbolized in their commander, Lt. Col. Koumanakos. He has constructed for himself an outlook... which is higher and nearer the enemy than any other post of a senior commander in Korea. Col. Koumanakos is my eagle. He goes to his battle position high above his soldiers each evening ... Col. Koumanakos would welcome a Communist attack."

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Lt. Martin Markley.

Captain Martin Markley was the Commanding officer of K Company (15th Inf.Reg. 3rd ID initially on the O.P. DICK, and then he moved and his Company manned OP HARRY, defending it. Until Jan.11, 1953.



Lt. Martin Markley himself who was severely wounded, had this picture taken of himself to send home to show his parents that he was OK.

Martin Markley

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Looking east across the Chorwon Valley towards Whitehorse Mountain in Korea during the winter of 1952 (Photo by Martin Markley)

Upon arrival in Korea late September 1952, I was assigned to the Third Infantry Division joining the 15th infantry Regiment in a reserve area. I assumed command of M Company and was informed that the battalion would move on line to the Iron Triangle area the next day. Following a quick reconnaissance of the new position, we moved on foot in the morning. After spending a night just to the rear of the MLR, we occupied the bunkers and trenches of the company relieved. All the heavy weapons were left in place. The first day was spent verifying and registering mortar concentrations and machine gun fields of fire with particular emphasis on the final protective fire plans. The sector we occupied extended from the railroad tracks on the West to the area by outpost Dick on the East. Action primarily consisted

of support by the 81mm mortar platoon. During a prolonged fire mission on Jackson Heights the tubes became overheated. The heat thawed the frozen ground which caused the base plates to sink. At times the heat of the tubes ignited the propellant charge. The battalion came off line near the end of December. During this short period, extensive training was conducted at all levels and equipment replaced as necessary. I spent one day as an umpire with Major Eisenhower judging the effectiveness of a Greek company's simulated combat attack. In preparation of moving back on line all 15th Infantry reconnaissance members replaced the 3ID patch with the 25ID patch and vehicles were temporarily marked as 25ID. The move on line was made at night by vehicle. As we settled into position the CCF, over loudspeakers, welcomed the 3ID back. Obviously, the CCF intelligence was better than our secrecy. The battalion was again in the Iron Triangle area. I was assigned to the battalion S3 section. During this time I worked with division artillery in development of coordinated fire plans to support a raid north along the railroad to Jackson Heights. I accompanied a unit raid that passed through Outpost Dick with the CCF's Old Charlie as the objective.

I assumed command of <u>K Company</u> in February while they were on line behind Outpost Dick and East across Happy Valley. K Company remained in this location until relieved by N Company of the Greek Battalion in Late May. Activities during this period was primarily night patrolling and improving the defenses. While in this area, I went on R&R to Japan and also was sent to a joint Army/Air Force coordination course. My Air Force roommate was Lt. Frank Borman, who became the first astronaut to circumnavigate the moon.

Following relief by the Greeks, the battalion went to reserve in Camp Phiney. During this time all equipment



Lt Martin Markley with Greek soldiers.


was inspected and replaced as necessary, and time was spent improving rear area defensive lines. On June 5th K Company was alerted to prepare for a move to Outpost Harry. Vehicles arrived later that day and the company went on Harry June 5, assuming responsibility from the 65th Infantry Regiment on 6 June.

The initial effort on Harry was to prepare for the anticipated CCF attack. With considerable help from the engineers the battle positions, bunkers, trenches, and barbed wire placements were improved. Every soldier acquainted himself with his defensive responsibilities. Artillery and mortar concentrations were verified and adjusted to ensure the best possible final defensive fire. On June 10, I was called to a meeting at headquarters. I was told of the imminent attack and informed that having more than enough points for rotation, I did not have to return to the outpost. Upon returning, everyone was briefed and the waiting began until heavy CCF artillery signaled the time had come. The company repelled two massive attacks by the CCF. With our ammunition running low, the CCF were able to enter the trenches and hand-to-hand combat ensued. VT artillery was called on the outpost and reinforcements drove the CCF from the outpost. I was evacuated with other wounded and was in the Tokyo Army Hospital when the truce went into effect...



The Iron Triangle

After moving on line, 2nd Lieutenants Edward Mueller and Jay Burgess were assigned to me. I assigned Mueller as machinegun platoon leader and Burgess as Recoilless Rifle platoon leader. Burgess retired from the Army as a colonel. Mueller later transferred to the regimental Battle Patrol. A Battle Patrol was a group of volunteers formed



at the regimental level. Most wanted to see more action than they were getting during the stalemate. Battle patrols were sent on special missions beyond the range of

normal ambush and listening patrols, often with the purpose of capturing a prisoner or getting new intelligence. The regiment did all the planning and all the soldiers were located at regimental headquarters. Mueller died while on Battle Patrol in May of 1953 from wounds received when he stepped on a land mine.

We provided fire support on a daily basis from the first day we arrived on the MLR. In December, we were firing the mortars so fast that the tubes became overheated and the base plates thawed the ground and sunk a few inches. We were able to replace all the tubes with new ones before the next morning. It was amazing how fast the rear troops re-supplied our ammunition when they were told that if we didn't get it right away, they would have the CCF in their front yard.

The battalion moved to a reserve area near the end of December. There, we conducted training and rested for about two weeks. I made a trip to Seoul with Warrant Officer Howard to get supplies and see the city. I saw only a few young men, and almost all buildings had been destroyed. I don't remember seeing any civilian vehicles.

I also spent one day as an umpire with Major Eisenhower. I was given a time, date, and place where I was to meet with him to assist him in evaluating the way in which a Greek company's members conducted themselves on a field exercise. Major Eisenhower stayed close to the company commander to watch his actions, and I was watching

how the platoons and individual soldiers executed the orders. The plans and orders seemed appropriate, but some soldiers did not take the exercise seriously. At one point, they took time to dig up a Korean grave because they heard that Koreans were buried in a sitting position. I didn't ask them what they learned. I doubt that Major Eisenhower's report mentioned it.

About a month after I got to Korea, I saw my first dead enemy. He was brought in by men from a rifle company patrol. It had very little effect on me. I was glad that it was not an American soldier. About the same time, I saw my first dead American serviceman. My feelings were much different then. I saw him die in the battalion aid station. It was a very sad thing to watch.

When I first arrived in Korea, the weather was initially mild. It was comfortable fall weather until late November Then in December, it snowed temperatures were below zero, just like home in Wyoming. The cold could affect our weapons if we did not care for them. A light application of oil was a big help. We had winter clothing, bunkers, and space heaters, so the main problem in keeping personnel warm was to keep moving when outside. A thaw came after the cold winter, and then it rained in April. To survive the cold, I wore long underwear, winter trousers, parka, mittens, a cap with ear flaps under a helmet, and thermal boots. When summer came, I wore fatigues.

The entire time I was in Korea, we were in the same general area--sometimes on the MLR and sometimes in the rear. The area known as the "Iron Triangle" was north of the 38th parallel about twenty miles from Seoul. It was one of the most critical areas because it blocked the route of the CCF to Seoul. I was in the neighboring area of Chorwon. Once reported to be a city of about 800,000, now there were only the shells of three buildings remaining. A railroad used to run through the valley connecting North and South Korea. In that area, the 65th Infantry had fought a memorable battle in 1952. The hill involved was named Jackson Heights after the company commander, George Jackson. The CCF held the hill all the time I was in Korea. This placed them higher than our troops, so they limited our movement. Outposts Tom, Dick, and Harry were in this area. Happy Valley was a part of the MLR that started close behind OP Dick going east toward Harry. It was about 200 yards across to the next hill mass. It was flat and anyone there was in full view of the CCF on Charlie. Anyone moving in that area was fired on by the CCF. The name "Happy Valley" was facetious. The area was the defensive responsibility of the K company platoons.

Outposts Tom, Dick, and Harry were all in front of the MLR about 400-500 yards. The direction from Tom to Dick and Harry was east. To the west of Tom were the railroad tracks mentioned above. The MLR was the main line of defense, where the major defense of the area took place. Outposts were established in front of the MLR to delay or disrupt the enemy advance. Most outposts, located in an area known as "No Man's Land," were held as long as possible. But in June of 1953, orders would come down that Harry was to be held at all costs.

Prior to our defense of Outpost Harry, during the first week of January 1953, we returned to the same area we had occupied previously. In preparation for moving back on line, all 15th Infantry reconnaissance members replaced the 3ID patch on our shirts with the 25ID patch in order to hide our identity so the CCF and suspected spies/informants who might be in the area would not think that the 25th was being relieved/replaced. (All armies like to know where opposing units are, and armies like to keep the other side guessing.) The vehicles used to take us to the line were temporarily marked as 25ID while we were in reserve. Meanwhile, our counterparts of the 25ID showed us the entire area where we would go, including weapons positions. The 3rd Battalion was loaded on vehicles at night, and the move on line was made at night in blackout conditions. As we unloaded, settled into position, and the 25ID left, the CCF welcomed the 3ID back over their loudspeakers. Obviously, the CCF intelligence was better than our secrecy. The battalion was again in the Iron Triangle area. On 7 February I was assigned as battalion assistant S2, then assistant S3. I helped plan two raids on the CCF. Planning a raid entailed purpose, objective, routes

of movement to and from the objective, time of and length of mission, coordination with other units, fire support, enemy positions, weather, type of troops, and equipment needed. We had aerial support from division with light aircraft L-19 for reconnaissance. (Fighter bombers dropped 500 pound bombs concentrations to our front.) I flew in one over the CCF Outpost Charlie, and then I accompanied "I" company on the ground when they raided OP Charlie. Another raid (at Chorwon) was aborted when our tanks could not move forward. The objective was to have a flanking attack on Jackson Heights. It was planned for the tanks to use a railroad track bed, but the CCF forced them off with heavy artillery fire. The adjacent rice paddies would not support the weight of the tanks.

The raid on Charlie was not successful because the enemy was too well entrenched and had more troops than we did. We had four wounded in action during that raid. There were casualties at other times, too. Men from my company were wounded and/or killed while on patrol and on the MLR from artillery. Sgt. Bernard Perry was one of the medics for K Company who tended to our casualties. I saw him and the other medics administer first aid while under fire. Fighting was almost always at night. In mid-February, I was sent to Outpost Dick to get a report after a repulsed attack by the CCF. I saw a couple of mutilated Chinese soldiers there. Actually, mutilated isn't a good word. That was my immediate

reaction to what I saw. Some of the CCF were nude and partially burned from phosphorous grenades. I think it could have been avoided. The location of the burns was



in a place that was not possible except by a soldier after the battle. It was during this time frame that a call came to battalion from OP Tom that they needed some medical supplies. A large box of supplies was put together, and someone said it would be taken to them that night when dark. I thought it a better idea to take them immediately. I volunteered to take them and was given permission. From the MLR to OP Tom was all open area and under the observation of the CCF. I was alone and on foot, carrying the box of medical supplies. About halfway to Tom, artillery landed in front of me, then behind me, then in front. It was time for them to make final adjustments, so I hastily found a huge boulder and waited behind it until there was a lull, then quickly finished my trip to Tom This was the time over all other times when I felt I was in the most personal danger in Korea, excluding the events that happened on Outpost Harry a few months later.

March - June 1953

When the company commander of K Company rotated home in March, I asked for and was given command of the company. I had been on battalion staff from February 7 to March 10, but I enjoyed duty with a company more than being on a staff. I liked working with a unit and seeing first hand the accomplishments. Duty with a unit involved leadership. Duty as staff was more of a planning nature. When I became commander, "K" company had an outstanding Executive Officer in 1st Lt. George Richards. He was killed on Outpost Harry the night of June 10-11 while we were defending the company command post.

After becoming K Company CO, we remained in the same position until the near end of May. I received "Rest and Recuperation" (R&R) and went with our battalion surgeon, Dr. Roberto Fortuno, and 2nd Lieutenant Pavalosky to Tokyo. I went to Camp Fuji and visited my friends in the 34th Infantry Regiment. This must have been sometime in April. I dated the slides that I took as May, but that was after I took them, mailed them to Hawaii for processing, and they were returned to me. Kodak provided all that as a free service, and mailing was free, too. I captioned, dated, and sent the slides to my mother and father so they knew about my activities.

Also in April, I was sent to Johnson AFB in Japan to attend a Joint Air/Ground Coordination course for one

week. Infantry officers were paired with Air Force officers, and they shared a room. My roommate was 1st Lieutenant Frank Borman, later a NASA astronaut and first to circumnavigate the moon. The next time I saw him was in California in 1963. The course involved the types of air support and means to get support at the front lines.

During the March, April, and mid-May time period, the regiment was in a defensive position. K
Company was in the same location all the time I commanded it until relieved by the Greeks. My company conducted patrols almost every night. We also deepened trenches to more than six feet, which was a major project. Engineers assisted by dynamiting boulders. A trench was dug from the MLR out to OP Dick. We used Korean laborers to do that trench at night. Prior to then, movement to the outpost was restricted to the west side of the ridge leading to the outpost. Bunkers were reinforced and rebuilt. Additional barbed wire was put in.

Harassing fire from artillery and the battalion was increased on OP Charlie. The CCF and K company soldiers exchanged small arms fire on a daily basis. Both the CCF and my company had patrols between OP Charlie and the MLR. During this time frame, Assistant Division CG Brigadier General Wilbur Dunkleberg visited K Company on a monthly basis. I had met him in Japan when I commanded L Co., 34th Infantry Regiment,

during the field tests. I later saw him when I was at Ft. Ord. His visits to K Company were welcome. He went through the chow line with the soldiers. He said that he liked coming to K Company because the food was better than at division.

I recall that one night 2nd Lieutenant Brock Lippitt, a K company platoon leader, went with me to check the company listen posts. The listen posts were in front of the MLR, but not as far as OP Dick. We approached the listening posts from the enemy side. We found one guard asleep. For endangering the safety of the company and sleeping on guard duty, he was later tried by a military court at division headquarters.

K Company was relieved by a company from the Greek Expeditionary Forces (GEF). The Greeks were fearless, reckless, and brave. I stayed with them one night when they relieved K Company. One of their soldiers was slightly wounded, so they had a celebration for him. There was no food, but I recall that there was a lot of yelling and shouting that night. It seemed like it was a tradition that the first warrior to be wounded in battle was a hero in their eyes. It was part of their culture, I guess.

Relief by the Greek was orderly and without any problems. Other than the Greeks, no troops from other nations served near my company.

However, I know that a battalion from Belgium was attached to the 7th Infantry Regiment of the 3ID. Our company had Korean soldiers as part of the unit KATUSA. (I think that was "Korean Army to US Army".) I paid them in Korean money. All were good soldiers and some had been with American units for over two years.

Time on the MLR was not always spent in battle. There was a lot of waiting for things to happen, too. I recall that in April, two sergeants from I company got tired of waiting, and took matters into their own hands. I company was attached to K company to man Outpost Dick. Probably sometime during the March-April time frame, these two sergeants said they just got tired of sitting on the outpost, so on their own, they walked up to Charlie around noon. They were not noticed by the CCF until they reached the CCF trenches. They opened fire, killing several CCF, then returned to Outpost Dick. They were awarded Silver Star medals. Lt Col Shropshire, the battalion CO, was upset about them doing it on their own, but got the awards for them nevertheless.

K and L companies went into Reserve at Camp Piney for about two weeks around May 20. I don't recall the exact date. Time never seemed important then. One day was like the rest. I was CO of Camp Piney while we were there. The company lived in tents and slept on cots. We had three meals each day. All weapons were inspected, repaired, or replaced by the ordnance company

if necessary. The men played volleyball and mostly rested. One day, beer rations were provided for everyone. A couple of times the company was trucked to the Wyoming Line, a defensive position between the MLR and Seoul that would be used if the UN had to withdraw. The trenches there were deepened.

I was promoted to Captain at the end of May. I also received the Bronze Star for meritorious service for the period March to June 1953. I was doing my duty and apparently better than some other COs, but the fact that there were not any major battles, giving K company time to improve its defensive position faster and better than the other companies, might have had something to do with it, too. The Regimental CO Col. Russell Akers inspected K company a few days before Harry. He told the men that they were members of the best company in the regiment.

The Advent of Harry

Shortly thereafter, K company went back on the line, defending that part of the regimental sector that included Chorwon Valley, and Outposts Tom, Dick, and Harry. Prior to the 10th, I had not been aware that something big was about to happen, although the activity at Camp Piney getting equipment in shape indicated something unusual was up. On June 5th, K Company was alerted to prepare for a move to Outpost Harry. Vehicles arrived later that day and the company went on

Harry June 5, assuming responsibility from the 65th Infantry Regiment on 6 June.

Outpost Harry was situated some 425 yards northeast of the friendly MLR which was on a general southeast-northwest line from the Chorwon Valley to the Kumwha Valley. The hill was approximately 1280 feet high and was located about 320 yards south. It was part of a larger hill mass occupied by the enemy, referred to as Star Hill. The outpost commanded a good view of the enemy terrain and his avenues of approach to the MLR position. Since the elevation of the outpost was greater than that of any friendly-held terrain within an area of a mile, the position afforded early warning of enemy approach to the main battle line.

The road approach to the outpost from the MLR ran north along an intermittent stream to the rear of the outpost, where the supply point was located. From there, movements to the position had to be accomplished dismounted.

The position itself contained a communications trench that ran from the supply point forward some 315 yards to the forward observer bunker on the northernmost slope. There, the trench joined another trench, which made a complete circle around the forward position of the outpost. The position of the outpost was referred to as "The Loop." Approximately 80 yards to the rear of The Loop, along a finger of the ridge running to the right side of the outpost, was an additional trench that extended

approximately 110 yards. That finger was mutually supporting with The Loop position and helped protect the probable avenues of approach into position. The left side of the outpost was steep enough to afford a natural barrier to the attacking enemy forces.

The initial effort on Harry was to prepare for the anticipated CCF attack. With considerable help from the engineers, the battle positions, bunkers, trenches, and barbed wire placements were improved. Napalm was placed on the hillside. Every soldier acquainted himself with his defensive responsibilities. Artillery and mortar concentrations were verified and adjusted to ensure the best possible final defensive fire. A few replacements had arrived during the days before we moved up to Harry. They did very well for newcomers.

The siege of Outpost Harry actually began when K Company got there June 5 about 0500. Nearing the end of the war, the CCF wanted ground. If they could take Harry, they might reach Seoul in a couple of days. The CCF fired at us with artillery, mortars, and rifles whenever we moved. When it was dark, the entire company was on alert. Searchlights were used to illuminate the CCF Star position all night. Listening posts were outside the perimeter of Harry as early warning. Sleeping was done only during daylight and the men shared the daytime alert.

There were unsuccessful small CCF squad and platoon size probes every night. This helped the CCF to learn where our weapons were located. There were three K company men killed during this time frame. The men were confident and went about work as usual, but with more caution of incoming fire and minor fire fights at night than in our position on the MLR. I, too, was fine.



Being a more confined area than the MLR, I was able to see everything being done all the time. I worked hard with our forward observer, 2nd Lt. Sam Buck, to get the artillery concentrations where I wanted them. He still remembers one that I brought too close.

Aerial reconnaissance from 1 June to 8 June showed much increased enemy activity. This activity included construction of new anti-aircraft artillery positions, selfpropelled gun revetments, artillery positions, supply bunkers, personnel bunkers, and a new bridge and road

improvements along the enemy main supply routes. An enemy offensive was obvious. During the same period prior to the attack of 10 June, increased personnel sightings were reported during daylight hours. During the period of darkness, an increasing number of vehicle lights were reported, generally in the rear areas moving south and southwest toward the enemy's main battle positions. Prior to the attack, CCF artillery battalions positioned to fire into the 3rd Infantry sector disclosed the enemy to be employing 102mm rocket for the first time in this area. Also evident during this period was increased enemy counter battery fire on friendly artillery positions. Incoming artillery and mortar rounds reported in the regimental sector increased from an average of 275 per day to 670 per day, during the four to five days prior to the initial attack on the outpost. During the attacks on Harry, a tremendous volume of rounds fell in the entire regimental sector, including service units and regimental headquarters. Siege of Outpost Harry I was called off Harry on June 10 and briefed on the anticipated CCF offensive. I was also told that I had more than enough points to rotate out, and that I did not have to go back up to the outpost. My time in Korea had probably expired in April, but I think that someone forgot to include the twelve points I earned by being in Japan before Korea. In my way of thinking, K company was still my company. I could not run out when the biggest challenge came. I don't believe a company CO should ever leave under

those conditions. Once I got back up on Harry, I informed everyone that a major attack was anticipated. No one had a hard time; although they might have if we had known how "major" this major attack was going to be. There was no time to formally prepare the troops spiritually for the possibility of their death in the battle that was about to take place. They could only prepare themselves personally. As to readying ourselves militarily for a big battle, we had prepared from the time we went on the outpost June 5. We were better prepared with each passing day. Additionally, on the day of the attack, 500 pound bombs were dropped on CCF concentrations to further help us contend with approaching enemy forces. Our planes also dropped flares so we could watch enemy movement.

Throughout the remainder of the afternoon, we checked weapons, ammo, and communications. We had the standard weapons of machineguns, rifles, pistols and grenades. A few weapons jammed because of the dirt from incoming artillery as the big battle started and progressed, but overall, everything worked well. The men took their positions in the bunkers. Besides members of K Company, there were forward observers and machine gunners from M Company on OP Harry. They reinforced on the 11th, as well as companies "E" and "C" of the 15th Infantry. Lieutenant Richards, Lieutenant Buck, Sergeant Miller (I think), and I were in the command post. It was square, approximately ten feet by

ten feet and probably eight feet high. It was made of prefabricated twelve inch by twelve inch timbers, dirt, and sandbags, with rocks on top. There was one entrance off the trench leading into the CP. I think there were three wooden benches on three sides, long and wide enough for sleeping.



The O.P. Harry

According to the 15th Infantry after Action Report on OP Harry, at 1950 hours on the night of 10 June, the first CCF sightings were reported. Each sighting was engaged by mortar and artillery fire. The men who were on the listening posts in front of Harry returned to our bunkers and trenches under heavy enemy fire. The CCF had begun its offensive--one continuous big push. At 2130 hours, an ambush patrol west of OP Dick in the sector of the Greek Battalion reported Chinese numbering

approximately 250 coming off of Jackson Heights in front of OP Tom. Mortar and artillery began falling on the 15th MLR, as well as outposts Dick and Harry. After a short but intense firefight in the vicinity of Outpost Dick, including 2000 incoming rounds of enemy artillery and mortar fire, the enemy withdrew. This was recognized as a possible enemy feint, and all units were alerted. At 2245, while attention was still focused on Outpost Dick, word came that the CCF were in the trenches on Outpost Harry. In the CP, Lieutenant Richards helped with communication to the K company platoons while Lieutenant Buck directed artillery fire. I communicated with battalion and the platoons, and relayed CCF information to Buck until the phone and radio lines were cut by the enemy.

The enemy disposition at this time was not pinpointed; however, it was well known that there were in contact two unidentified battalions of the Chinese 22nd Regiment, 74th Division in the left sector, and two unidentified battalions of the 221st Regiment, 74th Division the right portion of the 15th regimental sector. The 221st Regiment, 74th Division, was located in the sector immediately opposite Outpost Harry. Enemy reserves capable of intervention in the Outpost Harry action were the two reserve battalions of regiments in contact with the 15th Infantry in the left sector, as well as three battalions of the 220th Regiment, not located, which were in the 74th Division reserve. All total, there

was a reinforced CCF regiment of approximately 3,600 enemies trying to kill us. A section of the Presidential Unit Citation that K Company later received best explains what happened in the siege: "Enemy assaults ranging from company size to a reinforced regiment were directed against the company's position in repeated waves in a desperate attempt to take the critical outpost (Harry). By massing his strength in depth, the enemy was at times successful in penetrating friendly positions but was consistently pushed back by members of this company following rigorous hand to hand combat. On the night of 10 June, a reinforced regiment, employing small arms fire, automatic weapons and grenades, and supported by 20,000 rounds of artillery fire and mortar fire, launched the initial assault of a series of new attacks on the position. Although having sustained over 200 casualties in their initial attempt to overtake the outpost, the enemy was determined to seize the key terrain at all costs and charged repeatedly throughout the night of 10 June and the following morning. During the height of the battle the trenches at times were overrun, but met with the inspired close-in fighting of the beleaguered but courageous members of Company K, the enemy was ultimately repelled from the position. The extraordinary heroism of the members of Company K, 15th Infantry Regiment, 3d Infantry Division, in fulfilling their assigned mission reflects great credit on themselves and upholds the highest traditions of the military service."

As the siege continued, we were vigorously keeping the CCF out of the CP. Between issuing orders and gathering and relaying information, we were all shooting as many of the enemy as we could as fast as we could. I was knocked unconscious by a penetrating missile (shell fragments) to my skull. When I regained consciousness, the CCF were in the CP bunker talking. I was not aware whether or not Lieutenant Richards or Lieutenant Buck was alive. I had something in my throat and I could not keep from coughing, although I knew it would alert the CCF that I was alive. It was dark and I could not see anything. After hearing me, a CCF soldier fired one round, shattering my right elbow. I could feel the bullet enter and exit. I did not make a sound, so they assumed I was dead. My thoughts were that I hoped I could be quiet so that I would not be shot again, and I was conscious enough to be concerned about my men.

After the CCF left the CP, Sam Buck gave me the first immediate medical assistance. I don't remember Sam administering first aid, and I don't remember talking to him. Maybe I had lapses of consciousness. Maybe it seemed routine. And maybe I've blocked more out than I realize

KOREA - JUNE 10 - JUNE 18, 1953 OUTPOST HARRY

(This is the official report of the 3rd Infantry Division of the USArmy. This report was posted to the Internet, by Martin Markley, commanding officer of K Company, 15th regiment.

"During the period 16 May to 5 June, the 15th Infantry had been relieved of its responsibility for the Outpost HARRY sector. When reports from various higher staff sections had been correlated and evaluated, and the higher commanders were assured beyond any reasonable doubt that Outpost HARRY was to be attacked by numerically superior Chinese force, it was ordered that the 15th Infantry Regiment, a more experienced and battle tried unit, be made responsible for the Outpost HARRY sector no later than the 6th of June. This was accomplished by relieving the 2nd Battalion 65th Infantry, with the 3rd Battalion, 15th Infantry. The regiment prepared to meet the onslaught of the Chinese.

Following is a physical description of Outpost HARRY, for most of the action from 10-18 June centered around this hill. Outpost HARRY is situated some 425 yards northeast of the friendly MLR which is on a general southeast-northwest line from the CHORWON VALLEY to the KUMWHA VALLEY. The hill is approximately 1280 feet high and is locate about 320 yards south, and part of a larger hill mass occupied by the enemy, referred to as STAR HILL. The

outpost commands a good view of the enemy terrain and his avenues of approach to the MLR position. Since the elevation of the outpost is greater than that of any friendly held terrain within an area of a mile, the position affords early warning of enemy approach to the main battle line.

The road approach to the outpost from the MLR runs north along an intermittent stream to the rear of the outpost, where the supply point is located. From here, movements to the position must be accomplished dismounted.

The position itself contains a communications trench which runs from the supply point forward some 315 yards to the forward observer bunker on the northernmost slope. Here the trench joins another trench which makes a complete circle around the forward position of the outpost; this position of the outpost is referred to as The Loop. Approximately 80 yards to the rear of The Loop, along a finger of the ridge running to the right side of the outpost, an additional trench extends approximately 110 yards. This finger is mutually supporting with The Loop position and helps protect the probable avenues of approach into position. The left side of the outpost is steep enough to afford a natural barrier to the attacking enemy force.

Aerial reconnaissance from 1 June to 8 June showed much increased enemy activity. This activity included construction of new ant-aircraft artillery positions, self-

propelled gun revetments. Artillery positions, supply bunkers, personnel bunkers, a new bridge and road improvements along the enemy main supply routes. An enemy offensive was obvious.

During the same period prior to the attack of 10 June, increased personnel sightings were reported during daylight hours. During the period of darkness, an increasing number of vehicle lights were reported, generally in the rear areas moving south and southwest toward the enemy's main battle positions. Prior to the attack CCF artillery battalions positioned to fire into the 3rd Infantry sector disclosed the enemy to be employing 102mm rocket for the first time in this area.

Also evident during this period was increased enemy counter battery fire on friendly artillery positions. Incoming artillery and mortar rounds reported in the regimental sector increased from an average of 275 per day to 670 per day, during the 4 to 5 days prior to the initial attack on the outpost. During the attacks on HARRY, a tremendous volume of rounds fell in all of the regimental sector, including service units and regimental headquarters.

The enemy disposition at this time were not pinpointed; however; it was well known that there were in contact two unidentified battalions of The 22nd Regiment, 74th Division, in the left sector and two unidentified battalions of the 221st Regiment, 74th

Division, in the right portion of the 15th regimental sector. The 221st

Regiment, 74th Division was located in the sector immediately opposite outpost HARRY. Reserves capable of intervention in the outpost HARRY action were the two reserve battalions of regiments in contact with the 15th Infantry in the left sector, as well as three battalions of the 220th Regiment, unlocated which were in the 74th Division reserve.

Then began the concentrated enemy drive which was to last for a week and was to cost the Chinese dearly for every engaged minute. At 1950 hours on the night of 10 June the first CCF sightings were reported, and each sighting was engaged by mortar and artillery fire. At 2130 hours an ambush patrol west of OP DICK in the sector of the Greek Battalion reported Chinese numbering approximately 250 coming of JACKSON HEIGHTS (in front of OP TOM). Mortar and artillery began falling on the 15th MLR as well as outposts DICK and HARRY. After a short but intense firefight in the vicinity of Outpost DICK, including 2000 rounds of enemy artillery and mortar fire, the enemy withdrew. This was recognized as a possible enemy feint, and all units were alerted. At 2245, while attention was still focused on Outpost DICK, word came that the CCF were in the trenches on Outpost HARRY, Bitter hand to hand combat was engaged in by members of Company "K", 15th

Infantry and the Chinese were killed or driven from the trenches. The Chinese reinforced their attack four more times during the early morning hours, and as late as 0430 hours 11 June, were in the trench on the northern side of the outpost. In addition to a composite reserve local reserve committed by the 3rd battalion commander, Companies "E" and "C" 15th Infantry were committed to reinforce. One platoon of tanks from Heavy Tank Company, 15th Infantry, and one platoon of infantry were committed to the valley east of Outpost HARRY, as a diversionary force. This tank-infantry team proved to be of great value in channelizing the enemy attack.

About 0530 the morning of the 11th, a daylight CCF attack in battalion strength was repulsed by elements of the outpost. An hour later, evacuation of dead and wounded began. This continued through the daylight hours. Colonel Russell F. Akers Jr., Regimental commander, reorganized placing Company "B", 15th Infantry, on the outpost, and placing responsibility for defense of this section on the 1st Battalion. The day continued with intermittent shelling of the outpost.

On 12 June at 0005 hours the Chinese moving through their own and friendly artillery gained the trenches in the rear of the outpost: hand to hand fighting followed. At 0032 hours the CCF gained the trench on the northern slope of the outpost while friendly forces held the southern trench. Bitter fighting ensued and the CCF made numerous attempts to reinforce through the

protective artillery ring. Company "B", 5th Regimental Combat Team, was used to reinforce. One platoon of tanks from Heavy Tank Company, 15th Infantry, and one platoon of infantry were committed to the valley east of Outpost HARRY. as a diversionary force and again this force was highly successful in channelizing the enemy attack. At daybreak, about 0545 hours, the enemy withdrew and all action ceased. Evacuation of the wounded and dead was begun and Colonel Akers took immediate steps to reorganize for renewed attacks, placing Company "A" 5th Regimental Combat Team on the outpost.

On the night of 12 June at 2200 hours, enemy artillery and mortar fire preceded a CCF attack on the outpost which was broken up by friendly defensive fires. CCF were in the trench for a short time but were forced to withdraw. Fighting ceased at 2247. However at 0208 the CCF attacked from the north, northeast, and northwest of the outpost. Bitter hand to hand fighting ensued as the enemy gained the trench on the northern slope of the outpost. Company "L", 15th infantry, reinforced and by 0450 hours the enemy was driven from the trenches and forced to withdraw. A platoon of tanks from the 64th Tank Battalion plus one platoon of infantry were dispatched to the valley east of outpost HARRY and operated successfully as a diversionary force. All action ceased with the exception of friendly counter battery and counter mortar fire. Evacuation of wounded and dead

was begun, and the regimental commander took immediate steps to reorganize for renewed attacks, placing Company "C", 15th Infantry, on the outpost.

Daylight hours were utilized to clean the trenches and refurbish weapons' positions in anticipation of another attack during the hours of darkness. On the night of 13-14 June, ant approximately 0255, enemy artillery and mortar fire preceded a CCF screening action against he outpost from the east and west for the purpose of protecting recovery of their dead. This screening force was broken up by friendly defensive fires. Action became sporadic, with light enemy artillery and mortar fire falling on the outpost and MLR. By 0440 the enemy withdrew and all action ceased. The regimental commander took immediate steps to reorganize for renewed attacks, placing Company "G", 15th infantry on the outpost.

During the night of 14-15 June, at about 0125 the Chinese moving through friendly artillery and defensive fires, gained the trenches on the rear of the outpost, and intense hand to hand fighting followed. At 0222 hours, friendly forces held the outpost with the enemy reinforcing in the bitter hand to hand action. Company "E", 15th Infantry was committed to reinforce. One platoon from Heavy Tank Company and one platoon of infantry were again dispatched as diversionary force. At 0345 the enemy withdrew and action ceased; the regimental commander again reorganizing for new

attacks, placed Company "A", 15th Infantry on the outpost.

The night of 15-16 June was a quiet night on the outpost, and the following morning the regimental commander placed the GEF Battalion in the area of the outpost HARRY sector in order that his US battalions, all of which had suffered heavy causalities, could refit and reorganize. During the night of 16-17 June there was no significant action, permitting much needed engineer work on the outpost to be accomplished by Company "P", GEF Battalion and elements of Company "B", 10th Engineer (C) Battalion.

On the night of 17-18 June, the Chinese returned at about 0052 hours, moving through their own and friendly artillery and mortar fire to attack Outpost HARRY from the northeast and northwest. The enemy was repelled and forced to withdraw, but stayed in the area. At 0240 the enemy attacked from the north under intense artillery and mortar fire. The CCF gained the trenches of the outpost on the northern slope at 0313. Bitter hand to hand fighting ensued with the enemy making numerous attempts to reinforce through the protective artillery ring. Company "N", GEF Battalion was committed to reinforce. One platoon of tanks from Heavy Tank Company, 15th Infantry Regiment, and one platoon of Greek Infantry were dispatched to the valley east

of Outpost HARRY as a diversionary force. By 0402 hours the enemy was forced out of the trenches on the outpost, and all action ceased with the enemy withdrawing, having fired 22,000 rounds in support of this attack. The enemy forces employed against Outpost HARRY during the period 10-18 June were tabulated by Intelligence Sections to be substantially as shown in the following table:

10-11 June A reinforced CCF regiment (Approx. 3,600 CCF)

11-12 June A CCF regiment (approx. 2,850 CCF)

12-13 June A reinforced CCF regiment

13-14 June An estimated 100 CCF

14-15 June An estimated 120 CCF

15-16 June Negative

16-17 June Negative

17-18 June A CCF regiment.

During this period the entire 74th CCF Division was utilized against this position and at the end of the engagement was considered combat ineffective. Enemy rounds fired in support of their attack during the period 10-18 June amounted to 88,810 rounds over 81 mm size: friendly mortar and artillery units in conjunction with friendly tank fires were 368185 rounds over 81mm size."



Lt General Ruben E.

Jenkins in Athens Greece
the day of the departure of
GEF for Korea.
He presented
to each Officer a pistol
for good luck.

Three years later.



Lt General Jenkins having at his left Lt. Col. George Koumanakos GEF Commanding. At the back row on the left, captain Skaltsas.

Read at the next page the report he sent to the Greek General Staff Commander, General Tsigounis.)

October 1, 1953

Dear General Tsigounis,

On 10 August regretfully surrendered command of IX US Corps and the Greek Expeditionary Forces Batta1lion to my successor. I was reassigned to my present command which has command and operational supervision of the three ROK Corps, composing the Korean Army in the field. I am departing this command for the US within a few days,

I would fail my duties my self, and the Greek armed Forces if I did not, prior to my departure comment upon the character of service rendered by your Expeditionary Forces which served under me.

This command, true to Greek tradition, more than lived up to what you and I both expected of it. Never during the ten and one—half months under my command did any member of the Greek Bn come to my ufavorable attention for any disciplinary administrative or combat operational reason. On the other hand I never heard any comment other than of the highest praise for all members of this Battalion in every qualification that goes to make up the soldier and the fighting unit. Nor at any time did I observe anything other than qualities of the highest order. And I might remark in passing that I was a most frequent visitor to the Greek Battalion both while in reserve and in the front line. It was particularly outstanding in a crisis several of which occurred during periods while it was holding front line positions, the most noteworthy of which occurred in the middle of June during the Battle of "Harry". On this occasion one Company of this Battalion, successfully withstood three of the most violent attacks launched against this position in rapid succession during darkness, by no less than two full-strenght Communist Battalions This feat alone marked this command for

what it is, a fine, courageous and determined representative of the Greek Army as you and I knew it in the last campaign in the Vitsi and the Grammos. To them I can pay no higher tribute.

I cannot say too much for the outstanding leadership displayed by your Battalion commanders. I have previously written you concerning Colonel Tamvakas. Now I would like to comment briefly upon Colonel George Koumanakos.

I have previously indorsed an Efficiency Report rendered upon Colonel Koumanakos by his Regimental Commander, Colonel Akers of the 15th Infantry which, I hope, has reached you by this time. In this Efficiency Report both the Regimental Commander and I stated categorically that Lieutenant Colonel Koumanakos was one of the most outstanding and courageous Battalion Commanders of our experience. I wish to repeat that assertion personally to you! The outstanding manner in which he administered the affairs of the Greek Battalion and the courage and determination which he instilled into his subordinates of all ranks by personal precept and personal example are, in my opinion, the factors which contributed most to the great success of the Battalion during the critical periods while under my command. I cannot say too much for his personal and professional qualification which is thoroughly in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service. This Officer can command an Infantry Regiment and perform the duties of a Brigadier General Assistant Division Command with high credit and distinction. He can, with little experience command an Infantry Division in a similar fashion. I wish to recommend him to your personal attention and to the personal attention of who may follow you. later in your high Office to the end that he may reach General Officer

Grads for which he is now fitted, as early as possible. I would like also appreciate it if you would bring this matter to the personal attention of the Chief of the National Defense General Staff and. to the attention of His Excellency the Prime Minister Field Marshal Papagos.

Although my contacts with Lieutenant Colonel Koumanakos successor, Lieutenant Colonel Prokos, have been few because of my change in assignment, I have been assured by his present Division Commander that he measures fully up to the standard as set by his predecessors.

As one of my last official acts in Korea I wish to convey to you as Chief of Staff, Greek Army, to the Chief of the National Defense, General Staff, and to Field Marshal Papagos my deeply—felt gratitude for providing me with such outstanding representatives of the Army with which I served in 1948, 1949, 1950 and 1951.

Please convey my very best wishes to Field Marshal Papagos to Kitrilakis, Grigoropoulos, Tsakalotos, Manidakis, Balodemos, Dovas, Zaimis, and my many other friends in the Greek Armed Forces who are too numerous to mention.

To yourself, my personal thanks and my warmest personal and highest professional regards.

Faithfully yours,

REUBEN E. JENKINS Lieutenant General, USA Dear General Tsigounis.

On 10 August I regretfully surrendered command of IX cessor. Iwas reassigned to my present command which has command and operational supervision of the three ROK Corps, composing the Within a few days.

I would fail my duties, myself, and the Greek Armed Forces if I did not, prior to my departure, comment upon the character of service rendered by your Expeditionary Porces which served under me.

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-2-

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Field Marshal Papagos.

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Please convey my very best wishes to Field Marshal Papagos to Fittilakis, Grigoropoulos, Tsakalotos, Manodakis, Balodemis, Dovas Safinis, and my many other friends in the Greek Armed Forces who are too numerous to mention.

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To yourself, my personal thanks and my warmest personal and highest professional regards.

Faithfully yours,

REUBEN E. JENKINS Lieutenent General, USA

Licutement General Alexandros P. Tsigounis Chief, Greek Armed Forces Staff The Parliagent Duilding At 18119, Greece

General Mark W. Clark and Lt Col Koumanakos

On 6 March 1953, the regimental CP and the GEF Battalion were visited by General Marl Clark, Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor, Lieutenant General Reuben E Jenkins, and Major General George W. Smythe. The visiting generals were briefed on the local tactical situation by the commanding officer, GEF Battalion Lt Col George Koumanakos.



Markley Received Greek Award

Martin Markley, one of OPHSA's founding fathers, received the honor of being awarded honorary membership in the Greek Expeditionary Forces in Korea, by Lt. Col George Koumanakos.

Dated 15 Sept. 1953 The citation letter read: "It is a distinct pleasure to me to appoint Captain Martin Markley, U. S. Army, an honorary member of the Greek Expeditionary Forces Battalion in acknowledgement of his services offered to this gallant unit.

The sincere co-operation of Captain Martin Markley and his utmost contribution to the successful accomplishment of the missions assigned this Battalion are greatly appreciated by every Officer and Men of the Greek Expeditionary Forces and reflects great credit on himself and the United States Army.

Effective this date, Captain Martin Markley, an honorary member of the heroic GEF Bn. is entitled to wear the "HELLENIC FORCES" Patch."

Signed by
Koumanakos George
Lt. Col. Inf.
Commanding GEF Bn.




A ROK Officer, the Commander of the Belgian Bn., Lt. Col. George Koumanakos, Commander of the Greek Bn, and 3rd Infantry Division Commander Major General George W. Smythe engage in a four way handshake symbolizing the joint effort in the Korean War.

Photo by Jarboe



The UN Review at 3rd ID HQ, April, 1953. The Division Band on the far left ROK, Belgian, Greek and American units in the division including a platoon of the 5th RCT that had been recently attached to the division. The formation extended as far to the right as to the left. The flags of all Nations represented are massed in the center with unit flags behind. You will note that it was hard to find a flat place in most of Korea so even the Division Parade ground sloped downhill!



The Eighth Army Front Line (27 July 1953)



The four Difensive Sectors: TOM, DICK, HARRY and the NEST OF EAGLE. GEF had defended all of them, one at a time.

Regnard Addison (RAB) Burgess, Jr.
Kiesche Swamp
P. O. Box 292
Joyce, LA 71440
17 April, 1999

I joined Headquarters Battery, 39th Field Artillery Battalion around 13 May 1953 and was assigned to Liaison Section #224 (Greek Infantry Battalion) with the 15th U. S. Infantry Regiment. We were over on the eastern side of Chorwon Valley. I think this was the western end of the 15th Infantry and 3rd Infantry Division sector of responsibility.

Verlin E. Rogers and I came in the 39th FA Bn. and the Greek Infantry Bn. together. We went out with combat seasoned men for about two or three weeks. By then we had proved out enough to go out, just the two if us. Rogers has a more level head and I was the wild one. By the time we got to the Greek Inf. Bn. on Outpost Harry we were combat veterans. We were a good team. Outpost Harry was different from anything else. The dead

bodies, the smell the destruction. The Greek soldiers probably said it best. "It was like being sent to hell." We repaired and ran new telephone lines across the flat behind the MLR and Outpost Harry. It seems like we were on O.P. Harry two or three times a day while the Greek Bn. was there even after the siege ended 18 June 1953. Peter (3rd) Company of the Greek Bn. was there the last night of the siege. 1st Lt. Peter B. Mavridies and Cpl.

Shaw were the Recon. Team (F.O.) from the 39th FA Bn. The uniforms rotted off of our backs since we didn't have a bath or change of clothes for about six weeks. We had better food being with the Greek Bn and we slept 45 minutes to an hour and half a night.

The siege stopped. The rain stopped. Only a few incoming artillery, mortar rounds and small arms fire. It was almost pleasant. Then we went back to regroup, retrain, rearm, etc.. However we didn't get there. Instead we went to Kumsung Valley. I went with Lt. Bitsis Recon. Section (Forward Observer) with Nan (1st) Company of the Greek Inf. Bn. On the way to Nan Company I carried batteries to Peter Company of the Greek Bn. As I went to Nan Company it became very dark and I could hear the Chinese talking very close around. I pushed on and ran into a patrol of Greek soldiers from O (2nd) Company. After much talk they let me come in. My knowledge of the Greek language isn't that good, then or now. Peter Company had lost contact. Lt. Col. George Koumanakos, Greek Inf. Bn. commander and 1st Lt. Peter Mavraides, Liaison Officer of Section #244 were impressed and put me in for the Silver Star Medal. I received the medal about twenty years later, no orders with it. It just came through the mail. I spent the rest of the night with O Company of the Greek Bn. I found out I was reported missing in action. I called back and got the MIA report stopped before it was sent to my mother in Arkansas.

The next morning I had a pleasant stroll over to "N" Company, Greek Bn. Lt. Bistis and I went out the next day and called in some fire missions. He was then satisfied I could perform as a forward observer. The 30th Capitol ROK had run and left Kumsung and Kumwha valleys open. After the CCF made a mass attack the 555th AFA n. of the 5th RCT lost 16 of their 18 self propelled guns to the CCF. The CCF fired on us with the 55th AFA guns (155mm) and ammo. The Third Infantry division had been sent in to plug the breakthrough. We held the ground until 27 July 1953 and cease-fire. 'N: Company Greek Bn. was surrounded for six days in the Kumsung Valley. The Greek Captain exclaimed "no surrender. Fight to the last man". On the last night the Air Force napalmed the CCF and we walked out. We ran out of food and water but had plenty of ammo. Sometimes every man in the company was firing and the Chinese were firing back. CCF bodies were piled up all around the company. We settled in a new position and I think we stayed there until the cease fire. After the cease fire we went back to the Greek Bn. we had no detail or guard, plenty of good food and drink. It was my best time in the Army.

The last night Col. Koumanakos called me off to one side and told me I would receive the Greek War Cross. In the fall of 1953 we were told that President Eisenhower wouldn't let us receive the Greek medals. We went back with HQ Btry 39th FA Bn. after the older (RA) Sgts

rotated home. They took our hex tents and put us in squad tents. Rogers and I made Cpl in Oct 1953 and were laiaison Sgts and I was a forward observer from time to time. Our men pulled all the duty details and more than their share of guard duty. We went on field problems with the Greek Bn. and the rest of the 15th Inf. Regt. During the winter of 1953-1954 I went on field problems almost all or maybe all companies of the 15th Inf. Regt. B company of the 15th Inf. Was one I remember well. It was a well run company. I also remember K Company of the 15th Inf. Ola "Lee" Mize was 1st Sgt.. We had to march an extra 20miles for having a late start. This was the only company that my Recon Section was dismissed and not asked if we needed transportation. I was told it was a first class company in earlier times. I was the only enlisted man in our Bn. to have to qualify on a firing range as a forward observer. The rest of the FOs were officers 1st&2nd Lts).

The Greeks were brought up to regimental strength that winter. I went with them on their first regimental field exercise as Liaison Sgt. They had two battalions. The 3rd Inf. Div. Or Corps or Army had a Bn. field exercise that winter. I went on this field problem with both Greek Bns and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Bns. Of the 15th Inf. Regt. The 2nd Bn 15th Inf. failed this problem and I went with them on the second try. The C.O. of the 39th FA Bn. promoted his jeep driver to Lno. Sgt. in my spot. In May 1954 made Sgt. (E-5).

In June 1954 I extended my Korean tour 30 days and made Lno. Sgt. Of Section #242, 2nd Bn 15th Inf. Regt. Assigned to Chorwan City. The most likely to be hit first if the war was restarted. We had run out of liaison people. I was offered 1st Lt. To extend for a year. I was also cleared for Top Secret. At this time the 2nd Bn. was very good and smooth running. I drew up the fire plans. They were approved and I set up the commo and had a good running section, I rotated (boarded a troop ship) in Pusan 27 July 1954. My time with the four battalions of the 15th Inf. For the most part were very hard and very pleasant. All we did was hold our ground against an unbelievable mass of Chinese. I have done many things since I left the Army. Some well, some poor. I am proud of being a charter member of the Outpost Harry Survivors Assn. The highest honor being elected president of this small elite order by the men I had been in combat with. In 1992 when we were organizing the OPHS Assn., I became a charter member of the 15th Inf. Regt. Assn. This was a proud time also. Both groups have increased in numbers and many good things and will do even bigger things. Let us not forget the Society of the Third Infantry Division gave birth to both of these Orders. We could have done it anyway but this made it much easier.

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GEF LIAISON STAFF

Front Row L to R: Pfc Capotas; Pvt Stamataky; Cpl Johns; Pfc Manolatos Back Row: Lt Scarmoutsos; Lt Hallis; Sgt Cahelles; Pfc Stamatakis

Bill Dannenmaier



(...I wanted to tell the story of the citizen soldier in Korea, July 16, 1999)


Reviewer: William Dannenmaier from Cumberland Furnace,
Tennessee USA We Were
Innocents Author's Comments:
In writing "We Were Innocents" I wanted to describe army life during

the Korean conflict for many of us, not just for me. I believe I have accomplished this.

In the three months since publication I have received about a dozen telephone calls from men who "were there" as well as two or three from women who read the book. All of the men reported a kinship in one or more of the situations I reported. Two spoke of their experiences on merchant marine ships. Both described the filth, one said life preservers for the enlisted on his ship were useless also. One caller, responding to my description of our monthly showers, said he could remember laughing and saying, "three more showers til I go home." An exlieutenant said he was trapped out in the open by also. artillery once and described his American experience. One caller asked if I knew the battle for Outpost Harry was classified secret until 1992, when a group of survivors got it declassified. I don't know that this is true, but it may be. I have often wondered why such a bloody and victorious battle, involving so many

men, was unknown when less bloody affairs were highly publicized.

Several readers, and all of the women, commented on the humor. I am glad. That is important. For those who lost, and lose, loved ones in war, remember that combat time is not all bad. There were times of laughter and many occasions of camaraderie -- truly good moments. I know it is painful to lose a loved one or friend in combat, in one stupid war or another, but don't ever think that their situation was one of constant pain and horror. It wasn't. This is non-fiction. I did my best to write the absolute, unvarnished, truth. Some incidents I wasn't going to include because I didn't trust my memory, but found evidence for them in the letters my sister saved. I have left out memories of other incidents for which I have no proof. Two newspaper reviewers have felt I had no respect for officers. That is not true. I had no respect for anyone, officer or enlisted, who didn't do his job, but I have and had only the highest respect for officers such as Lt.Brady, Lt. Rinklemeyer, Colonel Stillwell, Colonel Akers, Colonel Koumanakos and Lt. Col Eisenhower, who knew their men: when to encourage them and when to ignore them. Lastly, the book is dedicated to the 54,246 Americans who died in Korea, the 103,284 wounded and the 7000 known to have been prisoners of war, half of whom died. Any mistakes in the book are mine, not theirs.



William Dannenmaier in front of the Greek Battalion Commanding Post.

The following pages are from the book of William D. Dannenmaier "WE WERE INNOCENTS"

The Castle on the Hill page 119

.. For the first time in my experience we had company. In addition to the scouts, this bunker housed a forward observer for the artillery, along with his aides and other occasional guests. For example, it was the custom of the commander of the Greek battallion, Col.Koumanakos, to sleep on the front line when his troops were on line. He and his staff would come forward to the outpost at night, returning to their battalion headquarters to work during the day. This resolve of the high-ranking Greek officers to expose themselves to the same dangers as their men impressed me at the time and still impresses me. Our squad had not seen its own officer up front in the two months I had been on the line. So far as we knew, neither had our other squads seen him. To see the lieutenant, someone had to drive back to regimental headquarters. If our lieutenant needed to communicate with us, he used the telephone, if it was working, or the radio.

Outpost Harry page 146/147

.....

On the night of june 17, at about 2;00 A.M.. the Chinese Communistsrenewed their mass attacks. As the battle began, the Greek sang their national anthem. Initially, P Company's defense held, but the Chinese were able to force their way into the trenches for hand-to-hand fighting, at which the Greeks excelled. N Company, also of the Greek Expeditionary Force, was sent to assist. Colonel Koumanakos stayed with us, as was his custom when his men were on the line, and a visiting Greek general spent the night on Outpost Harry. I don't remember his name, but I recall that he had a black patch over one eye.

HEADQUARTERS GREEK EXPEDITIONARY FORCES GAPO - 5800

28 March 1953

Ed Lt John G. Beechler Artillery FO "N" Company 39th FA Battalion APO 468

Dear Lieutenant Beechler,

It is not often that one can witness the close coordination and cooperation present between the 15th Infantry Regiment and the 39th Field Artillery Esttalion. This can be attributed to one principal factor; the combined efforts of each individual doing his job efficiently and conscientiously.

You as one of the integral component parts of the 39th FA Battalion has contributed immensly to the forming of an effective unit. Your devotion to duty; your competence as a field artillery observer and your ability to associate willingly with all the members of my Battalion in a friendly and compatable way is much to be commended. The example that you have set is one that other officers should strive to achieve.

The men of the GEF Battalion thank you for the coordinated fire that you have been able to procure and effectively employ during our more dire moments.

In appreciation of your untiring efforts and loyal spirit, the GEF Battalion cordially invites you to assemble in the ranks of notables that are now Honorary Members of the SPARTAN Battalion.

As a symbol of your Honorary Membership to our Battalion we proffer a Hellenic Forces Patch which we hope you will condescend to wear proudly.

COMMANDING GEF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Washington D. C., 10 March 1955 GENERAL ORDERS 18

DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION

Company K,15th Infantry Regiment,3d Infantry Division (Third Award) is cited for extraordinary heroism and outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy in the vicinity of Surang-NI, Korea during the period 10 June to 11 June 1953. Defending a critical sector of the battlefront, the company was subjected to repeated attacks by numerically superior Chinese Communist Forces. Enemy assaults ranging from company size to a reinforced regiment were directed against the company's position in repeated waves in a desperate attempt to take the critical outpost (Harry). By massing his strength in depth, the enemy was at times successful in penetrating friendly positions but was consistently pushed back by members of this company following rigorous hand to hand combat. On the night of 10 June, a reinforced regiment, employing small arms fire, automatic weapons and grenades, and supported by 20,000 rounds of artillery fire and mortar fire, launched the initial assault of a series of new attacks on the position. Although having sustained over 200 casualties in their initial attempt to overtake the outpost, the enemy was determined to seize the key terrain at all costs and

charged repeatedly throughout the night of 10 June and the following morning. During the height of the battle the trenches at times were overrun, but met with the inspired close-in fighting of the beleaguered but courageous members of Company K, the enemy was ultimately repelled from the position. The extraordinary heroism of the members of Company K, 15th Infantry Regiment, 3d Infantry Division, in fulfilling their assigned mission reflects great credit on themselves and upholds the highest traditions of the military service.



Louis Bravos and Martin Markley with 3ID Flag Markley Donated to the OP at the Mar 06 Meeting. Photo by Jim Jarboe.

On Aug 26, 2006, Col. Andreas Koumanakos wrote to Mr Markley.:

Dear Martin.

Thank you for the remarkable correction. I had noticed my error already because of an argument I had with Mike Pagomenos. He insists that there are mistakes in the official records. I don't agree with him because I think we must accept the official papers as correct.

This is why I asked you if there is any change to the history of O.P. Harry. Well, I am a ret. Colonel of Engineers Corp. and I stopped to write to him for military subjects. Because of ignorance of the Battalion during the defense, he insists that P Company did the whole job. Besides he has an unacceptable opinion for the battalion commander Lt Col. G. Koumanakos.

By the way, did you meet Col. Koumanakos personally?

Thanks Martin for every thing.
Andreas Koumanakos

And then Mr. Martin Markley answered...

From: Martin Markley <m.markley@sbcglobal.net>_+ **To:** "Andreas Koumanakos" <andreas@fastmail.ca>

Subject: Re: Info-2.

Date: Sat, 26 Aug 2006 08:19:29 -0700

Dear Andreas,

I agree that official records should be accepted. They may have errors but are written by those in command who must at times rely on Information from their staff.

As you know each unit documents its actions. Some are based on hearsay.

The Third Infantry Division was the first unit to Hitler's Eagle Nest during WWII and is documented in official reports at all levels. However other units have claimed they were their first.

I did not have the honour of meeting your uncle or many Greek soldiers. I have kept in contact with Constanine Pissiotas whom I met while we were in the Tokyo Army Hospital. Best wishes, Martin.



Martin Markley today with his wife.

Private First Class James "Red" Davis E Company, Fifteenth Infantry Regiment, Third Infantry Division

In May 1952, I graduated from a small country high school near the town of Mount View, in southwest Oklahoma. At the time, I had lived my entire life in a farming community with my mom and dad, plus my three brothers and three sisters. I had no idea how much my life would be changed in the next two years by the war in Korea. I spent the summer working on the farm as usual, but by fall, I was ripe for the draft. Then one day I received my draft notice, and on October 23, 1952, I was inducted into the army. After basic training at Camp Roberts, California, the army shipped me to Korea, where I arrived in May 1953. I was assigned to the Fifteenth Regiment in the Third Infantry Division.

Actually, the Korean War was nearly over, although there was no way we could have known this at the time. For the past year or so, both sides had pretty well stayed in their trenches, and the fighting was seldom on the front pages of the newspapers. The truce negotiations had been on and off so much nobody paid much attention to them. As it turned out, the negotiating teams were actually getting close to an agreement by the time I arrived in Korea. At the same time, the fighting had actually picked up. Most of this fighting took place

on "outposts," ugly, treeless hills and mountains located well in front of our Main Line of Resistance (MLR). While the Communists lost thousands of men trying to capture these outposts, we also lost of lot of men trying to defend them.

Outpost Harry was typical of these outposts, and the Third Division was assigned to defend the hill. I arrived in Korea just in time for the battle, which was one of the most intense of the entire war (even though the war had only a few months to go).


When I arrived at the Third Division MLR in May 1953, I could easily see the outpost to the north of our line. A short time after I arrived, I was assigned to one of the units on Outpost Harry. Right away I met my sergeant and my lieutenant, a Lieutenant Brown. I will never forget what Lieutenant Brown said to me that night: "We will hold this hill at all costs, even if this means your life. If you run, I will shoot you or someone else will." The real battle for Outpost Harry began during the night of June 17/18, 1953, when the Chinese mounted a major attack on the hill. At that time I was still on our MLR, but not for long. Within hours I found myself and about a dozen other GIs in a half-track headed for the hill. It was only about a mile from our MLR to the backside of Harry, but it seemed much longer. Perhaps the incoming mortar rounds had something to do with this.

Harry was located in what was commonly referred to as the "Iron Triangle" in Korea. This was an area

approximately 60 miles north of Seoul and was the most direct route to the South Korean capital. Outpost Harry's elevation was around 1280 feet high and positioned some 320 yards south of a larger landmass occupied by the CCF (Chinese Communist Forces) called "Star Hill" and some 425 yards northeast of United Nations positions. A service road that wound from the MLR (Main Line of Resistance) along an intermittent stream led to the rear of the outpost where a medical aid station and a supply The position point were located. contained communication trench line which ran from the supply point forward some 400 yards to the top. At that point, the trench line joins another trench that makes a complete loop (circle) around the outpost with an additional finger that ran along the east ridge about 100 yards. The trench line was deep enough to walk around the perimeter unseen by the enemy. It was fortified with reinforced fighting bunkers, a command post and a forward observation bunker. It could accommodate approximately 150 infantrymen.



Demetrios Papadopoulos



Outpost Harry
Diary Account of
Demetrios
Papadopoulos,
2nd. Lt. Interpreter
of the Greek
Battalion. June 11
to June 21, 1953

June 11, 1953 -Thursday night

On the right flank of our positions the Chinese are launching a series of strong attacks.

It appears that

they want to capture outpost Harry. The other night it was real hell over there! The Chinese were making repeated attacks to obtain their objective. But when they were almost on top of the outpost, the American troops made a counter attack and finally forced them to withdraw.

What a catastrophe! Thousands of rounds of artillery, mortars and rocket fire were falling from 2200 hours until morning. The last wave of the enemy attack was made at

0600 in daylight. But again the Chinese were repelled from the outpost. Listen! Tonight the Chinese are attacking again. They are determined to take the outpost. But what kind of hill is it? From our position it seems like an insignificant bald barren hill that nothing or anyone could possibly live on or want to live on. However, it has great tactical importance so the 3rd Infantry Division says. It has the highest elevation in the area except for the Chinese outpost Star that is just north of Harry and is not much more than 300 - 500 yards away.

I am afraid that the Chinese are going to be successful and take outpost Harry tonight. Yesterday the 15th Infantry Regiment had 200 dead and wounded soldiers and the Chinese lost an estimated 1500 troops. A very bloody affair and a high price to pay to preserve Harry. The searchlights are illuminating the whole vicinity of Harry. The artillery batteries have turned this night into a disaster! I don't hear anything else but the continuous roar of the artillery fire. At this moment I wonder how many Americans are holding their chests and screaming in pain and closing their eyes leaving their souls - to fly to no one knows... However, they are fighting against communism. The United Nations forces have come here to keep this country free. It is emotional to see Americans, Greeks, Belgians, Frenchmen, Ethiopians and many others fighting shoulder to shoulder under the same flag! How could I record these horrible events amidst the continuous her of explosions and the whistling of shells and shrapnel knowing that men are dying at this very moment, in order to read it back like an old phonograph when I'm an old man? But what am I saying? Who knows if I will be alive tomorrow... It would be better for me to say ... Thank God for keeping me alive one more day!

June 15, 1953 - Monday morning

Terrible news has come to our battalion this morning. In a few hours we are leaving our present positions to defend outpost harros. (in Greek language the name of death is "harros." so the Greek soldiers pronounce the Harry as "harros" and they were using it as a joke.) Two American battalions were practically decimated by the continuous attacks by the Chinese and now it is our turn to defend the outpost. Every night for the past five nights the Chinese have launched awful attacks. All of the American companies sent to defend the outpost have There is suffered destruction. almost total great possibility that I might be killed on this God forsaken Korean hill. Perhaps I will have the same bad luck as hundreds of Americans have had. It is difficult for me to think that my last breath alive will be here in Far East so distant from my homeland and my family. Is that my Destiny? All of us are very anxious. I can see in the eyes of my comrades pale faces as well as cool and hardened ones. We know very well that tomorrow we shall have a lot of casualties. We are going to a real slaughter; to a

real execution ...may the Blessed Virgin Mary keep us well...

June 17th 1953 - Wednesday

I am at the bottom of Outpost Harry. Yesterday our company "C" went up on the outpost. We are ready to reinforce them with a counter attack if the Chinese approach the top of the outpost. Last night there was no attack. Yesterday the M-39 carriers were busy carrying out dead American troops. Our soldiers found them among the dead Chinese who were trying to evacuate the trenches and the destroyed bunkers in the forward area of the outpost. This must have meant that brutal hand-tohand combat took place in this forward area. I saw two dead American soldiers in a carrier. The one was disfigured but the other one seemed to me as if he were sleeping. He was probably killed about an hour ago. If only their poor parents knew were their sons are lying now... The American engineers, the Korean labors and our soldiers are working hard on the hill to open and repair the new bunkers. An hour ago I had a short call from Jimmy (interpreter of "C" Company.) He told me "The odor of dead Chinese is making us faint" the situation is indescribable. All is in ruins and death is everywhere. Tomorrow or the day after is my turn to go up on the outpost. It might be the last time I will be writing in my diary. I have never been in such great danger in my whole life as I have been for the past few days. "May God forgive me, His will be done".

June 21, 1953 - Sunday night

I am in a C.P. bunker on top of Outpost Harry. I am writing in the light of a small candle. It's a quiet night, so I have the chance to describe the facts from the beginning, since June 18th. Fortunately, we didn't face any other Chinese attacks the last three nights. During this time our finger is always on the trigger and we are waiting ... From time to time the Chinese remember us and they send mortar rounds in on our positions and bunkers. I am quite sure these days are the most critical of my life. They will be unforgettable. Very few people have seen such horrible sights... Last Wednesday night our battalion fought bravely against the Chinese. Especially company "C" as they fought hand-to-hand combat with the enemy. (In Greek we call it a body-tobody combat.) Three platoons of company "A" and "B" reinforced the efforts of Company "C" to drive the enemy out of the trenches. We had 6 dead and 21 wounded and 2 wounded platoon leaders. At 1300 hours on June 18th we got in carriers and we started moving to the top of Outpost Harry. I whispered a prayer. I am sure that the others did the same. The M39 personnel carrier roars like a lion threatening the Gods and the devils (Greek expression). It wants to scare the barbarians, the evil Chinese for the destruction which they caused us and our American friends. Here it is!! The outpost is in front of us and near us!! There is not one tree standing. It has a black color because it's been pounded by thousands of rounds

of explosives. We got off the carriers and started up the trench line quickly. We are sweating profusely as the trench line up Harry is very steep. When we arrived at the C.P. bunker it's a ground hole with a few pieces of wood and sandbags. When I got into the bunker I noticed many marks all around the wood and the bags that were probably the result of hand grenade fragments. Perhaps a Chinese threw the grenade in one of the previous nights of fighting. Immediately Captain Jannetos, the American forward observer 2nd Lt. Morris and I started walking and bending down along the trench line in order to make our first reconnaissance of the vicinity. "Oh my God, how could I count the dead Chinese?" bodies are everywhere.

A dozen of them are pinned up on the barbed wire in different positions, which indicated their efforts to approach and destroy our machine gun positions and bunkers. Fortunately, our well armed Force reaped them down as though they were ears of wheat! (Greek expression) the stench of the decomposed dead Chinese is unbearable. Particularly in the north forward area where the men of the 1st Platoon were working to open the destroyed trenches and bunkers. The soldiers had to cover their noses with kerchiefs to protect themselves from the odor. In the forward northern trenches I could see half buried Chinese as their arms and legs were not covered with soil. Their rifles, swords and caps were mixed with helmets, clothes or bags of our troops. Again, it's the result of hand to hand combat. I noticed one dead

Chinese next to me. He was just a boy, 17 to 18 years old with his hair cut very short and very skinny. He had a series of bullet holes around his waist and was carrying a small bag of boiled rice. Evidently, it was his only food. Youth is dying on both sides... Young men are leaving their souls to fly to the heavens. So early, so untimely. "God be merciful to me, I don't want to leave my strong and young body to be buried on this damn hill"... The illuminating shells are falling continuously in order to warn us in time of an enemy approach and a surprise attack. The United Nations have trusted the valuable outpost Harry in our hands because they believe that we are good fighters as our ancestors were. For this reason we must hold this "beloved hill" regardless of the cost of blood of the loss of life. It's 0300 in the morning. I feel tired and my eyelids are heavy. The daybreak is coming in two hours. Only then will I will be closing my eyes to take a nap. Thanking God for a quiet night...

Demetrious Papadopoulos
Fst Lieutenant Greek Army

Spyros Zisimopoulos.



Spyros Zisimopoulos went in Korea with 14th mission voluntarily and he served there as a master sergeant of the 2nd company of the Greek Battalion. On this time Commanding Officer of GEF was Lt Col George Koumanakos.

Mr. Zisimopoulos today, has the rank of Lt Colonel, he is

married and has a son who is also married. With unmistakable emotion he remembered the events of the time he was serving in Korea and he narrates:

". In 1953 I served as permanent master sergeant and I asked to be included in the 14th mission of completion the Greek Battalion in Korea. My request was approved and after short briefing we left by boat from Piraeus. Our trip to Korea and we arrived to Pusan harbor of Korea. From there in military vehicles they brought us to the MLR, where we arrived on April 4, 1953. This year, the frontier was stabilized and all the allied units were on defending operations along the "Missouri" line.

At that time, Greek Battalion was attached to the 15th regiment 3rd Infantry DIV, and had as mission to defend the sector of "THE EAGLE'S NEST". In the regimental Sector on our left there were three more sectors known with the names TOM, DICK and HARRY. On the middle

of May we moved from Sector THE EAGLE'S NEST to Sector DICK. Here the most of the time, we had to dig and improve our trenches and the positions of our guns. Our CO Colonel G. Koumanakos had a close supervision on us and he was very respectable to his Americans comrades, as he was a newly graduated of the USA School of Staff College. He was greatly appreciated from his superior Commanders for his knowledge and his war experience. Regimental Commander Akers, used to call him "...my eagle."

At that time there were negotiations and a cease-fire agreement was to be signed on July 27, so North Koreans and their allied Chinese, continued attacking to our positions, in order to remove MLR towards south. There was an information that they would try to conquer some Out-Posts of our line. Chinese used to attack during the night. On Dick Sector, Greek battalion faced such hostile attacks in 6 and 10 of June, 1953 with a victory over the Chinese

The same day (June 10, 1953) when the battle of Greek battalion was over, we heard that Chinese had captured O.P. Harry. Company K 15th re was on the O.P. Harry that night. As I heard later, there were only 75 soldiers to man the Outpost. American troops counter attacking next morning recaptured Harry but Chinese continued to attack the following three nights against O.P. Harry with a strength of three battalions each time.

This persistent effort of Chinese to conquer the Outpost was called later "Siege of O.P. Harry."

The next two nights Chinese returned with a small strength of a Company, not to conquer the OP Harry of course, but to gather the bodies of their deads.

On June 15th, Col. Akers called our Battalion Commander and had a long discussion. After that Lt Col. Koumanakos called to Battalion CP the officers and non-commissioned officers and said that.. "we are moving from sector DICK to defend sector Harry." I remember him, to explain us that he denied to send on the OP Harry only a rifle Company and he asked the entire Greek Battalion to assume the defense of the entire sector Harry. It was accepted and then he had changed the defending plans and the fire plan for the entire sector Harry.


Next morning, all the units of GEF manned the positions they were assigned to go. The plan was simple but clever. One company on OP Harry, two Companies



left and behind and a Heavy Tank Platoon at the right. He brought the .50 M. guns on the Outpost and supported the barbed wire around the Outpost. Improved the roots of tanks and mainly he was aware for his flanks. In the 16 and 17 of June Chinese did not attack and we had the time to organize these our works. We had considerable help from the American crew of Engineer's Corp and a platoon of Korean workers.

In 01.00 hours of 18 June Chinese started their attack with two Battalions that attempted at their method to overflow us from the sides. But our Commander vindicated. Chinese were murdered by the fires of heavy machine-guns that Koumanakos had put everywhere. The third enemy battalion acting forehead had the same chance. Chinese spent under the Greek fire two and a half hours to approach our barbed wires. Then, Koumanakos ordered the two companies from left and Tank Platoon from right to counterattack. The Chinese had been surprised, they were reversed also they withdrawn.

The battle kept until the 04.00 hours of June 18th. Chinese occupied that something had changed in the sector Harry and that they could not overcome henceforth for they changed place for new effort. The night of 17/18 of June 1953 will remain to me unforgetable.



A skech of the O.P. Harry

Lt Gen. Perimenis Michael.



Lt General. Michael Perimenis. He was a First Lt in Korea and was charged with the G3 Office and active Adjutant of GEF Commander Lt Col. George Koumanakos.


"I arrived in Korea on October 1952 and left this country on July 1953. During the battle of GEF at the Sector Harry the night of 17/18 of June 1953 I was beside the Commanding Officer of GEF Lt Col. George Koumanakos. For us, the Greeks, we consider the battle of Harry, as a battle that fought the whole Greek Battalion, all over the Sector of Harry and not only the Peter Company (Third Company) that was assigned to defend the hill 420.

Harry was located in what was commonly referred to as the "Iron Triangle" in Korea. Outpost Harry is positioned some 400 yards south of a larger landmass occupied by the CCF called "Star Hill" with elevation around 60 feet lower. Of course the hill 420 is some 400 yards northern of MLR but and the other two outposts (TOM and DIC) are beyond MLR. O.P. HARRY was connected with a service road with the MLR and an intermittent stream led to the rear of the outpost where a medical aid station and



a supply point were located. The position contained a communication trench line which ran from the supply point forward some 400 yards to the top. At that point, the trench line joins another trench that makes a complete loop (circle) around the outpost with an additional finger that ran along the East Ridge about 100 yards. The trench line was deep enough to walk around the perimeter unseen by the enemy. It was fortified with reinforced fighting bunkers, a command post and a forward

observation bunker. It could accommodate approximately 120-130 infantrymen.




The reg. 15th Defence Sector on Shorwon Area




O.P. HARRY (on the top of 420 Hill.)

The top of Hill 420 as it was organized in 1953



The above picture was taken from the internet and was posted by an American soldier, who had served on the hill 420.



The Sector Harry and the plan of the battle as it was designed from Lt General Mechael Perimenis

The 15th of June was a quiet day on the outpost, and the company A, elements of Company "B", 10th Engineer (C) Battalion, were able to evacuate the casualties and repair the damages to the trenches and bankers, on the hill. The same day, GEF was ordered to move from Sector DIC to Sector HARRY. Col. Koumanakos issued the necessary orders and at 0930 hours of June 16, we reported to the Regiment responsibility for defence of Sector Harry. On the Hill 420 Company P was assigned to defence the O.P. Harry.

The two first days 16 and 17 of June passed without any significant action, permitting much needed engineer work on the outpost to be accomplished by Company "P", a platoon of the American battle Engineers Battalion and a platoon of Catousa. These repairing works were supervised by the Greek Eng. Officer Major John Scoutaris.

After the midnight of 17th of June at the 0052 hours of 18th of June, the Chinese started to approach, moving through their own and friendly artillery and mortar fire to attack Outpost HARRY from the northeast and northwest. Then the friendly plan of fire started and the enemy stopped. But they were decided to proceed. At 0240 the enemy attacked from the north under intense artillery and mortar fire. The CCF were using the trenches on the northern slope at 0313. Our machine guns and mortars donated death to the unlucky CCF. But in spite of our fires they continued to proceed. At 0345

hours they reached the barbed wire. At that time the Battalion Commander Lt Col Koumanakos George ordered the counterattack. Two rifle companies from the left ("N" and "O" of Spartans' Bn) and one platoon of Heavy Tanks from the right, rushed to the battle field and a bitter hand to hand fighting ensued with the enemy outside the barbed wire. By 0400 hours the enemy was repelled and was forced to withdraw. The whole attack lasted tree hours. The enemy didn't put his foot in the trenches of the O.P. Harry. The whole fighting was outside the barbed wire. All the battalion participated to the fight. It was an area defense on Harry Sector of Spartans Battalion and not a defense of the Company "P" on the hill 420. This is why GEF won. What could do Company "P" was never Company P/15 alone? dispatched as Skaltsas and Pagomenos say. From the morning of June 16th that our battalion was assigned to defend Sector Harry we faced the enemy as follow:

16 June Negative
16-17 June Negative
17 June Negative
18 June A CCF regiment.

I attended a documenter that did Mr. Mike Pagomenos, son of George Pagomenos, who was on the hill 420 during the battle of Harry and I don't agree with that entire said captain Skaltsas and George Pagomenos. The hill 420 was never abandoned by American troops. When the Greeks went on the hill (June 16, 1953) there was

Major Denison with Company A. Also there were men of Engineer Corp repairing the damages of the fortification works, one platoon of KATUSA and two carriers. Also, from early the morning of June 15, the CO PC was connected with land telephone lines. I don't know why Mr. Pagomenos says all that unhistorical things.

I have a copy of the record of G2 and G3 of the 15th Regiment, where are written minute by minute all the days of the battle, from 1st of June to 30 of June 1953.



(The photo belongs to Chic Pellegrini and shows the east slope of Outpost Harry looking north toward Star. The CCF trench from Star is clearly shown in this view.)

No CCF stepped in the trenches of O.P. HARRY. There was not any body to body struggle in the OP trenches. Everything that is said or written on this subject is only a stylistic expression. CCF used the trench line of the northern slope excavated by themselves and was connecting OP Harry, with STAR and OLD CHARLIE.

The trench line I talk about can be seen clearly in the previous picture. Such trench lines were covered by fires of the allied artillery as well as by our heavy mortars. Trenches like that, were the traps that the Commanding Officer of GEF Lt Col. Koumanakos had foreseen for the coming CCF, and not only.

The Greek **Battalion** Commander Lt Koumanakos ordered never Capt. Skaltsas withdrawal. He had no reason to do that. He had foreseen what CCF could do and he was waiting. And as soon as CCF reached the barbed wire, Lt Col Koumanakos ordered the counter attack with the reserve companies from the left and with the heavy Tank Platoon from the right and repelled them back.

Here I have to mention the substantial and effective contribution to the victory of GEF, of the men of USA Engineers Army who worked on the hill 420, as well as the men of the American Heavy Tank platoon, the artillery observers, the men of communication, and the men of the Regimental S3 Sector.

Michael Perimenis
Ret. Lt General, Greek Army.

ARVANITIS DIMITRIOS

Ret. Lt General Greek Army.



Lt General Arvanitis Dimitrios arrived in Korea, with the 14th mission voluntarily, by the end of April 1953, and he served as leader of 3rd platoon, "O" co, GEF Battalion. He had the rank of First Lieutenant

(Note of author: Lt General Arvanitis has seen my book on the internet. After having read it, he decided to write and send me the following letter.)

January 7, 2018. At Athens Greece.

Dear Andreas

It was for me a joyful surprise to see your book under the title "THE EAGLE OF THE IRON TRIANGLE" posted on the Internet. You describe a period of the Korean war through of several documents, quite successfully. I was really excited by the accuracy of the description of the various events hosted in your book. It was a matter of luck for me to be there, during the time you describe, serving in the Greek Battalion. I arrived at South Korea at the end of April 1953 and I met the Greek Battalion at Chorwon Valley,

defending there under the Commanding of Lt. Col. George Koumanakos. This is why I decided to write you and add my personal experience from the Korean War and point out three characteristics events. I wish to start with our brave and intelligent Commander Lt. Colonel Koumanakos, who had earned the respect and love of all Officers and soldiers of our Battalion, as well as of the other American war-men. He was newly graduated from the USA Military Staff College.

Lt. Col. Koumanakos was performing his duties in a superior manner. He was spending the most of his time close to us. His tireless enthusiasm and determination in training and supervising his men contributed materially to the battalion's high morale and close coordination despite adverse conditions. His aggressive leadership qualities, while under fire on the front line, were an incentive to his men. The smooth operation and dependability of the battalion in combat were largely a result of his relentless efforts and sound decisive Judgement. His outstanding skill, initiative and untiring devotion to duty was reflecting great credit upon himself and the Greek soldiers. I was a platoon leader in the second company and I dare say that he was visiting us more often than our company Commander was. On the night of 17-18 of May 1953, GEF relieved the 3rd Battalion 15th re. in the sector of Outpost DICK. We had on our left O.P. TOM and on our right O.P. HARRY. At that time we were receiving a crowd of artillery and mortar shells. The amount of hostile shelling and probing pointed to an attack in near future. There was a little indication, however, that the Chinese

had chosen this particular time for it. I remember that in a visit of his, such a small scrap wounded him slightly on his leg. He avoided commenting on it and left telling us. "Watch out ...maybe the Chinese are attacking us at that *night."* He did not report his injury and later I learned from his assistant that he tied his wound by himself in order to avoid the hospital. He did not wish to leave his unit. He was very respectful to all of us as well as to his superior Commanders for his strong character and his war experience. Reg. Commander Col. Akers, used to call him "...my eagle." For a long time, there were negotiations and a cease-fire agreement was to be signed on July 27, so CCF continued attacking to our positions, in order to remove MLR towards the south. On Dick Sector, Greek battalion faced such hostile attacks in 6 and 10 of June 1953 with a victory over the Chinese. After their defeat to O.P. DICK they attacked against O.P. HARRY, and then "the siege of Out Post Harry" started. I am not going to write you about that anything as you have written so many things very successfully. I will only mention that on the morning of June 16, by regimental order, GEF Battalion was assigned to defend the Harry Sector and his Outpost HARRY in order that the US battalions, all of which had suffered heavy causalities, could refit and reorganize. During the night of 16-17 June there was no significant action, permitting much-needed engineer work outpost to be accomplished by Company (P), GEF Battalion and elements of Company (B), 10th Engineer (C) Battalion. On the night of 17/18 June, the Chinese attacked Outpost HARRY from the northeast and northwest.

The enemy was repelled and forced to withdraw, by our Company (N) on the left, and the platoon of Heavy Tank Company, 15th Infantry Regiment, on the right. The direction of the battle and the coordination of the means available to the Commander of the Battalion was absolutely wonderful and well organized. It was an excellent defensive battle that produced the devastating effects on the enemy. The Battle of HARRY on 17/18 June 1953 was the ultimate culmination of Lt. Colonel Koumanakos' capability and experience.

The next event of my personal experience I wish to point out, has happened on 17th of July 1953, ten days before the shift of fires. Early on the morning of that day, our battalion was attacked on the MLR by estimated 2 CCF reinforced companies. After 1-hour-and-35-minute small arms and automatic weapons firefight, the enemy withdrew. Enemy casualties were: 40 counted killed. About 15.05 the afternoon of the same day, 200 CCF were sighted about 500 yards to the front of our Companies. Artillery and mortar fire was placed and then our Company, GEF Battalion, was dispatched to the vicinity of the Chinese. A firefight followed which lasted until 17.30 when all action ceased. Enemy casualties resulting from artillery and mortar fire and from the GEF contact, were 95 counted dead. There were also, one Officer and 14 soldiers prisoners taken by the GEF Battalion's action. It was my platoon that did this action. When these people fled to the intelligence section, it was found that the Officer was an important member of the Communist Party of China, and the soldiers belonged to

the special forces of the Chinese army. For this success of my platoon, I was honored with the gold medal for excellence bravery. An American TV channel interviewed me for a show on television. The Chinese officer was a professor and he had a little knowledge of the Greek language. He told me some Greek words and mentioned ancient Socrates and Aristoteles. During that interview, (the Panmunjom negotiators had reached an agreement)

I had met there the son of the USA President Eisenhower. He had the rank of Major and he told me.. "Lieutenant Arvanitis.. My father called me last night and told me that we have won an armistice on a single battleground, not a peace in the world. We may not now relax our guard nor cease our quest. And it is true." The signing of the armistice brought an end to the shooting, but it did not bring an end to the ideological war. Nobody won, but the countries that fought under the flag of the United Nations to prevent the conquest of South Korea had demonstrated their ability to put aside differences and act in concert against a common enemy. Those nations of highly diverse cultural, religious, and racial background, could rise above national pride in their never-ending fight to remain free. Among the units receiving the Distinguished Unit Citation for their performance on Harry, was the Greek Battalion for the night of June 17/18 of 1953.

Andreas, I have to close for now respecting the space of your book. I enclose two pictures of Col. Koumanakos. At the first he is between Greek soldiers and at the other with the superior commander of the United Nations Army, General Mark Clark. Best of luck.



GENERAL MARK W. CLARK, Gommander in Chief, U.N. Command (right), at the Greek Battalion headquarters. With him are (from left) Lt. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins, Commanding General, IX Corps; Lt. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Commanding General, Eighth Army; and Lt. Col. George Koumanacos, Commanding Officer of the Greek Battalion.



The USA Engineers Corp helped effectively for the victorious outcome of the battle on HARRY



This group of 10th Engineers fought on OP Harry alongside the Infantry, as well as preparing bunkers, digging trenches, laying mines and barbed wire. Chic Pelligrini, Ernie Kramer, Francis Riley (OPHSA VP), Rubin (Ruby) Baum (Medic attached to the 10th) and Ray Anderson.

Ernie Kramer





Ernie Kramer tells his experiences in Korea and while on OP Harry as a member Company B of the 10th Engineering Combat Battalion.

Combat

What an interesting word. What an interesting concept. Before I was engaged in combat in Korea during the night of 12 - 13 June 1953, I had only heard of the combat experiences of others. Until that night was ended, I had no way of knowing what a personal, singular, unique activity combat would be for me. Neither did I have awareness that memories of that night on Outpost Harry would live within me for decades, would cause such overwhelming terror and pain when they revisited my conscious thought - regardless of how much effort was put into not thinking about the events.

The year was 1953 early in January when I landed in Inchon and then proceeded north by rail, truck, and foot to a replacement depot. Shortly thereafter, I was assigned to the 10th Engineer Combat Battalion somewhere on line and finally to a squad of Baker Company (Company B). Within two hours after arriving, I was driving a "deuce and a half" (2 1/2 ton truck) with a convoy of several other trucks hauling dirt to a forward position. The blackness of the night was eerie and I had never

before followed tiny cat's eyes taillights of the truck in front of mine. I had no idea where I was, where we were going, or where my Company area was.

I dumped my load of dirt and was about to lower the truck dump bed and follow the other trucks out of the area. We had dumped the dirt within a few yards of several large rocket launch vehicles which at that moment fired their rockets.. I had never seen that kind of armament in basic training. The surprise of firing, the noise, the light, smoke, and heat of the launch really unnerved me so much so that I drove with my dump bed up in the raised position for a couple miles before I realized it. I was really rattled trying desperately to keep up with those tiny cat's eye taillights of the truck in front of me. was a very confident young man up to that point, b ut I knew then I had learned an important lesson about self control and vulnerability. From that moment on, I paid a great deal of attention to details.

I truly loved the work of the Combat Engineers. I worked without taking breaks much to the annoyance of other guys in my squad. This was never a matter of trying to be different, but simply that, before entering the Army, I had never taken breaks and I was not about to do something that I didn't feel the need for and which I considered a waste of time.

During the winter, I was on an assignment with a small crew to repair the road approach to a bridge over a river (name unknown/not remembered). The river was frozen from shore out to about 50 yards to open water. Our work

was done and we joined some Greek soldiers at the river's edge to say hello.

These soldiers had built a sauna inside the back of a deuce and a half and had it fired up really hot. They had an oil fired stove inside the truck and the heat pipe going out up through the truck's canvas top was cherry red, but functional. I accepted their invitation to join them. Even though it was quite cold outside, I was sweat soaked from working, so the idea of a sauna really sounded great. After about a half hour inside the truck, I told them I was going out to roll around in the snow, but they had a better idea. One of the Greek soldiers ran ahead with two grenades and blew a huge hole in the ice near the shore. Most of us jumped into the water and this was the end of the best sauna I have since enjoyed.

I knew at that moment these Greeks were great guys. Some time later when the weather had warmed, I was temporarily assigned to a Greek outfit for a couple days. I had expertise in demolition and was assigned to assist in building a 105 mm howitzer firing position at the front side of the hill for direct point blank firing at the enemy. The Greek soldiers and I had great fun building that firing position. I never did see the howitzer fire at the enemy, but heard later that the effort met with some success. Enemy forces were close, but inactive. They could be seen by naked eye digging out their trench lines with shovels immediately following a 7 to 8 hour air and

artillery strike on their position directly in front of the Greek position. I was told that the enemy was reluctant to encounter Greek forces because the Greeks were such fierce and courageous fighters. I found no reason to doubt that

As I recall, only two of the Greek soldiers spoke English, heir commander (a Colonel, I believe) and the Mess Sergeant. I had no problem communicating with The Greek soldiers - the common language we shared was hand signs and pig-English - very effective.

I did notice same differences in attitude between American and Greek forces. I thought Greeks were very casual in presence of the enemy. American forces generally observed some precautions (armoured vests and helmets always worn within sight of enemy forces and only in small groups because large groups of GIs seemed to draw mortar fire.) The Greeks were much more relaxed in their conduct seeming only to disperse and to wear helmets and armoured vests if they were under fire. At about midday at the first day of assignment with the Greek force, most of us were on the back side of the hill awaiting the noon meal. That is when I met the mess Sergeant and had the pleasure of enjoying one of the finest meals I had eaten in Korea. Long lines were formed as we picked up our food trays and meals from the mess trailer which the Mess Sergeant had brought up from a rear area. What a banquet: each man got half a roasted chicken, two loaves of bread still hot from the oven, fresh

green salad and fruit (I hadn't seen that for weeks) and steaming hot, strong, delicious coffee. We all went through the chow line and gathered in groups of 10 to 15 to thoroughly enjoy the meal. My thought at the time was - it's no wonder these are great guys - they eat like kings. This was my expedience with the Greek forces in Korea. I remain proud to have had the opportunity to serve with them. Even today, when I eat in a Greek restaurant or when I meet someone either from Greece or with Greek heritage, I reflect on and I often mention my personal respect and high regard held for the courageous effort made in Korea by this small nation's great sense of commitment to humanity.

And now - to my recollection of one night of combat. At the close of an uneventful day after the evening meal in a rear company area of the 10th Engineer Combat Battalion somewhere in Korea, my Squad Leader, Asbury Cole, told me volunteers were being sought for a detail in front of Outpost Harry. Of course I volunteered - I volunteered for everything as a young man. Approximately 13 of us from Baker and Charlie Companies were to lay a triple belt antipersonnel minefield to slow down enemy personnel anticipated to again attack Outpost Harry. We were told that the 15th Regiment held the OP on the night of the 10th and had sustained high casualties. There was allegedly less activity from the enemy on the night of the 11th and the expectation was that they would strike again

in force on the night of the 12th. If we could lay these AP mines, it would deter the advance expected that night. Thus, our force of 13 Combat Engineers (2 officers and 11 enlisted men) proceeded to the OP. I was not aware that we had any officers with us on that assignment, but learned of it many years later upon receiving a copy of the Morning Report of the 10th Engineer Combat Battalion from 10 June to 20 June 53. That report



(The photo is used courtesy of Chic Pellegrini and shows the east slope of Outpost Harry looking North toward Star. The CCF trench from Star is clearly shown in this view.)

indicates that of this group of 13 Engineers, 4 enlisted men were killed that night and 2 officers and 7 enlisted men were wounded. We were transported to the OP by armoured personnel carriers. There were approximately 10 12 Katusas (members of the Korean Service Corps, non military Korean men aged 36 to 50 years of age conscripted to assist UN Forces - mostly manual labour.)

The Katusas assisted us that night in carrying antipersonnel mines to the site.

Armoured personnel carriers could no longer reach our position to evacuate the Engineer detail and we were told that we would stay the night and function as Infantry.

Since the enemy was anticipated to attack, as was customary, during early hours of the morning, we proceeded to ground in front of OP Harry at approximately 1830 hours. Before all AP mines could be laid and armed, we were receiving small arms fire of a large force from positions to the northwest, north, and northeast of our position, so we withdrew to the OP. Shortly thereafter, a small force of enemy managed to gain the trenches on the south approach to the OP after the hill received enemy fire. mortar and artillery

Lieutenant James W. Evans, commanding Company A, 5th Regimental Combat Team, which occupied OP Harry during the night of 12 - 13 June 1953, recalls that during the night, there suddenly appeared in the command bunker a Lt. Colonel of the l0th Engineer Combat Battalion asking him, "... if there was anything he (the Engineers) could do to help."

I was in the trench on the southern approach to the OP when the enemy soldiers first appeared having come through artillery fire (I assume through their own fire.) The enemy (I was to learn weeks later in an article I read in an army hospital) were members of the 8th CCF (Chinese Communist Forces.) We thought we were

fighting North Koreans.

I recall vividly their black pyjama-like uniforms and black flat baseball caps. The first 3 enemy I saw suddenly appeared at the east edge of the trench immediately above me. I was still hunkered down as deep in the trench as I could get during the incoming artillery and mortar barrage. I half expected they would appear soon because you could clearly hear shouts and those terrifying, infernal whistles nearby just moments before.

It took me only a moment to realize that I had to fire this was the enemy - that is what had to be done or die for
hesitating. I had borrowed a camouflaged helmet and a
carbine for this mission from my squad leader, Asbury
Cole. I have wondered for decades if he ever found out
his helmet and his carbine were blown apart and
destroyed on me that night. I have tried to find him for
years - unsuccessfully.

I had 3 double clips of ammunition (a total of 90 rounds) for my weapon and I fired 15 rounds at these 3 soldiers. They tumbled into the trench almost on top of me and I immediately unloaded, reversed the clip, and fired 15 more rounds into their spastic bodies. They were all immediately still - no movement at all - very dead. My first thought was that my ammo would not last if I continued to fire at this rate. I had to gain control of myself.

There were 3 young soldiers dead at my feet - dead because I killed them. They were the first human lives I had caused to end. They looked so young. Where were their uniforms? Where were their weapons? They carried no guns - one had a short stick. Why were they wearing those old fashioned rubber sneakers on their feet? Is this what the enemy used instead of combat boots? How could kids that young be involved in this grisly business of killing? Nevertheless, they were very dead. I expected more would come. But when?

I attached my bayonet and double checked that it was secure. I again thought about those 3 dead enemies. I felt no worse than when I killed ducks, geese, rabbits, crows, squirrels, pheasant, or grouse years earlier. This was the same process - except that there was no time for stalking, taking sure aim, or hoping for a chance at a second shot if the first one missed.

I was surprised I had no sense of regret or sorrow - this had to be done. I moved a few feet away in the trench and there were 3 more soldiers standing/crouching at the top of the east side again. They jumped into the trench right on me. I fired one shot into the one on my left. The shot went low into his neck and I can sometimes still hear the loud gurgling sound he made for a while. As I moved my carbine to the right, the second soldier fell right unto my bayonet. I was knocked to my knees. The third soldier landed on my shoulders and back. We fought, punched, wrestled and scrambled until his neck snapped loudly

when I slammed his head into the side of the trench. I scrambled back to the second gook where I had lost my weapon. My bayonet had penetrated the centre of his chest and he was still draped over it - twitching and dying. I rolled him over and tried to retrieve my weapon. I could not pull my bayonet out of his chest - even by standing on his throat and pulling as hard as I could. I fired a few rounds into his chest, worked the bayonet up and down, and was able to retrieve it. The blade was clean. That made me gag and wretch. I did not throw up. I had to conserve my ammo. I still had 3 full 15 round clips and part of another. I still had not thrown my 3 frag grenades - one was on each shoulder and one at my right hip.

And then - nothing. This was scary. Where were they? I looked at my watch and it was a little before 2300 hours. There was still dirt so thick in the air you could barely breathe or see. Listen - harder. Don't move. Don't make a sound. Listen again. Where are they? Where was everyone else? Was there anyone else? Where? Listen! What happened to the trench? It was deeper down below - shallower ahead. Wait. Listen. No voices. Who is moaning? Where is it coming from? Enemy? Friendly? Moaning stops. What in hell is that GI doing laying up an top of the west side of the trench ahead. Maybe he's hurt - check it out - maybe he needs help. "Hey, buddy, are you all right? Get down in the trench? No answer. Quiet.

flash. His right arm is hanging down into the trench - he's Negro - was he with us?

I stood up and grabbed his right shoulder to help him into the trench. "Oh Cripes, no wonder he didn't answer, his face is gone". His face was scooped out of his skull leaving just his lower jaw - really healthy looking, teeth. Inside the back of his skull was clean - so clean - strange. Over the years I have wondered and felt really terrible about not pulling his body down into the relative safety of the trench. Was his body ever found? Was it identified? Did the rats eat him too? Who was he? Did I know him? Why didn't I look for his dog tags? Where is everyone else? Where are the guys I came here with? Where are the bunkers the 15th is supposed to be in? Is anyone else on the hill - supposed to be the 15th? Do the gooks have the hill now? Why is it so quiet - what's going on? Where am I? Quiet - listen - harder - still no yelling - and no whistles - where are they?

There was sporadic shelling for the next couple of hours. Even though I looked for them, I was unable to locate any bunkers in the trench. I knew there were bunkers there an OP Harry. I had been an a work detail some months earlier to repair and reinforce bunkers with 12 by 12 timbers, rocks, and dirt. I thought about what to do if I found one of the bunkers. Who would be in it - enemy - friendly? How would I let them know who I was? If they were enemy, would I use my pineapple to neutralize them? How could I be sure?

I crawled along the trench slowly up and to the north and suddenly realized there were two other GIs there with me - on either side of me. We said very little listening intensely. Overhead artillery burst nearby momentarily lit the dirt-laden air with a bizarre brown glow for perhaps 2 to 3 seconds and then darkness again. Then there was a loud buzzing sound like a model airplane engine screaming - getting louder and louder. Where was it what was it? Then something slammed into my flack jacket behind my right shoulder with a force that knocked the wind out of me. I thought "grenade" and immediately turned in the trench to find it to throw it out. Right next to my right knee I found the "grenade", which was not a grenade after all, but a shell fragment so hot that it burned the inside of my right hand. We were OK. These 2 GIs chose to stay there and I moved up into the trench on to the northern slope. This would be where the gooks would come from and where I could do most good. Relative quiet - spooky, weird quiet continued unnerving me when sporadic mortar or artillery rounds would again calm me down after realization that I was still OK. The worst scare was not the heat and deafening noise of nearby blasts, but the close ZZZIP and THUD of shell fragments and shrapnel burying into trench walls just inches from my face - time after time after time making me wonder just how many times can I beat the odds. Noise was beyond deafening - that sense was temporarily no longer functioning. The blast of

concussion from nearby bursts would repeatedly shudder loose clothing anywhere on my body. Where are those bunkers? I've got to get out of this trench and into some kind of shelter - anything would be better than being out here in the open.

At approximately 0200 hours hell became reality and reality became hell. There ensued an intensity and frequency of explosive detonations far beyond my capability to describe it. After the first few minutes of this ever increasing barrage of earth shattering madness, it's devastation expanding beyond my capacity to imagine it, I felt a strange calm. I knew at that moment that there was nothing on earth I could do to influence this situation. I realized how infinitesimally small and insignificant my life was. I realized that I should probably have been terrified, but strangely I was not even frightened. There was work yet to be done and to do it, I had to rely on myself. I could not count on anyone else there was no one else. I was just an observer along for the ride completely unable to alter the course of this ride - no matter what the outcome. I thought if I was to come out of this battle alive, it would be good to do worthy and beneficial things with this gift. I changed an important point of view which I had held up to that point in my thinking life - I realized at that moment that Man, in fact, had created God, not the other way around. Over the next few hours, this geographic bump called Outpost Harry, some 300 yards high and located some 400+ yards

northeast of the 8th Army Main Line of Resistance (then) and some 300+ yards south of a much larger hill mass known as Star Hill (occupied by enemy forces) engendered importance beyond its size. It was highly sought by enemy forces at the close of the Korean conflict and worthy of costly defence to UN forces because its height, which was not equalled within a mile, offered occupying forces excellent observation of the enemy's intent and preparation for movement to the main line of battle.

Occupation of this hill was paid for at a terrible price of lives lost, bodies maimed and with equally intense tragedy, the denigration of minds. Can anyone who was there in the fight on Outpost Harry really find any sense or meaning in calling the Korean conflict, "The Forgotten War". I think not. It is for each of us to resolve the personal burden of dealing with memories of OP Harry each in his own way for as many years as it takes. It is inevitably and finally a personal resolution. Talking about that one terrible night I spent in combat on OP Harry sometimes brings me sleepless nights, frightening nightmares I would rather do without, short temper, and other activities that seem to lie dormant within me - all of which it would seem I could just forget about and be done with. Maybe this time it will work... Back to the hill.

Shortly aver 0200 hours, I found a pocket in the wall of the trench where recoilless rifle rockets were stored. I

squeezed myself into that niche to find some kind of cover from the rain of shrapnel. There were enemy troops everywhere and the northern slope in and out of the trench. They seemed to be on the move to somewhere and acted as confused as I was. All I focused on was - if it moved, if it wore black pyjamas and sneakers, I had to kill it before it tried to kill me. The fighting was intense at that point.

I saw only two enemy troops with weapons that entire night. The first one held a grease gun. He was standing up on the edge of the trench holding his weapon pointing away from me. In the momentary light from the burst of an artillery round, I could see his face clearly - a large square block face with slits for eyes. He saw me below him and before he could bring the muzzle of his weapon around to his right, I shot him squarely in the face. From that moment, I knew that the head shot was the thing to try for - clean kill, decisive, and took only one round to preserve my ammo. Most of my remaining shots were head shots because the enemy was on us in the trench. The second weapon I saw that night was a stick grenade. This was carried by a rather large soldier who had it cocked back in his right arm ready to throw. He was losing his balance gaining the trench when I killed him another clean head shot. I was rattled for a moment thinking the grenade was going to drop into the trench, but it fell to the downhill side where he came from and all was quiet there for a short time. What kind of an enemy was this - so young, so poorly armed and equipped? This was sheer insanity and these guys were trying to kill me.

At approximately 0230 I was still leaning into the rocket storage cache when I was hit by a grenade (probably) which blew the fore stock off of my carbine rendering it unworkable, taking with it some of my hand, and blowing a hole in the back right side of my helmet big enough to pass a tennis ball through. I was momentarily stunned, heard a high pitched ringing in my ears, and could taste and smell blood, nothing really hurt. I was just numb and then got angry when, in the dim momentary light of shell bursts, I thought surely I was going blind. I had thought about that and blindness was the one thing I did not want to happen to me.

Colonel Albro L. Parsons, Jr., commander of the 10th Engineer Combat Battalion from about April until December of 1953 had indicated to Colonel Louis Feroni, commander of the 36th Engineer Group, some time after this night, that he was slightly injured by shrapnel from the same grenade that hit me. The irony is that I did not find out about that until months later from Colonel Feroni. At the time of battle, I did not know that anyone near me was wounded or I would have asked for help with the tourniquet. I knew I could not look at my hand after I tied the tourniquet. I knew it did not hurt. I knew the fight was not over.

When I regained my senses, I could see fingers of my left hand lying back down on my wrist and I had a major pumping bleed - not good. The light was poor and only sporadic; there was dirt thick everywhere in the air. From the first aid kit on my belt, I tied a tourniquet around my wrist to stop the blood flow. I tied it off and tightened it with a piece of wood. The blood flow stopped and I moved to the south to find another weapon.

There were bodies and body parts everywhere. This was a nightmare. As before I was hit, I removed more bodies from the trench to retain same cover. The trench was now less than 3 feet deep in same areas. In all, I threw (and later lifted) 7 dead enemy out of the trench to gain cover. In this area there were 4 dead GIs, whose bodies I left in the trench. I needed the cover they were taking, but it didn't seem right to expose their bodies to more harm out of the trench. The thinking we undergo is strange in the afterglow.

Some minutes later, I found an MI rifle with part of a clip in it on a dead GI. I knew he was dead because both his legs were gone, so I took the rifle. There was a round in the chamber, but I didn't have reason to fire it (and may not have been able to even if I had to.) A GI nearby said I was hit and should move ahead to the command bunker which was, he said, just about thirty yards ahead. I made my way to the command bunker and cautiously proceeded inside where I met the Commanding Officer of

the 5th RCT. This man, I found out same 40 years later,

was in fact, Lt. James W. Evans, who has become a steadfast and true friend. The CO looked me over, told me to give my weapon to another officer in the bunker, and to get over into a corner of the bunker out of harm's way. I gave my M1 to the other officer and proceeded back out of the bunker into the trench. I thought this officer had lost his senses because there was work to be done out in the trench where the enemy still was. I also knew if the enemy found this bunker, anyone inside it would surely be killed.

There were two cases of concussion grenades in the trench at the entrance to the bunker. I dragged one case with me heading toward the southward slope where I thought most of the enemy were entering the trench.. Over the next several hours, I threw a grenade every time I heard voices or other sounds of the enemy outside the trench. The grenades had two second delay fuses in them and I counted off one second after releasing the handle before throwing the grenade. That way, I was confident these grenades would not be thrown back into the trench. I had thrown almost the whole case of grenades by daylight and sustained no further injury. The only thing that really hurt during that entire night was my eye tooth, which got really sore from pulling the pins from the grenades.

A recurring disturbing memory is of having to crawl over dead bodies and body parts, arms, legs, heads, hands many hands, feet, footless boots and sneakers, torsos, and

several heads. All these body parts of friend and enemy alike were slippery and soft. It was a horrible sensation to have to crawl, sometimes walk on them and feel them give way underneath my weight. It still makes me shudder to recall that sensation - this was a slaughterhouse. The noise from some corpses was unnerving. In each case of noise, I made certain that a live person was not making the noise, just a corpse - there were so many - so many.

I didn't see another live GI in the trench until hours later - well into sunrise when it was obvious that the fighting had stopped. I think I was headed down the southward slope of the hill, but was not certain because of the incredible change in appearance of the hill and of the trench. This part of the trench could not have been 2 feet deep now. Just a few hours earlier this same trench was at least 5 to 5 1/2 feet deep.

Much later, at the bottom of the hill, I was really tired and sat down to rest against - I don't remember whether it was a tree stump or a pile of dirt - to await help. I kept dozing off. I woke to the sound of someone saying, «My God, this one's alive." A GI kneeled in front of me and carefully removed my helmet. When the helmet finally came off, huge clots of coagulated and fresh blood flowed down over my face and neck from the scalp wound received earlier. This poor GI just lost it. He must have thought he pulled off the top of my head. He wretched and vomited all over my boots. I felt sorry for

him I was loaded onto the left rear corner of the floor of a personnel carrier. Another wounded GI was loaded in above me in a litter and we were on our way to an aid station, I guess. When we started moving, the noise inside was very loud. Blood from the GI above me would pour down over me at each bump and worse at each turn. I yelled to the driver to stop this guy's bleeding, but he couldn't hear me. When we arrived wherever it was we were taken, people placed me on a litter and took away my remaining grenade. Someone looked down into my face and said "Take this one first". My litter was loaded onto the pod of a helicopter (starboard side), a Plexiglas canopy was secured over my upper torso, and I woke up some 3 days later on a hospital train on our way to Taegu (I think.) After some surgical interventions at the 279th Army hospital in Osaka, I was shipped to the Valley Forge Army Hospital in Phoenixville, Pennsylvania, where I remained a patient until my discharge from military service some 8 months later.

I came out of Korea alive and perhaps somewhat wiser and very grateful to have survived. What did I learn from this? I learned that in combat we exist alone and we survive sometimes because of our singleness of purpose and attention to detail. I have heard many references to the camaraderie of troops in battle, to finding God, to the strength of togetherness. In the heat of battle, I have experienced none of this. It may well be that several people were responsible for getting me off that hill alive,


but I am unaware of it. I learned about self reliance. I learned about the strength of loneliness. I learned that persistence is omnipotent. Most importantly, I learned that life is fleeting, it is fragile and it is precious.



Men of Engineers Corp workink to construct new bankers or to repair the damages caused from the intensive fires.



Ray Anderson



The picture of the Command bunker by the MLR is very familiar to me. I haven't seen that sight in some 49 years. It was our hopping off point for our trek to Outpost Harry. A journey I never looked forward to. I have a picture of Outpost Harry that I've captioned, "The long climb to death's doorstep". My Greek counter parts called it "Death Place".

I was on the Outpost every day except for one from June 11-18th. Lost most of our squad and two platoon leaders. I recall the morning of June 11th. Like it was like yesterday. We arrived at that jumping off point to make our way to Harry. There was shooting going on all around

and there was this one soldier in a shallow trench just shaking and crying. I guess it was just battle fatigue. We were ordered to fix bayonets and told we were going to have go up and chase the Chinese off the Outpost. That order was changed as we had to pile into an armored personnel carrier for our run up to Harry. It carried us right to the supply bunker.

From that point we jumped into the trench line and made our way up to the top of Harry. The scene was just grotesque. The dead everywhere were and in every imaginable condition. No heads, parts of heads, parts of bodies. Being thrust into that situation like is




being hit in the head with a sledge hammer. You can't describe the carnage to someone unless they have witnessed it.

Just as we got to the top of Harry, The Chinese put down this horrible artillery & rocket barrage. I was certain I wasn't going to make it. But God was on my side as I

prayed for survival. I was just fortunate that I didn't have to stay up there at night. It was bad enough during the day.

The photo at right is of me with a captured Chinese burp gun. The burp gun was in excellent condition and I was going to bring it home with me but couldn't figure out a way to get it past inspections. So I just ended up giving it away.



Distinguished Unit Citation Company P, Greek Expeditionary Forces Battalion (Second Award)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Washington D. C., 10 March 1955 GENERAL ORDERS 18 DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION



Company P Greek Expeditionary Forces Battalion (Second Award) is cited for extraordinary heroism and outstanding performance of duty in action against an armed enemy in the vicinity of Surang-NI, Korea during the period 17 June to 18 June 1953. Assigned the defence of a vital outpost position (Harry), the company encountered a major enemy assault on the evening of June 17. After an intense concentration of enemy mortar and artillery fire, the hostile forces, which had taken up an attack position on the northeast and northwest side of the outpost, moved rapidly through their own and friendly artillery fire to gain a foothold on the northern slope of the position? Refusing to withdraw, Company P closed in and met the attackers in a furious hand to hand struggle in which many of the enemy were driven off. The aggressors regrouped, quickly attacked a second

time, and again gained the friendly trenches.⁶ Immediately, the Greek Forces launched a series of counterattacks, simultaneously dispatching a diversionary force to the east of the outpost which successfully channelled the enemy thrusts. After 2 hours of close in fighting, the aggressors were again routed and the friendly positions restored. The outstanding conduct and exemplary courage exhibited by members of Company P, Greek Expeditionary Forces Battalion, reflects great credit on them and are in keeping with the finest traditions of the military service and the Kingdom of Greece

⁶ No aggressor has put his foot in the Greek trenches. They reached the barber line and then the Battalion Commander, Lt Col. George Koumanakos ordered the counter attack and the CCF were repelled. The new documents of the battle on that point are quite clear.



From left to right: Lt Col Elias Prokos, Lt Col George Koumanakos, his adjutant First Lieut. Mike Perimenis and Brigadier General Vlassis. Lt Prokos was the new GEF Commanding Officer from Jult 20, 1953.

Mosxos Tsiakiris



Greek Army Sergeant My name is Mosxos Evaggelou Tsiakiris and I was born in Soufli a small town of the Evros province in Northeast Greece, on 8th June 1929 In 1953 I was serving national service as an Artillery first class sergeant at **Paylos** Melas in Thessalonica. I voluntarily joined the

mission as an artillery sergeant participating in 14th mission of the Hellenic Forces to the Korean War. We departed from Vouliagmeni (near Athens) on 18th of March 1953 and arrived in Pussan Korea on 18th April 1953

Upon our arrival we immediately departed for the front line by train. We reached the front line by midnight. A convoy was waiting for us there in order to forward us the "C" assembling point. The driver of the vehicle where

I was a co driver was a soldier named Koskinas, a friend of mine from the artillery training camp of Megalo Pefko. When we arrived at "C" point the infantry elements remained there for a week's fire practice while we, due to the lack of antitank artillery personnel, were directly forwarded to the front line.

The driver of the GMC vehicle was as Dimopoulos Panagiotis from a village called Nemea Korinthias. I asked him were the front line was and showed me a burned top hill, just across to the location we were the moment. My assignment was an antitank platoon commander's assistant. Dimopoulos said that this hill was our destination.

When we approached the location's cookhouse the Chinese artillery started firing on us. We took cover as fast as we could. I hide under 4burell tank, which was there, and the rest of my comrades took cover wherever they could.

After the cease firing every one took his position according with his duties. My self as a platoon commander's assistant, I took the command of the right side and the platoon commander Lt. Pavlos Andreou the left one

Two days after the old antitank platoon commander Lt. Maragoudakis came to say goodbye to us but at that exact time that the change of platoon's command was taking place he was killed by enemy fire. We had been replaced and after spending one week behind the line in order regain our strength we marched for the Dick high. We started at midnight in a formation of a single file, keeping distance of 2 meters between us, having orders how to react in case of an attack. The path was marked by phosphorescent elements.

Finally we arrived at the front line, which was under the control of the American troops. Military police was there as well. We took our positions and again I took the right flank while the new Lt. took the left one.

We had spent there about 20 days digging trenches and taking out the dead bodies of N. Korean soldiers just to make space to protect our selves. I remember that at that time I said to my self "This is what it written in the Bible: you the dead ones get out of the way so we the living ones to take your place!"

Then a soldier came and told me to report the battalion's command post noting that I should be shaved before. I did so and I went to the command post. I found there the officers of the infantry company. They were all upset commenting that the Commanding Officer had sold them out. I asked them: "Why he sold us out; after all we are volunteers aren't we?" They answered: do you know were they are sending us? We are going to HARRY!

The jeeps were ready to transport the American platoon leaders for a reconnaissance mission to the HARRY location. I was the co driver in one of these

vehicles. We drove till we passed Seoul⁷ and then we made a left turn and continued for about 1500 meters through a smoke screen. We stepped down from the jeep and using the smoke screen as cover we started to walk towards our positions.

Then we all of us saw on the ground about 22 gear sets, which used to belong to dead comrades of ours. We were all upset but we continued to walk till we found the American Lt. who was the platoon leader there and we proceed. After a gully we started to climb the up hill till we reached and AT 75 type position constantly under the observation of the Chinese who were on the opposite side of the hill.

Just a few seconds before we reach our target location the Chinese started to fire at us with smoke grenades. Then I yield to the American Lt. and to the rest to take cover immediately because these smoke grenades were marking us for the enemy's artillery.

I haven't finished my words and the fire started. My self and two Americans the Lt. and a sergeant took cover in a nearby natural shelter. For the next 20 minutes we lived in a living hell. We all thought that we wouldn't live longer and we were ready to start smoking our last

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⁷ It is obvious that Snt Tsiakiris, describe the invitation of the officers and the Squad leaders by the Greek Battalion Commander to announce them that the Battalion will move from the Sector Dick to the Sector Harry. So Seoul has no reference here.

cigarette when all of the sudden the Chinese stopped firing at us. We started to move again and a met two Greek Lts. One of them was saying that the other had saved his life twice within the last 30 minutes. We continued the reconnaissance in order to mark positions for our guns and after that we left the location. Later that day the replacement of the American unit took place during day light despite all the military regulations after the command of our C.O. Colonel Koumanakos.⁸

For the next two days we worked hard preparing out positions taking advantage that the Chinese didn't hit us. On the 18 of June 1900 hours they started firing at us with heavy artillery shells. We all took our positions. I had specially prepared my guns firing position and after I put all the rest of the personnel in to a safe place except for my gunner and my shooter we started to fight back. Fortunately at that first night two six engine planes flew above us and fired flares and bombed the enemy positions. The Chinese forces at that night tried to take us by surprise but thank God a Greek corporal named Dimitrios Pasallis from the town of Orestiada saved the entire battalion reacting in a very heroic and effective

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⁸ And at this point Tsiakiris is not right. It is known that CCF were attacking during the night. GEF had to move from sector Dick to sector Harry. Guess two Battalions changing position in the night and the CCF to launch their attack. Re CO Akers Jn.in his reports writes that all the necesary works were becoming during the day light, because the Chinese use to attack by night.

way and the enemy forces were apprehended in time. For this action Passalis was later promoted to sergeant and decorated with the golden Metal of courage.


Captain Visiotis (1st Lt. C. Pissiotas - ed.) was injured that night and in the morning we found out we had six killed in action and seventeen injured comrades. I remember that at night I had fired in total 4 full loads of artillery, 2 loads of antitank and 2 loads of antipersonnel ammunitions. Every 2 shell I was firing an antitank one as a tracer in order hit more accurately my target Some time in the early morning around 0500am Cpt. Argrafiotis who was looking for my Lt. Andreou told me to cease fire and preserve my last 10 shells for the ceasefire period. In the morning we left our position forgetting to secure the gun's breech hold resulting to a serious malfunction. I had afraid that had to pay for that but fortunately my commanding officer managed the breech hold to be replaced within 2 hours without any further complications for me. In the next morning and we went behind the line at the height 412 to get some rest and wait there for our replacement to take place. By that time Lt Col Prokos Helias had arrived there in order to take over as the new Battalion Commander.9

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⁹ Sergeant Tsiakiris is wrong again. Lt Col Koumanakos continued to be the Commanding Officer of GEF, formally until July 20, 1953. But it is known that on 17+18 condacted and won a roughshod battle against CCF. Still it is known he left the Battalion on October 19. In the next page see a photo

It was the same day when the Eastern line broke and the Allied Command sent us there. We fought there in three different lines until the ceasefire was signed and thus the operation at Harry location had ended. On July 27th 1953 we met the enemy's troops and we exchanged cigars instead of firing each other. In the beginning both sides withdraw 3 kilometers each and 3 days after the final demilitarized zone was extended up to 6 kms. Those who participated in operation Harry were decorated with the Kandou metal, which means strength in Korean. Many years after that period when I was in Frankfurt W. Germany as an emigrant. I saw there the American base of Harry's veterans.

Fortunately at that first night two six engine planes flew above us and fired flares and bombed the enemy positions. The Chinese forces at that night tried to take us by surprise but thank God a Greek corporal named Dimitrios Pasallis from the town of Orestiada saved the entire battalion reacting in a very heroic and effective way and the enemy forces were apprehended in time. For this action Passalis was later promoted to sergeant and decorated with the golden Metal of courage.



Lt. Col George Koumanakos and Lt Col Hlias Prokos keeping the icon of Madonna Maria {Panagias} at her name day on August 15, 1953.

HELLENIC FORCES



HEADQUARTERS
GREEK EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
G.A.P.O. 5800

15 Sept. 1953

SUBJECT: Honorary Membership

TO :

:Captain Martin Markley Cheynne, Wyo. U.S. of America

It is a distinct pleasure to me to appoint Captain Martin Markley, U.S. Army, an honorary member of the Greek Expeditionary Porces Battalion in acknowledgement of his services offered to this gallant unit.

The sincere co-operation of Captain Martin Markley and his utmost contribution to the successful accomplishment of the missions assigned this Battalion are greatly appreciated by every Officer and Men of the Greek Expeditionary Forces and reflects great credit on himself and the United States Army.

Effective this date, Captain Martin Markley, an honorary member of the heroic GEF Bn, is entitled to wear the "HELLENIC FORCES" Patch

> KOUMANAKOS GEORGE Lt.Col. Inf. Commanding GEF En.

Koumanakos as Commanding Officer of GEF, singeing the honorary membership of Martin Markley, on 15th of September 1953.



This panorama was made from two pictures taken by Bob Brandon on OP Harry in March of '53. He made the shots from the left forward flank of the OP. The view is directly North from that vantage point and shows Star against the sky about 1/3 of the way in from the left margin. The darker ridge leading from Star to the barbed wire below the excavation at the right was one of the routes of approach to the OP for the CCF. A CCF trench can be seen at right center. (Photos courtesy of Bob Brandon, commentary by James Jarboe)

OUTPOST HARRY

From Voices from the Korean War: Personal Stories of American, Korean, and Chinese Soldiers By Richard Peters and Xiaobing Li Chapter 18: Outpost Harry

Between June 10 and June 18, 1953, just weeks before the end of the war, the Chinese made a determined attempt to take Outpost Harry, one of a series of outposts in the central section of the front. The defence of the outpost was assigned to the U.S. Third Division and its attached units, the Fifth RCT and the Greek **Expeditionary Force.** Although the battle is unknown to most Americans, the intensity of the fighting equalled the most bitterly fought battles of the war. Each night a single company defended the outpost but suffered such high casualties (59 percent average) that on the following night it would be replaced by another company. The battle is typical of the kind of fighting that took place toward the end of the war, when the Chinese increased the frequency of their attacks, mostly against outposts, primarily for the purpose of strengthening their bargaining position in the peace negotiations.

There was never a safe time to be on Outpost Harry. The Greeks had a name for it and it was called "Death Place". Our motto is, "WE HELD". And indeed. We did!

ENTRIES IN THE 15TH INFANTRY S2/S3 JOURNAL FROM 31 MAY TO 30 JUNE, 1953



Photo by James Jarbon, Jone 13th 1953

A RECORD OF EVENTS DURING THE DEFENSE OF OUTPOST HARRY

EXCERPTS FROM 15th INFANTRY S2/S3 JOURNAL 31 MAY to 30 JUNE 1953

31 MAY

- 2036 P Company patrol departed MLR Thomas
- 2116 P Company ambush patrol in position Economopoulos
- 2325 5 CCF engaged GEF LP in a 10 minute small arms, automatic weapons firefight with enemy disengaging and withdrawing. Results were 2 friendly WIAs and no estimate on enemy casualties
 - Pappas

1 JUNE

- 0315 P Company patrol closes MLR Yanakopoulos
- 2105 P Company patrol departed MLR Thanos
- 2134 P Company ambush patrol in position Economopoulos
- 2327 P Company patrol engaged 30-35 CCF in small arms fire fight. After 20 minutes, enemy disengaged and friendliness withdrew, regrouped and resupplied with ammo and returned to screen battle site. Casualties: Friendly, 1 WIA Enemy, est 4 KIAs, 5 WIAs Pappas

- 0340 Ambush patrol closed MLR Yanakopolos
- 2055 P Company ambush patrol left MLR Hallis
- 2132 Ambush patrol in position Hallis

3 JUNE

- 0340 Ambush patrol closed MLR. Negative enemy contact. Yanakopolos
- 2125 Ambush patrol in position Economopolos

5 JUNE

- 0350 Ambush patrol closed MLR. Negative contact.
- 1545 K Company, 15th Infantry Regiment relieves F Company, 65th Infantry Regiment on OP Harry.
- 2055 P Company ambush patrol crossed LD Thanos
- 2115 Ambush patrol in position Thanos

- 0250 K Company reports mortar round on OP Harry
- 0410 P Company ambush patrol returned to MLR. Negative contact.
- 0430 PVT Wilson evacuated to 3rd Clear Station after slight wound on OP Harry Mortar fragments.
- 1740 Heavy Mortar Company, 5th RCT comes under operational control of 15th Infantry.
- 2048 P Company patrol departed MLR Hallis
- 2228 OP Harry reports 4 yellow parachute flares to the Right of OP.
- 2240 OP Harry reports 1 yellow parachute flare to left of North Star.
- 2345 P Company ambush patrol engaged an estimated reinforced enemy company in a 2 hour, 45 minute SA, AW, and hand grenade fire fight. At 0230 Enemy withdrew. One wounded PW was captured

but died while being evacuated to the MLR. An estimated 100 rounds of enemy mortar fell in vicinity of patrol during period. Friendly casualties:

3 KIA and 6 WIA. Enemy casualties were 1 counted KIA, 19 estimated KIA and 32 estimated WIA.

7 JUNE

- 0040 OP Harry reported hearing someone cutting wire To their right. Fired 1 illum flare, saw movement. Fired 2nd flare with negative results.
- 0110 OP Harry reported sighted small arms fire firing down Happy Valley from Star Mass into Greek sector.
- 0130 -OP Harry reported 5 white parachute flares at azimuth 328 degrees, 3500 yards.
- 0510 OP Harry sighted 9 CCF on Star. Artillery fired. Est 5 KIA

8 JUNE

- 2140 OP Harry rptd illuminating HG fired on road Leading from OP Harry to MLR. Are now investigating.
- 2232 OP Harry rptd sighting of illum HG over in Happy Valley.

- 0045 OP Harry heard noises, fired flares, no enemy sighted.
- 0145 OP Harry reported trip flare set off 300 yards north of Harry, negative sightings.
- 0350 P Company ambush patrol closed MLR. Negative

- contact
- 0505 OP Harry sighted 10 CCF in trench on Star. Artillery fired. Results unknown.
- 0545 Tank Company spotted 1 CCF on Star Hill. Tanks fired Results 1 KIA
- 0930 OP Harry reports 2 CCF observers at CT 518417.
- 1550 OP Harry -Friendly air strike at CT 505425. 2 planes.
- 2035 Air liaison officer from 5th RCT, LT. Nix, reported to 15th Inf CP.
- 2045 OP Harry sighted 20 CCF to their left moving south. 15 CCF moving down from Hill 412 toward Harry. Arty notified.
- 2050 OP Harry reported 3 CCF moving south from Star Hill. Arty notified.
- 2100 P Company ambush patrol on position.
- 2140 OP Harry reports receiving mortar fire from draw behind Hill 412. Arty LNO took azimuth of flashes and notified FDC

- 0125 OP Harry rpts SA fire fight to left of OP Dick
- 0140 OP Harry rpts MG firing from Star to Happy Valley
- 0155 Company N patrol from GEF receiving small arms and mortar fire.
- 0155 OP Harry rpts mortar fire from behind Star Hill.
- 0221 OP Harry fired flare to left front with negative results.
- 0235 OP Harry rpts mortar flashes at 1600 mils and vicinity Bunker Hill
- 0445 OP Harry rpts hearing small arms fire vicinity of Hill 412.
- 0520 COL Koumanakos of GEF rpts screening patrol

left of OP Dick found 7 CCF bodies in creek bed, 2 bodies returned to OP Dick. Patrol drew fire from CCF group who appeared to be trying to recover the bodies.

0537 - (Twilight Zone) LT Thomas Martin and SGT Lenwood, 39th FAB observers on OP Charlie observed a luminous round object, which appeared to be spinning. Angle of site, 290 mils, AZ 4800 and later, at AZ 6052, object stopped for about 5 seconds, est range 10000 yards. Another similar object sighted from 0120 to 0123, AZ 4600 at a higher altitude than first sighting. Alvis

Information and names given to G3 and forwarded to 8th Army at their request.

0720 - Pappas rpts at 0130 N Company, OP Dick and P Company ambush patrol began receiving long range AW fire from Old Charlie, right finger of Hill 472, North Star and Star Hill. Enemy arty and mixed mortar fell in the same areas. At 0200 reinforced LP vic casualties during attack on reinf

est KIA 6, CT486428 was attacked by est 40 enemy employed SA, AW and HG fire. Friendly LP returned fire in kind and was supported by arty and mixed mortars. Fire fight lasted until enemy withdrew at 0230. Enemy did not break protective wire around LP at any time during this action. Friendly casualties: ambush patrol 2 WIA, LP 1 KIA, 2 WIA. Enemy est WIA 15. Between 0130 and 0230 - est 750 rounds of enemy mixed mortars and arty fell on Company O, OP Dick and ambush patrol area.

LP: Counted Killed 5,

1855 - OP Harry rpts 20 CCF carrying supplies, 2 carrying bodies, ordered arty

- 1930 OP Harry rpts 2 CCF in trench, az 27, CT 516435.
- 1930 GEF Thanos: 43 CCF vic CT 505429. Arty fired.
- 1940 10 CCF moving between Mushroom toward OP Harry. Unknown number moving between North Star and Star. Arty placed. Unknown results.
- 2027 OP Harry sighted 20 CCF on Henry also 5 CCF on Hill 412. Arty notified.
- 2100 At 2054, yellow parachute flare on forward portion of OP Harry. 2056 yellow parachute flare by Star.
- 2100 OP Harry spotted movement and light to be a cigarette on Star.
- 2120 OP Harry saw yellow parachute flare over Hill 412.
- 2115 OP Harry sighted 20 CCF moving from Star down to the valley on right of Star
- 2145 Land line (telephone) from OP Harry and radio land line to CO, Company L is out.
- 2156 Harry hears voices to their supply point.
- 2216 Blue 6 (CO, 3rd Bn) rptd 6 rounds per minute of mortar and arty coming in on Harry and I Company. Harry reports 3 WIA, LP pulled in.
- 2212 Harry reports rifle fire on right front of OP
- 2217 OP Harry requests illumination. Illum fired
- 2221 OP Harry requests protective fire to left front.
- 2229 OP Harry -land line is out. Harry reports a fire fight developing behind OP.
- 2222 L Company patrol receiving small arms fire from Harry. At 2225 Harry ordered to cease fire. CCF believed to be vicinity CT 513419.
- 2230 81mm firing front barrage for Harry
- 2233 I Company reports burp gun fire to right of OP Harry

- 2235 OP Harry requested defensive fires except on right.
 Land lines to Harry, I Company and L Company are Out COL Akers requested flare ship.
- 2245 Lt Lipett reported CCF in trench on Harry. Final protective fires fired. Harry requests continuous illumination.
- 2246 Hvy arty and mortar shelling on MLR and OP Harry. CCF in trenches on Harry. OP Harry requests VT fire on position. Arty on way.
- 2250 Reinforcement on the way to Harry. HQ composite company. 70 men.
- 2255 All protective fire except right rear of OP Harry being fired.
- 2302 Counter mortar fire requested by Harry.
- 2306 CCF out of the trenches on Harry
- 2309 Harry contacted by radio, no land line yet.
- 2313 Harry requests more ammo and continuous illum.
- 2320 Land line to Spartan (GEF) out.
- 2325 Harry reports incoming slackened. Told that friendly arty is on the way.
- 2328 OP Harry being attacked on left front and right 'flank.

11 June 1953

- 2330 GEF reports heavy shelling on MLR and OP Dick. N and O Companies receiving long range AW and SA fire.
- 2334 Tank and inf moving out from L Company toward Harry.
- 2345 Harry requests slow fire on left front.
- 2358 Harry reports CCF in trenches and swarming position.

- 2400 CCF attacking Harry. CCF on top of Harry.
- 0002 C Company committed to counterattack on order of Blue 6.
- 0006 MG fire coming from North Star toward Harry.
 All available fire put on North Star.
- 0008 Firefight has shifted into valley at right of Harry. Flare ship dropping flares over Harry.
- 0013 M Company 81mm observer rptd situation on Harry is "touch and go."
- 0016 Harry reports Chinese still on OP.
- 0017 1st Bn, 15th Infantry has moved to assembly area behind 3rd Bn. COL Akers has ordered Rotary Red (1st Bn 5th RCT) to Bn reserve area.
- 0045 E Company in trenches on Harry. Request lifting of defensive fires.
- 0046 All fires placed in front of Harry.
- 0100 Land line to Company K reestablished. K reports All quiet except one quad 50, which is firing in support of OP Harry, is receiving 5 rounds of arty or mortar per minute.
- 0125 OP Harry reports that tanks are returning to MLR.
- 0134 81mm FO pinned down by enemy fire inside bunker. He has no contact with K Company on Harry.
- 0135 B and C Companies moving into position in forward assembly area. E Company on Harry. Chinese forward toward Star Hill.
- 0156 OP Harry repts HE on right side of OP.
- 0200 FDF on Harry lifted; all other fire shifted to Star.
- 0206 At 2130 P Company ambush patrol engaged est 100 CCF in long range SA, Arty, mortar and HG fire.
 - At 2225 patrol withdrew and action ceased.
- 0210 Harry still receiving mtr and arty fire; OP is

- densely smoked.
- 0213 FDF called in on Harry. All available weapons being fired at max.
- 0216 Bn aid station repts 32 WIA, 3 KIA
- 0225 L Company requests 2 guides for C Company who wish to be shown the way to OP Harry. 2 men dispatched.
- 0236 M 39s instructed to return to tank cut and shuttle C Company personnel to OP.
- 0256 E Company reports receiving 76mm fire.
- 0300 Still receiving burp gun fire on left side of Harry. Firing defensive fires. 50 WIA (one was LT Pheiner) and 3 KIA removed through 3rd Bn aid station.
- 0305 1 MG firing from rear slope of Harry toward Mushroom.
- 0315 SA fire from left rear slope of Harry to right forward slope. 55 gal drum of napalm set off on right rear slope.
- 0321 CCF attacking from north and northwest.
- 0340 Capt Fee (15th Inf S-3) requests G 3 for air strike at first light Star Mass to be target. Fire fight has ceased on Harry.
- 0345 Easy Company requests more ammo.
- 0417 L Company rpts air panels sent to Harry. C Company departed for Harry.
- 0440 Mortar observer on OP Harry has been uncovered by friendly troops. Observer, Robinson, 5th RCT Hvy Mtr Co, had relayed reports of situation back to orange by radio all during the action while CCF surrounded his bunker.
- 0500 Friendly troops on right slope of Harry, Enemy being forced back.
- 0555 Capt. Markley recovered barely alive. Pvt Kiskey

- escaped over side of Harry. Came back to MLR in valley right of Harry.
- 0630 Est 150 CCF attacking Harry from northwest.
- 0650 All PW on OP Harry being evacuated. 2 PW in good shape.
- 0654 Air strike requested for Star Mass.
- 0709 Documents identify enemy as 24 Army, 221 Div, 211 Regt, 5 Bn.
- 0728 Red smoke to right of Harry
- 0730 Air strike on its way. 1st plane made passes between Star Mass and Hill 478.
- 0731 2nd air strike directly in front of Harry and on Star Mass.
- 0734 -Planes are striking rear slope of Harry and Star mass.
- 0747 150 CCF to left front of Star. Arty notified.
- 0753 -Report received that Harry is rebuilding its positions.
- 0800 VT placed on Star Mass. Fee reports only 4 bunkers remaining on Harry.
- 0801 OP Harry land line is in.
- 0807 Steady stream of wounded being evac from Harry. Hasty fortifications being built on left forward slope.
- 0845 Mtr and arty is subsiding on Harry. Visibility is improving. No CCF in sight.
- 0920 Helicopter returning with wounded
- 0955 Sighted 5 CCF escaping from Harry.
- 1100 Elements of E, C, and K Companies on Harry
- 2000 B/5th RCT departs assembly area for Hill 312.
- 2122 A Company/5th RCT came under fire as they crossed a pontoon bridge on 3D. No casualties.
- 2115 B/15th departs MLR to relieve OP Harry

- 2145 B/5th RCT on Hill 361.
- 2200 B/1 5th on Harry but not yet in position.
- 2230 B/5th RCT is attached to 1st Bn, 15th Infantry.
- 2300 B/15th in position on Harry.
- 2315 Harry reports an unknown number of CCF moving from Star Mass toward OP. Arty placed.
- 2330 1st Bn, 5th RCT closed new assy area at CT495388.
 Capt. George Fee, 15th Infantry S 3, summarized the night of 10 11 June as follows: "At 2230 an estimated enemy company attacked OP Harry.
- 2245 CCF were in the trenches engaged in close combat with elements of K Company. Heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire was following on the OP and the MLR.
- 2250 Headquarters composite company, 3rd Battalion was on the way to reinforce the outpost.
- 2305 The CCF were out of the trenches of Harry.
- 2400 The CCF started their second attack on OP Harry, having been reported in the trenches once again.
- 0045 E Company reinforced K Company on OP Harry.

 The enemy was driven off and OP Harry remained secure.
- 0002 C Company was committed to counterattack on order of 3rd Bn CO.
- 0319 The CCF attacked OP Harry for the third time. The action ceased at 0340 with friendly still holding OP Harry.
- 0415 1st, 2nd and 3rd Platoons of C Company closed OP Harry and reinforced elements of K and E Companies.
- 0630 The CCF attacked OP Harry with a force

estimated at 150 men. The attack was repulsed and at 0845 it was reported that there were no CCF on OP Harry.

It is estimated that the enemy force involved in attacks on OP Harry was a reinforced regiment. During the period a total of 22, 729 rounds of mixed mortar and artillery fire fell across the regimental front."

- 0005 Harry reports receiving a barrage of mixed mortar and artillery.
- 0008 Orange (Hvy Mtr Co/5th RCT) reports all defensive fires being fired around Harry. CCF reported approaching Harry.
- 0013 Radio contact out with Harry.
- 0015 MG firing from Star Hill at Harry.
- 0030 CCF overrunning right rear slope of Harry. Hvy mortar barrage on top of OP.
- 0037 OP Harry rpts many wounded and requests immediate help.
- 0040 P Fox rpts CCF on OP Harry and Harry requests immediate help.
- 0042 OP Harry requests litter jeep. 4 WIA from incoming rounds.
- 0045 OP Harry requests all defensive fires. CCF are approaching from all directions.
- 0046 Harry reports many incoming WP (white phosphorus) rounds.
- 0053 Outpost George reports MG fire from Harry towards our own MLR.
- 0057 COL Akers ordered B/5th RCT to move from 361 to OP Harry. C/5th RCT relieves Company B on Hill 361
- 0110 All communication with Harry out.
- 0113 4.2 FDC has reestablished commo with Harry.

- 0132 2 more squads of B/15th depart for Harry.
- 0140 Harry rpts CCF coming up right slope.
- 0140 Friendlies now control rear of Harry OP is notified that friendly forces are coming up rear of OP and friendly tanks are in the valley to the right.
- 0155 Flare ship made first drop and will continue to do so until daylight.
- 0147 OP George rpts direct radio commo with OP Harry and that OP is requesting fires on front slopes.
- 0201 Bn has had no contact with Harry since 0140.
- 0215 Mortar FO on Harry reports heavy incoming.
- 0216 FO has no contact with forward elements on Harry. Friendlies still hold rear.
- 0245 Orange radio picked up one word from Harry, "Arena"
- 0255 B/5th RCT crossed MLR for Harry.
- 0256 OP Harry reports direct fire weapon firing on Harry from Mushroom. Requests tank fire on it and on Star.
- 0302 1st Bn has radio contact with B/5th RCT
- 0307 OP Harry reports CCF believed to be in area \ again.
- 0326 Orange reports that the man on the radio is in a bunker, rear slope. He's hurt and can't get out. Men with him are hurt.
- 0428 Reinforcements have reached the rear positions on Harry.
- 0458 Capt Tarts rpts by radio from Harry that he has commo with rear group. He has no contact with forward group. No idea of CCF on position. Incoming from direct weapons has Tarts' CP zeroed in and he can't get out of bunker. Capt Tarts is lightly wounded. Has 8 other wounded

- men with him.
- 0523 Harry request maximum counterfire. Receiving heavy mortar on Capt Tarts' position. Tarts said he will be in serious condition unless an aid man reaches him soon.
- 0530 Major Connors (Red 5) designated OP Harry commander; to coordinate with B/15th and B/5th RCT.
- 0615 OP George rpts casualties being evacuated from Harry. Comparatively quiet at present.
- 0636 M39 departed MLR with Major Connors and replacement radios.
- 0700 Friendlies have full possession of OP Harry. Red 5 in command and consolidating position.
- 0743 A/5th RCT departed for OP Harry.
- 0825 All wounded have been evacuated from Harry. CCF bodies are now being evacuated.
- 0905 Major Byrd will arrive at Harry to survey the damage for Division.
- 1045 5th RCT placed under operational control of the 15th Infantry.
- 1700 Casualties for B Company, 5th RCT were 126 resulting from action on night 11-12 June. An estimated 9000 to 10,000 enemy artillery and mortar rounds fell on the outpost during the action.
- 1815 A Company, 5th RCT passed to operational control of 3rd Bn, 15th Infantry Regiment.
- 2143 100 CCF sighted on front of Harry. SA fire in vicinity of OP. Company commander thru 4.2 FO requested FDF on front and west of Harry.
- 2145 2 white parachute flares in valley rear of Harry.

 MG fire from front of Harry. OP George reports 76 and

- mtr fire to left slope of Harry.
- 2149 Final defensive fire being laid to left and front of Harry.
- 2153 100 CCF to front and 50 to right of Harry.
- 2217 OP Harry and I Company receiving hvy mortar and arty fire. I Company says they are 120mm mortars.
 - Enemy attack to left broken up by arty fire.
- 2247 OP Harry receiving hvy 76 fire from front. OP Harry defensive fires shifted to Mushroom, Bunker Hill area on unknown position.
- 2256 Harry requests more illumination. 1 WIA.
- 2301 M39 on way to Harry to evacuate 2 serious WlAs.
- 2305 Incoming rounds on Harry have decreased in intensity.
- 2308 Harry reports 3 WIA. Situation OK. Request constant illumination.
- 2313 OP Harry rpts supporting fire falling too close. Arty instructed to lift and shift fires. OP requests more illumination. 81s and 60s were instructed to fire immediate illumination.
- 2330 Harry reports receiving 120mm mortar fire. No illumination at all on Harry.
- 2332 A/5th RCT wants friendly arty lifted because they are getting friendly incoming rounds. Also want supporting fire on left and right.
- 2337 Harry reports very poor visibility and very poor illumination
- 2349 Fire fight on front part of Harry.
- 2343 Flare ship now dropping flares. FO in OP Fox adjusting ship.
- 2358 Heavy burp gun fire at OP's front.
- 2400 SA and AW fire on Harry. Counterattacking on right front.

- 0008 CCF are jamming air waves on 81mm mortar frequency.
- 0015 Harry reports increase in incoming arty.
- 0020 Harry is smoked in. Cannot make out outline of Harry.
- 0025 Harry reports flares still insufficient.
- 0030 Action on Harry has slackened. Attack was driven off.
- 0032 OP Harry rpts receiving MG fire from left front at range of 300 yards on Hill 478. Arty called in.
- 0040 OP Harry, SA from the left rear. Arty being placed. 81s ordered to target left rear of Harry.
- 0050 Incoming rounds on Harry increasing.
- 0059 Harry reports a build up on their left flank.
- 0130 Unknown number of CCF behind Harry. Requests flares.
- 0158 OP Harry rpts heavy shelling. M Company rptd Small arms fire left side of Harry.
- 0206 Direction of the attack is from the front of Harry.
- 0212 CCF 100 yds from the front of Harry. All available fires being placed.
- 0215 Enemy attack on left flank of Harry. Are now in the trenches. Unknown number. Enemy troops on right flank. Reinforcement on way. Maximum illumination.
- 0223 OP Harry rpts CCF in trenches in front sector. Request Arty barrage, increased illum. Under heavy Barrage. Direct hit.
- 0230 Second Platoon, Company L being dispatched to reinforce. Left side is critical. All support fires at maximum. M39 arrived at blue CP is dispatched

- to Harry.
- 0243 Too much friendly fire in trenches. Continue with final protective fire. 3rd Platoon, A/5th RCT has arrived on Harry.
- 0249 1st and 3rd Platoons of L Company, 15th Infantry, have arrived in the trenches of Harry.
- 0255 Harry requests more arty around right front and left front.
- 0301 Moonbeam (searchlight) ordered to shift to Harry.
- 0302 Flare ship is dropping flares. Is receiving anti aircraft fire from Hill 478. Harry requests more ammo. On the way.
- 0305 Harry requests add 300 yards on all concentrations.
- 0312 4th Platoon A/5th RCT ordered to move out across MLR at 0330.
- 0315 1 additional FO team has arrived on Harry.
- 0325 CCF on right, left and front of Harry. Trenches are being cleaned.
- 0328 Harry requests have another group bring more ammo
- 0340 Harry reports CCF still on the hill but exact whereabouts unknown.
- 0350 Wounded man being debriefed states that at 0310 there were 200 CCFs on front slope and in the trenches. Those friendly troops were pushing them out.
- 0352 Forward trenches are secured. No CCF in them.
- 0358 All counter battery and counter mortar fire is being fired on the right flank of Harry.
- 0420 Firing outer protective fires for Harry to catch withdrawing CCF.
- 0425 CCF are withdrawing to Star Hill and Star Ridge.
- 0450 Harry requests reinforcements, medicine, litters,

- litter bearers and M39s.
- 0455 Harry is getting heavy arty and mortar fire.
- 0458 CCF attacking OP Harry
- 0501 Harry requests immediate reinforcement. All weapons are in bad shape.
- 0505 1st Bn/5th RCT is alerted and ready to move out.
- 0515 Cease fire, end of mission given by OP Harry
- 0625 Everything is quiet on OP Harry.
- 0655 One slightly wounded PW on way from Harry to Blue CP.
- 0756 Two platoons from C Company, 5th RCT close on OP Harry.
- 0816 Approximately 100 WIA had been processed by 3rd Bn aid station since 2400.
- 1300 Estimated enemy force of one reinforced regiment attacked OP Harry during the night 12-13 June.
 Total incoming rounds about 14,000 mixed Mortar and artillery.
- 2110 OP George reports one trip flare set off to the left of OP Harry.
- 2139 -OP Harry requests illumination.
- 2150 Fire fight on right side of Harry
- 2205 OP Harry rpts receiving 76mm WP
- 2212 Both moonbeams adjusted on Harry
- 2206 OP Harry requests I litter bearer for I WIA. Litter bearer dispatched from A/5th RCT.
- 2213 OP Harry receiving heavy shelling.
- 2219 OP Harry reports friendly artillery landing in trenches.
- 2230 Harry requests discontinue all concentrations except illumination.
- 2245 Harry reports that AA behind OP is firing at flare ship.
- 2255 Harry reports everything in good condition.

- 2257 Harry receiving MG fire from the Pimple.
- 2310 Blue Arty has ceased firing flares on Harry. 81s requested to fire a flare every 5 minutes.
- 2340 OP Harry requests maximum illumination. They sighted CCF on right.

- 0010 OP George rpts that Harry is getting short friendly VT rounds
- 0020 OP Harry is getting 120mm mortars from a back azimuth 6400.
- 0023 Harry rpts short frdly arty still coming in.
- 0205 OP Harry suspects CCF around position.
- 0220 OP receiving SA fire from right. Request increased illumination and FPF fires be laid to left and front.
- 0255 Est 75 CCF coming up left side of OP Harry.
- 0315 A Company/ 15th rptd seeing something moving up left rear of Harry. 81mm fire requested.
- 0405 OP George rpts AW fire from left rear of Harry. Unable to determine position.
- 0435 Harry reports bunker burning on left rear of OP
- 0500 G/15th departed MLR for Harry
- 0505 2nd Bn/15 relieved by 1st Bn/15. 5th RCT assumed responsibility for left of battalion sector and OP Tom.
- 0745 G Company relieves C/5th RCT on Harry.
- 2045 Bn switchboard reports land line to OP Harry out. Commo accomplished through A Company.
- 2220 Since 2050 there have been 3 casualties on Harry due to enemy mortar.

- 0030 Land line to OP Harry reestablished.
- 0125 Harry reports CCF in trenches. Request FDF
- 0130 E Company counterattack force is alerted to move out. Tanks ordered to move out immediately.
- 0135 Main attack is on the right side of Harry.
- 0147 Bunker burning on left rear of Harry. Requests more litter bearers immediately.
- 0151 OP Harry requests all outer defensive fires.
- 0155 Land line to Harry has been knocked out.
- 0159 Small arms fire has almost stopped.
- 0210 E Company departed MLR for counterattack.
- 0217 1st Platoon, 15th Tank Co arrived at Bn CP in preparation for counterattack.
- 0224 Bn CO to A Company to remove mines from road leading to Harry.
- 0218 OP Harry is receiving fire from Old Charlie
- 0227 Major Dennison, 2nd Bn XO, directed to take Command of OP.
- 0238 Flares are too far to the left for Harry.
- 0242 There is still SA fire and hand to hand fighting on forward portion of hill.
- 0243 George Company reports LT Walker, CO, wounded. Lt Yomoshito assumed command. flares are in right position but a little too high.
- 0245 Bn S 1 I reports approx 20 casualties have arrived at forward aid station.
- 0249 MAJ Thomas order commo personnel to relay land lines to OP Harry.
- 0252 Tanks departed MLR
- 0315 Easy Company is now on Harry.
- 0315 Major Dennison departed MLR to organize and command hill. Still some sporadic SA fire from Hill.

- 0315 Request from Harry to lift FPF, fire only outer ring of defensive fires.
- 0332 Secondary explosion from burning bunker on OP
- 0345 B/15th departed for 2nd Bn area for possible counterattack on Harry. Harry requests more litter bearers, have 10 casualties to be evacuated.
- 0350 Major Dennison reports all CCF cleared from OP Harry and hill is secured. Requests medical assistance.
- 0400 OP Harry requests counter mortar on Star and Bunker Hill and Counter battery on Mushroom and Henry hills.
- 0420 It was estimated that 100 CCF were in night's action on Harry. 25 CCF KIA, no WIA estimate as yet.
- 0504 MAJ Dennison requested a few fresh people to Help in reorganization of OP Harry. Also requested KSCs (Korean laborers) be dispatched.
- 0525 Land line to Harry reestablished.
- 0700 Lead elements of G Company departed Harry.
- 1530 Lead elements of A/15th Inf departed MLR to relieve E Company on Harry
- 1910 A Company/15th completed relief of E Company/15th on OP Harry.
- 2225 Harry requests illumination. Heard noises.

16 JUNE

0217 - OP Harry reports sighting of undetermined number of CCF moving northeast vic CT517429. Arty being placed.

- 0930 P Company, GEF, completed relief of A Company on Harry.
- 0935 GEF Battalion completes relief of 2nd Bn/15th Inf on MLR.
- 1945 35 to 40 CCF advancing in trench from Star Hill. Arty fired. Est 30 CCF casualties. There were 4 WIAs from incoming rounds: 1 GEF, 2 houseboys and 1 sergeant from smoke generator team.
- 2258 OP Harry heard noises vic CT509424. Flares fired. No enemy sightings reported.

17 JUNE

- 1445 39th FA reports est 50 CCF in the trench line in front of OP Harry. Arty being placed.
- 1745 GEF (Hallis) rptd 40 CCF in trench at T519435. Arty fired. Est 6 KIA, 20 WIA
- 2140 SGT Thanos reptd Harry receiving Arty and mortar fire for past hour.
- 2210 SGT Thanos reptd OP Harry receiving direct fire around CP bunker and FO bunker.
- 2301 OP Harry reports 40 CCF at CT506425. Arty notified. (This message was relayed by William Dannenmaier, author of We Were Innocents: An Infantryman in Korea)

- 0028 OP George reports estimated two enemy battalions attacking from NE and NW
- 0030 SGT Thanos rpts unknown number of CCF moving south off Star Mass toward Harry.

- Requests final barrages.
- 0035 OP Harry under heavy mortar and arty shelling. Company N 81s and 75s ordered to fire supporting. Flare ship on way.
- 0040 CCF advancing up right slope of Harry
- 0050 AW fire down left front and left rear of Harry
- 0100 Col Koumanakos estimates CCF force attacking OP Harry at 2 battalions.
- 0116 Bn OP reptd incoming arty rounds decreasing on Harry.
- 0150 OP Harry requests continuous arty fire and continuous illumination.
- 0158 LT Pappas rptd as of now no CCF actually on OP Harry, requests continuous illumination.
- 0205 GEF Bn 6 (Koumanakos) states P Company has a great number of casualties. N Company is being committed.
- 0210 Orange FO on OP Harry was under attack but enemy came only to within 10 yards of trench, maybe 1 or 2 got in trenches.
- 0218 Harry rpts 100 150 CCF massing to right of CT5064425. (About 100 yards downslope of Harry) Mortars placed.
- 0238 Spartan 6 repts 1 platoon of N Company has reached Harry. Asks for continuous illumination. Chinese have reached the barbed wire.
- 0240 Pappas repts the Chinese are at HG range.
- 0245 Spartan 6 (Koumanakos) Now is the most critical time. If we repel them, they will not have time to organize another attack. CCF attacking from North and right of Harry. Heavy arty and mtrs falling on Harry and MLR.
- 0313 CCF in trenches on north nose of Harry. Hand

to hand combat.

- 0330 N Company now counterattacking on OP Harry. 1 Platoon of N Company with tanks in valley. 2nd and 3rd Platoons of N Company on way to Harry.
- 0420 LT Pappas rpts all CCF driven off OP Harry. OP is secure.
- 0600 Spartan 6 estimated that 3 enemy bns attacked OP Harry during the night.
- 0700 SGT Thanos, est friendly casualties were 30 WIA and 6 KIA (incomplete)
- 0900 Est enemy casualties for nights action on Harry was 120 KIA and 480 WIA
- 0910 Friendly casualties for night's action were: GEF Bn 21 WIA, 4 KIA; US personnel 4 WIA, KATUSA, 3 WIA, KSC, 2 WIA
- 1500 N Company completed relief of P Company on Harry and assumes responsibility for the mission.
- 1730 P Company closed assy area vic Hill 312.
- 1800 R Company completed relief of O Company in right company sector on MLR. 1 platoon of O Company attached to R Company. 2nd Platoon of O Company remained on MLR until daylight as counterattack force for Harry.
- 2130 Hvy Mtr Co repts 8 CCF moving toward Harry. Mtrs fired with unknown results.

20 JUNE

0400 - 3rd Bn, 23rd Inf Regt completed relief of 5th RCT and passed to operational control of CO, 3rd Inf

Div. 5th RCT moves to Chipo ri as part of the 8th Army reserve.

21 JUNE

- 0245 French Bn, 23rd Inf Regt completed relief of 3rd Bn, 23rd Inf.
- 0300 Responsibility for entire regimental sector passed to 23rd Inf
- 1700 O Company completed relief of N Company on OP Harry,
- 1755 OP Harry reptd 3 GEF KIA, 2 GEF WIA, 2 KSC WIA and 1 American WIA resulting from incoming rounds.

22 JUNE

- 2005 OP Harry rptd sighting 60 CCF moving south from Star Hill. Arty placed results 25 KIA, 15 WIA
- 2115 OP Harry sighted 10 15 CCF on Star. Mortars and arty fired. Also illumination.
- 2145 Undetermined number of CCF on right slope of Star Flares and arty fired.

23 JUNE

- 0030 OP Harry rptd hearing movement. Illum fired with negative results. At same time booby grenade went off at left front of Harry.
- 2100 GEF rpts that 50 CCF bodies have been buried since last action on Harry.
- 2250 Harry rptd receiving approximately 15 rounds of 60mm mortar from vic CT507427.
- 0340 OP Harry sighted 25 CCF vic CT508424. Mortars

fired 25 KIA

25 JUNE

- 0045 Hallis rpts 50 cal MG and SA fire at Harry from CT507425 (Star Hill)
- 1645 Lt Pappas repts that N Company relieved O Company on OP Harry
- 1725 OP Harry obsvd 2 CCF running in trench vic CT519436.

27 JUNE

2255 - Noises heard NE of Harry. Illumination fired with negative results.

28 JUNE

1145 - Flood Warning from G 2, One inch of rain fell during the night. Rivers are rising. If rivers continue to rise we will have flood conditions by tonight or tomorrow. More rain is forecast for today.

29 JUNE

1735 - O Company assumed responsibility for OP Harry. N Company returned to positions behind Hill 312, minus 1 platoon attached to R Company on the MLR.

30 JUNE

No references to OP Harry.

GLOSSARY

AA Anti Aircraft ammo Ammunition Arty Artillery AW Automatic Weapon az Azimuth

B

Blue Designation for 3rd Bn, 15th Inf Rgmt Command Post Bn Abbreviation for Battalion Burp gun A lightweight, portable submachine gun used by CCF. Bob Baker is shown at center holding a captured CCF Burp gun.

C

Ca Caliber CAP Captain (rank) CCF An acronym for Chinese Communist Forces **CO Commanding Officer** COL Colonel (rank) Commo Communication **CP** Command post \mathbf{E} Est Estimated

Evac Evacuated

F

FAB Field Artillery Battalion FDF Final Defensive Fire Flank Side **FPF Final Protective Fire** FDC Fire Direction Center (Artillery, Mortar) FO Forward Observer. A soldier who remotely directs

fire for artillery, mortars, or other heavy weapons.

typically an FO is located on an outpost.

Frdly: Friendly

G

G3 Regimental Operations Office

GEF Greek Expeditionary Forces

H

HE High Explosive. A type of artillery or mortar round

HG Hand Grenade

Hvy Heavy. Usually applied to weapons, i.e. Heavy

Mortar and Heavy Machine Gun

I

Ilum Refers to illumination by flares or searchlight (Moonbeam)

inf Infantry

K

KIA Killed in action

KSC Korea Service Corps (Korean laborers)

L

LD Line of Departure

Land Line Voice telephone line

LP Listening Post

LT Lieutenant (rank)

M

M39 A tracked, armored, personnel carrier

MLR Main Line of Resistance

MG Machine gun

Moonbeam WWII anti aircraft arc searchlights used to illuminate the enemy. Think of deer, at night, caught in a car's headlights.

MTR Mortar

N

Napalm Gelled gasoline used as anti-personnel weapon

0

OP Outpost. A position ahead of the MLR used to observe enemy action and be the first line of defense. In the Korean war, OPs were given names. For example in the sector where OP Harry was located, there were three OPs named, from west to east, OP Tom, OP Dick and OP Harry.

P

Pvt. Private (rank) PW Prisoner of War

Q

Quad 50 4 antiaircraft 50 caliber machine guns mounted on a half-track used to strafe attacking CCF

R

Red5 1st Bn, 15th Inf. CO RCT Regimental Combat Team. repts Reports

S

- S1 Battalion Personnel Officer
- S2 Battalion Intelligence Officer
- SA Small Arm. An Infantry hand-carried weapon.
- SGT Sergeant (rank)

V

Vic Vicinity

VT Variable Time fused artillery shells which used radar technology to detonate at a predetermined distance from the target. Produced a precise air burst.

W

WIA Wounded in action

X

XO Executive Officer

(The following document is the official report of the CO of The 15th reg Col. Akers, to the 3rd ID, for the period from 10 to 18 of June 1953. Printed in the United States of America, 2008)

5 R3 29 June 1953 TO: Commanding General 3d Infantry Division APO 468 ATTENTION: AC of \$.03

- 1. Intelligence
- a. Terrain

Outpost Harry (CT508422) is situated some 400 meters northeast of the friendly MLR which runs diagonally northwest from CT518408 to CT498420. The outpost elevation is approximately 420 meters. It is located on a small hill, which is 350 meters south, and part of a larger hill mass occupied by the enemy, referred to as Star Hill meters), CT507426. (elevation 440 The outpost commands a good view of the enemy terrain and his avenues of approach to the MLR position. Since the elevation of the outpost is greater than that of any friendly-held terrain within as area of 1500 meters, the position affords early warning of enemy approach to the main battle line (Enclosure 1&2). The terrain with 500 meters is generally classified as non-trafficable to tracked vehicles and trafficable with difficulty to foot troops. The rugged nature of the terrain, with its numerous smaller ridges, offers some cover and concealment to advancing enemy troops. Intermittent streams on either side of the outpost flow south and connect at a point 100 meters southeast of the outpost flow south and connect at a point 1000 meters southeast of the outpost along the friendly MLR. The terrain in the immediate vicinity of

these streams is trafficable to tracked vehicles during this period of the year (Enclosure #3).

The road approach to the outpost from the MLR runs north along an intermittent stream to the rear of the outpost, where the supply point is located. From here, movements to the position must be accomplished itself dismounted. The position contains communication trench which runs from the supply point forward some 400 meters to the forward observer bunker on the northern most slope. Here this trench joins another trench which makes a complete circle around the forward portion of the outpost; this portion is usually referred to as the Loop. Approximately 75 meters to the rear of the loop, along a finger of the ridge running to the right side of the outpost, an additional trench extends for approximately 100 meters. This finger is mutually supporting with the Loop position and helps to protect the probable avenues of enemy approach into the position. The left side of the outpost is steep enough to afford a natural barrier to the attacking enemy forces (Enclosure 4&5).

b. Weather:

Weather conditions during the period 10-18 June were clear skies with scattered low clouds and temperatures ranging from a minimum of 65 degrees to maximum of 75 degrees.

c. Light data:

The light data for the period of 10-18 June was as follows:

<u>Day</u>	Sunrise	Sunset	
Moonrise	Moonset	Phase	

THE EAGLE	OF THE	IRON	TRIANGLE

10 June	0507	1950
0328	1842	Quarter
11 June	0507	1950
0415	1946	New
12 June	0506	1951
0511	2043	New
14 June	0506	1951
0612	2130	New
15 June	0519	1951
0908	2159	New
16 June	0520	1951
1006	2222	New
17 June	0521	1950
1103	2244	New

- 2. Preliminaries to the attack: a. A comparative Study of Air Force photo mission 31 8-p "flown 27 May, 3241-B and 5812, both flown 2 June and mission 3260-p flown on __ June all indicated much enemy activity along the division front. This activity included construction of new positions, SP revetments, artillery positions, supply bunkers, personnel bunkers, a new bridge and road improvements along the enemy MSR. An enemy offensive was obvious.
- b. During the same period prior to the attack of 10-11 June, increased personnel sightings were reported during the daylight hours. During periods of darkness an increasing number of vehicle lights were reported, generally in the rear areas moving south and southwest toward the enemy's main battle positions.

Prior to the attack CCF Artillery Battalions c positioned to fire into the 3rd Infantry Division sector increased from an estimated 13 ½ battalions with 108 pieces to an estimated 15 Battalions with 126 pieces; of these 126 pieces capable of firing in the division sector, 117 were either in position or were displaced forward so as to be in position to fire into the sector of the 15th Infantry Regiment. In addition, shell fragments picked up in the 15th Infantry sector disclosed the enemy to be employing the 102 mm rocket for the first time in this area. Also evident during this period was increased enemy counter-battery fire on friendly artillery positions. Prior to this time, the enemy had concentrated on harassing and interdiction fire on the main MSR's and friendly positions on the OPIR and MR. Incoming artillery and mortar rounds reported in the division sector increased from an average of 27 per day to 670 per day, during the 4 to 5 days prior to the initial attack on the outpost.

d. Enemy disposition:

Units in contact in front of the 15th Infantry Regiment, as reported in 3^d division PIR #160, dated 9 June 1953, were estimated as two unidentified battalions of the 222d Regiment, 74th Division, in the left sector, and two unidentified battalions of the 221st Regiment, 74th Division, in the right portion of the 15th Regimental sector. The 221st Regiment, 74th Division, was located in the sector immediately opposite Outpost Harry. Opposite the 3rd Division center and right regiment were two unidentified battalions of the 70th Division, two battalions of the 208th Regiment, 70th Division. Reserves capable of intervention in the Outpost Harry section were the two reserve battalions of regiments in contact with the 15th

Infantry in the left sector, as well as, three battalions of the 220th Regiment, unallocated, which were the 74th Division reserve, (Enclosure 6).

- 3. a. The friendly situation in the sector of the 15th Infantry Regiment prior to the initial attack is shown on overlay, Enclosure #7.
- b. In addition it should be pointed out that the 15th Infantry Regiment was at approximately 105% strength, morale was high, and the regiment was in excellent overall condition.
- c. Two to three days prior to the attack it became apparent that an attack was imminent. Incoming artillery and mortar fire along the MLR increased to three to four times normal; counterfire plots increased and there were numerous sighting of CCF in large numbers.
- d. The members of the 15th Infantry Regiment were alerted by the Regimental Commander, himself, and could not have been more ready for battle.
- e. Outpost Harry was classified as a major outpost because of its strategic importance. The 15th Infantry was charged with defending Harry at all costs. Outpost Tom was also classified as a major outpost, while Outpost Dick was classified as a minor outpost.
- 4. Sequence of events:
- a. Night: 10-11 June.
- (1) 1850 first CCF sightings reported. Each sighting engaged by mortar and artillery.
- (2) 2130 An ambush patrol west of Outpost Dick in the sector of the GEF Battalion reported Chinese numbering

approximately 250 coming off Jackson Heights. Mortar and artillery began falling on the 15th Infantry MLR as well as Outposts Dick and Harry. After a short but intense firefight in the vicinity of Outpost Dick, including 2,000 rounds of enemy artillery and mortar fire, the enemy withdrew.

- (3) 2245 While attention was still focused on Outpost Dick, word came that the CCF were in the trenches on Outpost Harry... bitter hand to hand fighting followed and the Chinese were killed or driven from the trenches. The Chinese reinforced their attack four more times during the early morning hours and as late as 110430 June were in the trench on the northern side of the outpost. In addition to a composite local reserve committed by the 3d Battalion commander, E and C Companies, 15th Infantry Regiment were committed to reinforce. One platoon of tanks from Heavy Tank Company, 15th Infantry Regiment and one platoon of infantry were committed to the valley east of Outpost Harry as a diversionary force. This tank infantry team proved of great value in channelizing the enemy attack.
- (4) C530 A daylight CCF attack in battalion strength was repulsed by elements on the outpost.
- (5) 0630 Evacuation of wounded and dead began. This continued through the daylight hours. The Regimental Commander, 15th Infantry Regiment, reorganized, placing B Company, 15th Infantry Regiment on the outpost.

b. Night of 11-12 June:

Overlay, Enclosure #8 shows the reorganization that the Regimental Commander effected to prepare for a continuation of the attack by the CCF.

- (1) 0005 Intense mortar and artillery fire started along the MLR and on Outpost Harry.
- (2) 0015 The Chinese moving through their own and friendly artillery gained the trenches on the rear of the outpost; hand to hand fighting followed.
- (3) 0032 The CCF gained the trench on the northern slope of the outpost while friendly forces held the southern trench. Bitter fighting ensued and the CCF made numerous attempts to reinforce through the protective artillery ring. B Company, 5th Regiment Combat Team was used to reinforce. One platoon of tanks from Heavy Tank Company, 15th Infantry and one rifle platoon were dispatched to the valley east of Outpost Harry as a diversionary force, and again this team was highly successful in canalizing the enemy attack.
- (4) 0545 The enemy withdrew and all action ceased. Evacuation of the wounded and dead was begun and the Regimental Commander took immediate steps to reorganize for renewed attacks, placing A company, 5th Regimental Combat Team on the outpost.

c. Night of 12-13 June:

Overlay, enclosure #9 shows the organizational that the Regimental Commander effected to prepare for a continuation of the attack by the CCF.

(1) 2200 – Enemy artillery and mortar fire preceded a CCF attack on the Outpost, which was broken up by friendly defensive fires. CCF were in the trench for a short time but were forced to withdraw. Fighting ceased at 2247.

- (2) 0208 The CCF attacked from the north, northeast, and northwest of the outpost. Bitter hand-to-hand fighting ensued as enemy gained the trench on the northern side of the outpost. L Company 15th Infantry Regiment reinforced and by 0450 the enemy was driven from the trenches and forced to withdraw. A platoon of tanks from the 64th Tank Battalion plus one platoon of infantry were dispatched to the valley east of Outpost Harry and operated successfully as a diversionary force.
- (3) 0450 The enemy was driven from the trench and forced to withdraw. All action ceased with the exception of the friendly counter battery and counter mortar fire. Evacuation of the wounded and dead was begun and the Regimental Commander took immediate steps to reorganize for renewed attacks, placing C Company, 5th Regimental Combat Team on the outpost.

d. Night of 13-14 June:

Overlay, Enclosure #10, shows the reorganization that the Regimental Commander effected to prepare for a continuation of the attack by the CCF.

- (1) 0255 Enemy artillery and mortar fire preceded a CCF screening action against the outpost from the east and west for the purpose of protecting recovery of their dead. This screening force was broken up by friendly defensive fires. Action became sporadic, with light enemy artillery and mortar fire falling on the outpost and the MLR.
- (2) 0440 The enemy withdrew and all action ceased. The Regimental Commander took immediate steps to reorganize for renewed attacks, placing G Company, 15th Infantry Regiment on the outpost.

e. Night of 14-15 June:

Overlay, Enclosure #11 shows the reorganization that the Regimental Commandeer effected to prepare for a continuation of the attack by the CCF.

- (1) 0125 The Chinese, moving through friendly artillery and defensive fires, gained the trenches to the rear of the outpost, hand to hand fighting followed.
- (2) 0222 Friendly forces held the outpost with the enemy reinforcing in the bitter hand-to-hand action. F Company, 15th Infantry Regiment was committed to reinforce. One platoon of tanks from Heavy Tank Company and one platoon of infantry were again dispatched to the valley east of Outpost Harry as a diversionary force.
- (3) 0345 The enemy withdrew and all action ceased. Evacuation of the wounded and dead was begun and the Regimental Commander took immediate steps to reorganize for renewed attacks, placing A Company, 15th Infantry Regiment on the outpost.

f. Night of 15-16 June:

This was a quiet night on the outpost and on the following morning the Regimental Commandeer placed the GFF Battalion in the Outpost Harry sector in order that his US Battalions, all of which had suffered casualties, could refit and reorganize.

g. Night of 16-17 June:

There was no significant action this night, permitting much needed engineer work on the outpost to be accomplished by P Company, GEF Battalion and elements of B Company, 10th Engineer (Combat) Battalion.

h. Night of 17-18 June:

Overlay, Enclosure #12 shows the disposition of forces in the Regimental sector prior to the continuation of the attack by the CCF.

- (1) 0052 The Chinese, moving through their own and friendly artillery and mortar fire, attacked Outpost Harry from the northeast and northwest. The enemy was repelled and was forced to withdraw, but stayed in the area.
- (2) 0240 The enemy attacked from the north under intense artillery and mortar fire. The CCF gained the trenches of the outpost on the northern slope at 0313. Bitter hand-to-hand fighting ensued with the enemy making numerous attempts to reinforce through the protective artillery ring. N Company, GEF Battalion was committed to reinforce. One platoon of tanks from Heavy Tank Company, 15th Infantry Regiment and one platoon of infantry were dispatched to the valley east of Outpost Harry as a diversionary force.

 (3) 0020 The enemy was forced out of the trenches
- (3) 0020 The enemy was forced out of the trenches on the outpost and all action ceased with the enemy withdrawing. Evacuation of the wounded and dead was begun and the Regimental Commander took immediate steps to reorganize for renewed attacks.
- 5. Enemy forces employed against Outpost Harry:
- 10-11 A reinforced CCF regiment.

- 11-12 A CCF regiment.
- 12-13 A reinforced CCF regiment.
- 13-14 An estimated 100 CCF.
- 14-15 An estimated 120 CCF.
- 15-16 Negative
- 16-17 Negative
- 17-18 A CCF Regiment.
- 6. a. Friendly casualties for the period 101800T

June – 181800T June are as follows:

<u>KIA</u>	WIA	MIA		
15th Infantry	Regiment			
68	343	35		
KATUSA				
8	51	7		
GEF RN	15	36	1	
Attached & Supporting Units				
5th RCT	13	67	1	
39th EA	5	13	0	
TOTALS	102	533	44	
b. Ene	my Casualtie	es:		
KIA (counted):			223	
KIA (estimated):			1450	
WIA (estimated):			3800	

- 7. Ammunition expended:10
- 8. Enemy supporting fires:

During the period of the Outpost Harry action, enemy artillery and mortar fire was intensive. The following

¹⁰ Omitted by the author

figures reveal the estimated daily enemy expenditure in the 15th Infantry Regiment sector:11

- 9. Communications: a. Heavy shelling during phases of the action on Outpost Harry emphasized again the need for reliable radio communication and the normal over dependency of tactical units on wire communication.
- b. Extensive wire facilities had been prepared for normal use between units on and to the rear of the MLR. In addition to field wire circuits from infantry, artillery and weapons sections to forward observers and the company CP on Harry, a spiral-four cable had been placed and buried 12-18 inches in the access trenches from the outpost to the MLR. Many direct hits, including friendly final protective fires, disrupted all field wire circuits and severed the cable in at least eight different places. At no time during heavy fires could landlines be kept in and working.
- c. Direct hits on the communications bunker on Harry destroyed normal radio communications equipment initially and limited radio contact to that maintained by forward observers to their parent units. Reinforcing companies were supplied with equipment received from the Division Signal Supply section and reestablished radio contact, which was thereafter maintained by replacing damaged and destroyed sets with new ones brought in from the rear.

¹¹ Omitted by the author

d. Rapid replacement of companies emphasized the inherent advantage of the AM/PRC-10 which could quickly be shifted to a new command net frequency to maintain contact. Frequency shifting also minimized the danger of enemy radio interference by compromise of frequencies and call signs.

10 Administration:

- a. During the period 10-18 June 1953, the 215th Infantry Regiment was confronted with administrative problems that were new and unusual. The administrative personnel presently assigned to this regiment were familiar with normal casualty reporting, and the usual administrative after effects of such reporting, speed being the keynote. Over this period, the regiment suffered 68 officers and EM KIA; 343 officers and EM KIA; 35 officers EM KIA; in addition to this, **the regiment also had 16 GEF KIA; 36 GEF WIA; I GEF MIA;** 8 KATUSA personnel KIA; 51 KATUSA personnel WIA: and 7 KATUSA personnel MIA.
- b. The regiment's greatest concern was not only the speed and accuracy of reporting such details involving the definite types of casualties, but also the swift evacuation and identification of casualties. The Adjutant General of the 3rd Infantry Division had a prepared plan for casualty reporting for units on the line when heavily engaged as in an action of this type. This plan enabled the 15th Infantry Regiment to call for a casualty reporting team to come to the scene immediately and station

members at the aid-stations in the vicinity of the action. This team stayed throughout the action, working long hours without regard for food or sleep, and, in conjunction with the administrative personnel of this headquarters, was able to use the normal reporting methods. By being on the spot at the various aid stations the team was also able to keep the engaged units informed as to who had been evacuated as casualties.

- c. Due to the fact that every line company of this regiment plus 3 line companies of the operationally attached 1st Battalion, 5th Regimental Combat Team were utilized in the defense of Outpost Harry, evacuation and casualty reporting was a major problem.
- d With the large number of units involved and the necessity for rapid evacuation of seriously wounded, the casualty reporting team in addition to gathering casualty information on the spot, covered every medical evacuation station as well as the helicopter evacuation service, which accounted for over 10% of the wounded the first day. By staying abreast of the medical evacuation information and comparing these figures by name with casualty reports of engaged units maximum possible accuracy in reporting was achieved. In addition, clerical personnel were stationed at the Registration Section throughout this action to further assist in casualty reporting.
- e. In summation, by covering all of the possible medical evacuation channels and the Graves Registration

Section it was possible to crosscheck unit casualty records with the regimental master information file, and thereby establish accurate casualty figures by name. This procedure expedited the preparation of letters of sympathy and greatly facilitated the processing of recommendations for awards and decorations.

11. Supply: Ammunition presented the major supply problem during the period of this action, a total of 600 tons being hauled. At no time was there a critical shortage of any type. However, the action did reveal a necessity for more ammunition of the following types being on hand, on position: P1mm Mortar (illuminating shell; cal 30 M-1; cal 30 Machine Gun and cal 50 Machine Gun. Having these items on position would result in a far less of a burden on transportation due to long hauls to distant ASP's. In addition to ammunition, the major items of supply provided during the period were a shown below. 12 Besides ammunition and TO&E items the other major items of supply were logs, wire, and fortification materials which were required daily to facilitate rebuilding of damaged bunkers during the lulls in the action. Here again no serious shortage developed, and subordinate unit requests were filled.

Transportation: Closely related to the supply problem was the problem of transportation. Due to combat losses it was necessary for Ordinance to replace damaged trucks

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¹² These items were omitted by the author

on the spot in order to keep supplies rolling. Ordinance also supplied maintenance teams to facilitate operations. Perhaps the greatest deficiency which appeared was the shortage of assistant drivers for vehicles. This lack resulted in regular drivers working around the clock for days in succession, catching sleep at irregular intervals. Service: Service was adequate during the entire period; the work of the Graves Registration Section was particularly outstanding. Members of the Grave Registration Section moved to the outpost to personally supervise and expedite the evacuation of the dead, and insure the proper handling of personal effects.

12. Conclusions:

- a. The CCF enemy is capable of massing artillery at a given point on the front just as effectively as our own artillery and his employment of smoke to cover withdrawals is most effective,
- b. The CCF enemy moved through his own artillery.
- c. Early warning is a prerequisite for the successful defense of an outpost.
- d. Timely reinforcement can be the deciding factor in the loss or retention of an outpost.
- e. Wire communication must be considered ineffective when the CCF enemy makes a supported attack.
- f. Radio equipment is vital but not effective enough with present equipment.

- g. The CCF enemy employs feints in the same manner as we do as indicated by his move against Outpost Dick in the first night's action.
- h. The CCF soldier and his junior officers are tough, well disciplined fighters. They possess great stealth at night, and are capable of approaching to within a few yards of our positions undetected. In hand to hand fighting the American and Greek soldier are infinitely superior. The Chinese soldier appears to be shocked when he faces an Allied soldier at close range. His reaction is slow enough to permit him to be shot or bayoneted.
- i. The importance of battlefield illumination cannot be over emphasized. The searchlight, although valuable, is not alone adequate for illumination.
- j. The senior commanders of the CCF Army give every indication of stupidity and lack of professional knowledge in regard to the timing, coordination, and general pattern of their attacks.
- k. The evacuation of wounded from an outpost at night while under intense attack is nearly an impossibility except in the case of walking wounded.
- 1. In terrain of the type found in Korea, the infantry needs full track vehicles, covered, with four or five men capacity for evacuation of the wounded.
- m. Concurrent with the need for speedy rebuilding of defensive position is the necessity for immediate

evacuation of the dead, in order to simplify the rebuilding operation and to obviate the lowering of morale.

n. The combination infantry-tank team, as employed in the various actions, proved highly successful in denying important avenues of approach to the enemy, and in permitting CCF supporting weapons to be taken under fire more readily than could be accomplished from positions along the MLR.

13. Results of Operation

- a. All positions, including Outpost Harry, were held by the 15th Infantry Regiment at the completion of the action.
- b. Over 5,000 casualties were inflicted on the 74th CCF Division, which destroyed the combat effectiveness of that unit.
- c. Casualties suffered by the 15th Infantry Regiment and attached units were approximately 10% of those suffered by the enemy. At the end of action the 15th Infantry Regiment remained in line with the morale of the men and their pride in the regiment reaching an all time high.

P. F. Akers JR Col Infantry Commanding

Recognizing Heroes of the Korean War

» by <u>GI Korea</u> in: <u>Korean War</u> March 19th, 2008 at 11:25 am

For those that enjoy reading Korean War history, below I have consolidated the links to my on going series of Heroes of the Korean War. The Korean War is filled with many great heroes, but due to little public interest in the war, the story of their heroics has largely gone unnoticed. Here at the ROK Drop the leadership, bravery, and sacrifices of the brave service members who fought in the Korean War does not go unnoticed. I hope through my on going series to educate my readers about these heroes especially the foreign soldiers that you hear nothing about, that served so bravely during the Korean War.

I have organized the list by year and have noted the country, the unit the hero served with, and which battle the hero was most notably fought in. Some heroes fought in multiple battles of note, but for purposes of this list I noted the battle their participation was most recognized for. So take a few moments and read the stories, if you haven't already, of these brave men who served so notably during the Korean War. Finally if you have any recommendations for future additions to my on going list of Heroes of the Korean War feel free to add the suggestion in the comments section. Thanks.

Heroes of the Korean War:

1950:

<u>Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith</u> (USA), Commander 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, Taskforce Smith Battle

Major General William Dean (USA), Commander 24th Infantry Division, Battle of Taejon

General Tahsin Yazici (Turkey), Commander 1st Turkish Brigade, Battle of Kunu-ri

Ensign Jesse L. Brown (USA), US Navy 32nd Fighter Squadron, Chosin Reservoir

<u>Lieutenant Colonel Russell Blaisdell</u> (USA), Chaplain US Air Force, Operation Kiddy Car Airlift

1951:

Colonel Paul Freeman (USA), Commander 23rd Infantry Regiment at the Battle of Chipyong-ni

<u>Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Monclar</u> (France), Commander French Battalion, Battle of Chipyong-ni

<u>Lieutenant Colonel James P. Carne</u> (UK), Commander Gloucestershire Battalion, Battle of the Imjim

<u>Lieutenant Colonel J.R. Stone</u> (Canada), Commander Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, Battle of the Kapyong

<u>Lieutenant Colonel Dionisio Ojeda</u> (Philippines), Commander Philippines Expeditionary Force To Korea (PEFTOK), Battle of the Yultong

1952:

Brigadier General Haydon Boatner (USA), Commander Geoje POW Camp

1953:

<u>Lieutenant Colonel George Koumanakos</u> (Greece), Commander Sparta Battalion, Battle of Outpost Harry

Post-Korean War:

<u>Lieutenant Commander Lloyd Bucher</u> (USA), Commander USS Pueblo, USS Pueblo Incident



Lt. Col George Koumanakos

July 17th, 2008 at 4:22 am

Heroes of the Korean War: Lieutenant Colonel George Koumanakos - Part 1

by GI Korea in: Korean War

Historical Parallels

The recent<u>animated film 300</u> dramatized the <u>Battle</u> of <u>Thermopylae</u> in 480 BC that featured a protracted battle between a small Spartan force led by King Leonidas that was tasked with delaying the advance of the overwhelmingly much larger force of the invading Persians led by King Xerxes.



protecting the fledgling start of western democracy from being enslaved by the dictatorial Persian King. This

movie would go on to be a huge box office success and raise public awareness about the significance of the battle. However, though this famous historical battle happened nearly 2,500 years ago few people today (even in Greece) realize that Greek soldiers just 55 years ago had fought in their own modern day Battle of Thermopylae during the Korean War for similar reasons and fortunately even better results.

Background

When the United Nations authorized the use of force to expel the North Korean military who had invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950 for the sole purpose of reuniting the peninsula under communism, one of the nations that provided a large contingent of combat troops was the nation of Greece. Greece volunteered to supply one Air Force transport squadron and one combat infantry battalion of 840 men to fight in the defence of the Republic of Korea.



(The punch of the Greek soldiers)

It would seem strange at first that a small nation like Greece would be willing to send so many soldiers to fight in a war that on the surface would appear to have nothing to do with them considering how far Korea is from Greece and the fact the nation has no geo-strategic implications to Greek security. However, before the Korean War Greece had its own internal civil war against a communist movement that was ultimately crushed by the Greek government. Greece's own experience against communist backed forces caused much Greek sympathy with the situation that South Korea was now faced with. Another factor that influenced Greece's decision to go to war in Korea was that their ancient rivals, the nation of Turkey had also agreed to send a large combat force in support of the US led war effort in South Korea. Turkey had sent a large combat force to build stronger defence relations with the United States in case Turkey ever needed military assistance in return from the US due to the looming threat of Soviet expansionism. Much of the same thought process could be attributed to the Greek frontier of Soviet government that sat on the expansionism as well. So there was a variety of reasons for why the Greeks decided to go to war in Korea and with that decision the Greeks really did their best to put together a capable combat force to fight for the freedom of South Korea.



Arrival in Korea


The Greeks arrived in Korea on December 9, 1950 and their Air Force transport squadron was immediately put to use

in support of allied operations. The Greek ground forces which were deployed under the name, The Royal Hellenic Battalion had to go through initial pre-combat training at the allied training facility located in Daegu. Unlike some other allied nations that had arrived in Daegu for training the Greek forces were quite well trained on arrival due to many of the soldiers in the unit having prior combat experience fighting in the Greek civil war. By January the Royal Hellenic Battalion would see its first combat operation when it was assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division and fought in the Battle of Hill 381 at Icheon on January 29, 1951. The unit would go on to conduct other combat operations in Korea with the division, but when the Korean War's frontline began to solidify and the war turned into one of holding hill top garrisons as peace talks went on at Panmunjom, the Greeks spent a year defending the South Korean frontier near the village of Yeoncheon just north of Seoul before being moved to conduct operations in the Chorwon area which had by then begun to be known as the infamous Iron Triangle. Despite the amount of combat the Greeks

had seen in two and half years of fighting in the Korean War the bloodiest fighting and their greatest combat achievement of the entire war would occur ironically enough during the very last days of the war.

Prelude to Battle


By June of 1953 an armistice from the peace talks at Panmunjom appeared to be imminent. The Chinese military leadership understood that a truce could be signed at any time and thus they began a series of operations to capture key strategic territory from the United Nations forces that would give the communist allies a military advantage when a truce was signed. One of the most key pieces of terrain that the Chinese wanted to capture was a lonely mountain top outpost in the Iron Triangle known simply as Outpost Harry.



The Iron Triangle area during the Korean War.

Outpost Harry had received its name because other adjacent hilltops were known as Tom, Dick, and then there was Harry. However, unlike Outposts Tom & Dick,

Harry stretched out as a peninsula like landmass from the rest of the allies' frontlines and the landmass was connected to a Chinese occupied hilltop known as Star Hill. The hill top that the allies garrisoned on OP Harry was 1,280 feet high and looked across the ridge line of the landmass back at Star Hill which was only about 400 yards away and slightly taller then OP Harry.



The reasons the Chinese decided that OP Harry was an important tactical landmass to capture was because the hill offered the best observation of the surrounding area that allowed the allies easy view of any enemy troop movements on their side of the frontline. If the hill was captured the allies wouldn't just lose their ability to observe Chinese troop movements, but the allies would also have to fall back a distance of about 10 kilometers because the Chinese would have the ability to rain down accurate artillery on the allied side of the border due to

the great observation the hilltop provided of the Kumwha Valley that the allies currently occupied.



This picture of the Kumhwa Valley during the Korean War.

At the time OP's Tom, Dick, & Harry were all being defended by the <u>US 15th Infantry Regiment</u> of the US 3rd Infantry Division. At the time, the Greek Battalion, which had become known as the Sparta Battalion was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel George **Koumanakos** and was attached to the 15th Infantry to help fortify this section of the frontline. Companies from the regiment would rotate defending the outposts the regiment was responsible for holding on their sector of the frontline. The regiment at the time had roughly 4,000 soldiers including the Greek Battalion to defend their sector.



Greek Battalion Commander LTC George Koumanakos

The Chinese on the other hand had decided to commit. their entire 74th Division of 13,000 soldiers in their offensive operation to capture the OP Harry from the US 15th Infantry Regiment and fully expected the operation to be a quick and easy success due to the sheer size of the force they were committing. The confidence of the Chinese was quite evident to the soldiers of the 15th Infantry defending the OP because the Chinese made no effort to disguise their offensive operation. The evidence was quite clear that the Chinese were going to launch an attack as additional troops, equipment, and supplies could be seen entering the Chinese side of the frontline. An attack was imminent and the soldiers of the 15th Regiment to include Colonel Koumanakos and his men of the Sparta Battalion braced themselves for the heavy combat to come



View of Outpost Harry with the Chinese held Star Hill in the background.

The Battle of Outpost Harry Begins

The Chinese assault began on June 10, 1953 with a heavy artillery and mortar barrage on the allied positions. A night time assault which was customary by Chinese forces during the Korean War due to the allies' air superiority was launched against all the 15th Infantry Regiment's positions to include the Chinese main effort attacking across the ridge line from Star Hill to capture OP Harry. The American defenders of OP Harry held off the Chinese attack until day break but fighting continued.

Just after midnight on June 12th the Chinese forces through hand to hand fighting against US forces had captured the northern trench of OP Harry. Once the trench line was captured the Chinese then began efforts to reinforce it before proceeding over the hilltop to capture the southern trench line the US forces still occupied. As

the Chinese began to reinforce the trench line a US counterattack using heavy artillery and tanks targeting Chinese soldiers trying to reinforce those in the trench line was launched. The Chinese began to take heavy casualties and by day break withdrew out of the northern trench line when it became apparent they would not be able to successfully hold it from US air attack once the sun came up.

During the day the Chinese continued their artillery barrage on OP Harry as a fresh batch of US forces rotated on to the hilltop while the prior unit carried their dead and wounded off the mountain. Over 200 dead and wounded were pulled off the hill from the previous days fighting all because of the need to hold a bald barren hill. The next night would be a near exact repeat of the night before as the Chinese would once again capture the northern trench line to only lose it once again due to a US counterattack and the Chinese having to abandon the trench line at daybreak. The next day the American unit dragged their dead and wounded back down the hill and were replaced by another American company just like the unit before it.



Greek and American soldiers at Outpost Harry.

This cycle would continue until June 15th when Lieutenant Colonel **Koumanakos** was alerted that his men of the Sparta Battalion would be the next unit to defend OP Harry. By this time nearly two US infantry battalions of soldiers had been decimated by the five prior days of fighting on the hill and the Greeks would be the next to withstand the fury of the Chinese attacks.

Next Posting: Defending "Outpost Harros"

July 18th, 2008 at 4:22 am



Greek Battalion Commander LTC George Koumanakos

Heroes of the Korean War: Lt. Col. George Koumanakos

Part 2 Defending "Outpost Harros"

Defending "Outpost Harros"

On the morning of June 16th the Greeks began their march up the hill to OP Harry as American soldiers from the 15th Infantry Regiment they were replacing, dragged

their dead and wounded down the mountain. By now the Greeks had begun to call Outpost Harry, Outpost Harros which means death in the Greek language. This moniker was appropriate considering the amount of blood that was being spilled to defend this remote hilltop fortress. When the Greeks reached the hilltop fortress they were amazed to find nearly nothing left standing due to the blasting the hilltop had taken from Chinese artillery. The Greek soldiers had knew the hilltop had been fairly devastated, but even though they were forewarned about the damage done to OP Harry the level of destruction once on the hilltop still surprised them and made them wonder how anybody had survived such an attack in the first place. More importantly it made them wonder how they were going to survive such an attack as well.



The view from Outpost Harry towards Star Hill.

Realizing how the hill could not be held if the fortifications reconstructed. Colonel not were Koumanakos immediately had his soldiers with the aid of Korean Service Corps workers, begin redigging the trench lines as well as reconstructing the sandbagged fortifications. The Chinese rarely ever attacked during the day so as much work as possible had to be completed during the daylight hours they had left. The Greek soldiers felt like they were digging up a graveyard due to the sheer amount of Chinese bodies left on the hill. The smell death wreaked everywhere from the decomposing Chinese bodies. Occasionally the Greek soldiers and KSC workers would find an American body intermingled with the masses of Chinese bodies which really showed how up close and personal the hand to hand combat had been to hold the hill. As the American bodies were found the Greeks would carry them back down the hill to be transported to a casualty collection point. It was a grim task that made the Greek soldiers if the next morning it would be them be dragged down the mountain like their American comrades?



Chinese bodies litter the sides of Outpost Harry.

Reconstruction on the southern trench line of OP Harry was going well, but Lieutenant Colonel Koumanakos faced a great problem with trying to refortify the northern trench line of the hilltop garrison. When he sent soldiers to the northern side of the hill to begin the reconstruction the Chinese soldiers were able to see them unlike with the southern trench line and began to rain down accurate mortar fire on them. The first casualties for Colonel Koumanakos men during the Battle of Outpost Harry came from this mortar barrage. Koumanakos ordered his men back to the southern side of the hill and decided to wait until dark to begin work on the northern trench line again.

This was a risky proposition considering the Chinese usually attack at night which meant the soldiers probably had little time to reconstruct the trench. As night fell Colonel Koumanakos pulled his machine gun teams forward to overwatch the soldiers he had working in the darkness to reconstruct the northern fortifications. Surprisingly that night the Chinese did not attack the outpost. The Greeks were lucky that the Chinese had taken a night off on their offensive to reconsolidate and rest their troops. Ceasing this opportunity Colonel Koumanakos had has men work through the night to rebuild the northern defences. At daybreak the Chinese saw the Greek soldiers working on the northern defences again and began firing mortar rounds at them once again. With some of the fortifications reconstructed enough to shelter from mortar fire in, the Greek commander decided to keep his troops on the northern hill face in order to keep improving the defences despite the mortar fire. The Greeks worked throughout the day improving the northern defences despite the mortar fire and then that night the readied themselves for the inevitable Chinese onslaught that was sure to come.

The Final Chinese Offensive

At 11PM the night of June 17th the Chinese onslaught did come as the Chinese after their operational pause made their last ditch effort to capture OP Harry.

However, this time it wasn't the Americans they would be fighting but the men of Colonel Koumanakos Greek Battalion. Just like in the prior days battles the Chinese just through sheer numbers was once again able to get into the northern trench line. Colonel Koumanakos soldiers just like the ancient Spartan warrior of King Leonidas fought hand to hand against the vastly numerically superior foes. By midnight the Greeks were able to push the Chinese back out of the northern trench line due to the stubborn defence by the Greeks as well as the massive artillery advantage the allied forces employed against the advancing Chinese. Despite this initial setback the Chinese were not done with the Greeks yet.



Aerial view of the Outpost Harry and Star Hill landmass.

The Chinese launched another attack on the northern trench and this time brought even more soldiers to capture it. The Greeks fought on the hill for three more hours that included once again hand to hand combat in the northern trench line. The Chinee by 3AM on June 18th had recaptured the northern trench line and tried to refortify by massing a ring of artillery fire around the position to deter any counterattack. However, Colonel Koumanakos decided to commit another Greek company of men backed by a platoon of US tanks to recapture the trench line. The Greek soldiers charged through the artillery fire and descended into the trenches to expel the Chinese invaders. The counterattack was successful and the Greeks successfully recaptured the northern trench.

Day break on June 18th approached and the Chinese who still had not captured OP Harry and were in fact reeling from the heavy casualties inflicted on them by the gallant Greek defence of OP Harry. Seeing that they had no chance of recapturing their lost positions the Chinese decided to start withdrawing back down the hill in defeat. The Battle of Outpost Harry would be a combat victory worthy of the recognition of their ancient Greek ancestors since the Sparta Battalion had held their ground despite overwhelming odds.

However, like the American units they had replaced, the next morning the Greeks began their grim task of dragging their own dead and wounded back down the mountain. Amazingly the Greek casualties had been relatively light in comparison to the Chinese with six Greeks being killed in action with 21 others wounded. The Greek battalion would continue to rotate companies on to OP Harry until June 21st when they handed the outpost back over to the US 15th Infantry Regiment. After the final battle against the Greek defenders the Chinese never did attack again as the allies continued to hold the hill.

The Aftermath

It is estimate out of 13,000 Chinese soldiers used to assault OP Harry 4,500 of them died with many wounded which left the entire Chinese division combat ineffective for the few remaining weeks of the war. The allies losses were heavy though they were no where near as bad the sacrifice in blood the Chinese made on their assault on OP Harry. American units had 91 men killed as well 8 Korean KATUSA soldiers. The Greeks would ultimately loose 15 men over the course of the eight day battle to defend OP Harry. American and Greek units also had a combined total of 419 more men wounded in action. The amount of men that died, Chinese, American, Greek, and Korean over eight days of fighting over a featureless hill is staggering; especially when one considers that when the ceasefire was signed a little over a month later on July 27, 1953, the allied forces agreed to abandon this

featureless hill anyway as part of the Armistice Agreement. There has probably never been as many people killed and wounded in the history of warfare fighting over such an utterly barren and featureless rock. To make matters worse the sacrifice by the men on OP Harry have never been truly remembered as well as overshadowed by more famous battles during the Korean War that didn't nearly have the same amount of lives lost or strategic significance of the <u>Battle of Outpost Harry</u>.



The Chorwon corridor that formed the Iron Triangle during the Korean War. Notice the productive farming land on the South Korean side of the DMZ compared to the North Korean side.

Despite all this, it is important though to realize these men did not die in vain. The valiant defence of OP Harry showed the Chinese that the allies were still resolved to defend South Korea as well as the battle delivering a huge blow to Chinese morale with the steep casualties they received attacking OP Harry. These steep casualties served to speed up the armistice talks to end the war to stop the heavy losses the Chinese were taking. The fact that the large agricultural plain of the Kumwha Valley remains as part of South Korea today is largely because of the sacrifice in blood made by the men who fought on OP Harry back in 1953. I wonder how many people in South Korea know that the existence of a large portion of some of the nation's most productive agricultural land is because of the largely unknown efforts of a battalion of soldiers from the far away land of Greece?

In the aftermath of the battle a number of awards for combat valour were handed out to include for the first time in US military history five Distinguished Unit Citations to five different companies for actions during one battle. Distinguished Unit Citations were award to four companies from the US 15th Infantry Regiment and to Company P of the Greek Sparta Battalion that conducted the hand to hand fighting to hold Outpost Harry on the final night of the Chinese assault.

Here is the wording of the <u>Company P's</u>
<u>Distinguished Unit Citation</u>:

Company P Greek Expeditionary Forces Battalion (Second Award) is cited for extraordinary heroism and outstanding performance of duty in action against an armed enemy in the vicinity of Surang-NI, Korea during the period 17 June to 18 June 1953. Assigned the defence of a vital outpost position (Harry), the company encountered a major enemy assault on the evening of June 17. After an intense concentration of enemy mortar and artillery fire, the hostile forces, which had taken up an attack position on the northeast and northwest side of the outpost, moved rapidly through their own and friendly artillery fire to gain a foothold on the northern slope of the position. Refusing to withdraw, Company P closed in and met the attackers in a furious hand to hand struggle in which many of the enemy were driven off. The aggressors regrouped, quickly attacked a second time, and again gained the friendly trenches. Immediately, the Greek launched series Forces П of counterattacks, simultaneously dispatching a diversionary force to the east of the outpost which successfully channelled the enemy thrusts. After 2 hours of close in fighting, the aggressors were again routed and the friendly positions restored. The outstanding conduct and exemplary courage exhibited by members of Company P, Greek

Expeditionary Forces Battalion, reflects great credit on themselves and are in keeping with the finest traditions of the military service and the Kingdom of Greece.

In total the Greek forces in the Korean War would be awarded six Distinguished Unit Citations, along with individual service members being recognized with 32 Silver Stars and 110 Bronze Stars from the US military. A total of 4,992 Greeks would fight in the Korean War with 186 men killed in action and 543 more wounded. The final Greek unit would redeploy from the Korean peninsula in 1955 with the stabilization of the Demilitarized Zone.



A ROK Officer, the Commander of the Belgian Bn., Lt.Col. George Koumanakos, Commander of the Greek Bn, and 3rd Infantry Division Commander Major General George W. Smythe engage in a four way handshake symbolizing the joint effort in the Korean War.

Lieutenant Colonel Koumanakos six month tour of duty in Korea would come to an end on July 20, 1953 just days before the signing of the Armistice Agreement officially ending the war.¹³ He would receive many combat awards due to his service in Korea. He would go on to become a Lieutenant General in the Greek Army and would remain the nation's most decorated military officer before retiring and unfortunately passing away in 2003. However, nothing in Lieutenant Koumanakos long military career would be able to surpass the truly heroic stand against overwhelming odds by the soldiers of the Sparta Battalion he commanded during the Korean War. Lieutenant Colonel Koumanakos was not only respected by the soldiers of the Sparta Battalion but also US soldiers respected him more then many of their own leaders as evident by this passage from a book written by a soldier who fought in the Battle of Outpost Harry:

For the first time in my experience we had company. In addition to the scouts, this bunker housed a forward observer for the artillery, along with his aides and other occasional guests. For example, it was the custom of the commander of the Greek Battalion, Colonel

¹³ Note from the author: It is written to the papers that Lt Colonel Koumanakos, left The Spartans Battalion on 20th of July 1953. The truth is that he was with his Battalion until the end of September 1953. See the pictures on page.

Koumanakos to sleep on the front line when his troops were on line. He and his staff would come forward to the outpost at night, returning to their battalion headquarters to work during the day. This resolve of the high ranking Greek officers to expose themselves to the same dangers as their men impressed me at the time and still impresses me. Our squad had not seen its own officer up front in the two months I been on the line. So far as we knew, neither had our other squads seen him. To see the lieutenant, someone had to drive back to regimental headquarters. If the lieutenant needed to communicate with us, he used the telephone, if it was working, or the radio.

We Are Innocents: An Infanryman in Korea By William D. Dannenmaier, page 119



Hero of the Korean War LTC George Koumanakos

Lieutenant Colonel Koumanakos may not have been singularly as heroic as King Leonidas, but his combat leadership as witnessed by both Greek and American soldiers is sure to have made the spirit of King Leonidas proud and that is why he and all the soldiers of the Sparta Battalion are truly heroes of the Korean War.

GREEKS DEFEND OP HARRY AGAINST ATTACKING CHINESE

ChinksOutnumber Defending Greeks But Lose After Five Hour Battle

BY CFL EUGENE FARKAS

A singular chapter in the long and bitter struggle for Outpost Harry was cuacted last week when visitly outnumbered Greek infantrymen, is a spectacular exhibition of fire power, cut up three attacking Chinese buttalions in a five-hour long battle.

Employing maximum individual fire power with a minimum receiper of men and coordination closely with friendly satisfier; and morters, the warriors of Peter Company, Greek Bartalion, cause to gripe with the enemy in three separate and sent them melling back down the slopes of the strategic hill in bloody route.

The defendent sustained an imbelicrably annil number of casesties in spin of the fact that the Chinese midnight-to dawn assault was accompanied by a 20,000 round larrage.

Of Me men, Lt. Col. George Coumanulate. Athent, battalion crommin der said. "They fought with good barter and particulated efficiency. Every individual wastering and throwing geomedic."

A posting and a reply from the author

A person under the name Stavreas posted the follow letter that forced me to answer to Mr. Stavreas



12:05 pm on August 24th, 2009

3

I think that we must refer the leader of the company, captain George Skaltsas. Captain George Skaltsas, who was surely alive until 2007 living in Athens, when I saw him last time, was the most decorated officer in Greek Army, with the absolutely amazing record of 6 (six) promotion on heroism. The whole strategic of the action of the Greek company was designed by C. Skaltsas. Captain George Skaltsas was friend with distinguished and famous Col. Koumanakos from the years of Greek Civil War (1946 -1949). It is very interesting to mention that Skaltsas was a student of Law School of University of Athens without any aim to become officer. At the war of 1940-1941 (WW2) he was enlisted as corpal. After of about 9 years of war he had been captain!!!! It was in 1947 when Koumanakos (then major) and Skaltsas met in the battlefield. Koumanakos and Skaltsas had about 9 years of battle experience when they arrived in Korea.

Reply



Andreas Koumanakos

December 23rd, 2009 at 1:10 pm

I am sorry, but I have to disagree with STAVREAS at all points of his letter.

I fear that Mr Stavreas is acting as a provocateur. I am afraid that every thing he writes about captain Skaltsas has been given to him from Skaltsas himself. This is a known method Skaltsas uses, for years now, in order to show that he looks a bit alike to his Commander Koumanakos

Also, I am afraid that Mr. STAVREAS is not a real person, at all. Because...

- 1. Captain Skaltsas is named Kostas and not George.
- 2. He was a grammar school teacher and not a lawyer.
- 3. Yes.. Koumanakos was to the war for nine years before his arrival to Korea, but not Skaltas.
- 4. No.. Skaltsas is not the most decorated officer of the Greek Army. It is ridiculous to be said things like that. Skaltsas is not coming from any productive military school. This creates to him a sense of inferiority and after the death of Koumanakos; Scaltsas disseminates inaccurate things and events, in spite of the fact that Koumanakos proposed him for promotion twice.
- 5. It was a mission to the Greek Battalion to defend the SECTOR HARRY and the Battalion Commander

Koumanakos determined both, the Defense and the Fire plans of the Battalion, as well as the mission of each company. Captain Skaltsas was assigned to defend with his company "P" on the HILL 420 (O.P. HARRY). That hill is located 425 yards northeast of MLR and contained trenches deep enough to walk in. It was fortified with reinforced bunkers and could accommodate from approximately 150 up to about 180 fighting men. The CP had earth tel. line with the bt CP and the S2 and S3 Section. Double barbed wire of four lines enclosed the entire hill top and a system of roots covered the flanks of the hill up to the top, to help the action of tanks. These roots were opened under the personal supervision of Col. Koumanakos. He was waiting CCF from the flanks. 6.- Mr. STAVREAS is writing.. "Skaltsas designed the strategy of action of his company." What strategy? Does he know what strategy is? Of course... not the strategy of a corporal.

He had not any particular jurisdiction to develop personal strategy or other initiative, beyond his mission to defend the hill 420. Apart from that, what kind of strategy can develop a company commander on a top hill, circled by barbed wire in a trench line with semi permanent defensive works (bankers and trenches), except of asking for more artillery fires and lighting cells. And this is what he did.

Captain Scaltsas was presented in a documenter and himself says: "I was called by my battalion Commander

Koumanakos and he told me. "Kostas... you are going up to the hill, (HILL 420) and you will do this and also that."

I am afraid that this is the only truth he says because all the rest he said were exaggerations and ignorant of history.

7. – The battle of HARRY was given in the Sector Harry from entire the Battalion and not on the Hill 420 from the Company of Captain Skaltsas. The company "P" of Captain Skaltsas simply has made a good job. That is to say, they did in their trenches a good use of their weapons, against the approaching Chinese. And then before they reach the barbed wire, the Battalion Commander Lt. Col. George Koumanakos gave the order for a counter-attack from the two other companies, from the left and the heavy Tank Platoon from the right and the Chinese repelled and escaped. No Chinese stepped in the trenches of O.P. Harry.

The regimental Commander Col. Ackers in his record writes. "The whole operation took place around the hill." Captain Skaltsas personally narrated it to me, when I asked him on this subject. He told me. "How they could get in the trench line? They didn't pass the barbed wire at all. I had a team of four soldiers and we were inspected the barbed wires and if by chance some CCF could approach the fence... we fired on him."

This is the truth and this is the only strategy he could develop as a Company Commander closed in a trench

line on a top hill circled by multiple sets of barbed wire.

Land combat involves contact with an enemy throughout the depth of an operational area. Combat power is the ability to fight. It is the total means of destructive or disruptive force, or both, that a military unit or formation can apply against the adversary at a given time. Commanders combine the elements of combat power—maneuver, firepower, leadership, protection, and information—to meet constantly changing requirements and defeat an enemy. Never the less, defeating an enemy requires increasing the disparity between friendly and enemy forces by reducing enemy combat power. Commanders do this by synchronizing the elements of friendly force combat power to create overwhelming effects at the decisive time and place. Maneuver is the means by which commanders concentrate combat power to achieve surprise, shock, momentum, and dominance. Operational maneuver involves placing Army forces and resources at the critical place in time to achieve an operational advantage.

In the case of Harry Sector battle, only the Battalion Commander Koumanakos had such ability and not the Company Commander Skaltsas that was unable for any kind of maneuver.

Fifty five years later the records of the Harry battle were published and now Captain Skaltas and his friend Stavreas can be informed what happened at that battle.

ENTRIES IN THE 15TH INFANTRY S2/S3 JOURNAL FROM 31 MAY TO 30 JUNE, 1953 A RECORD OF EVENTS DURING THE DEFENCE OF OUTPOST HARRY

Outpost Harry Survivors Association

Outpost Harry was located in what was commonly referred to as the "Iron Triangle" in Korea. This was an area approximately 60 miles north of Seoul and was on the most direct route to the South Korean capital for the CCF. Outpost Harry was located 425 yards northeast of MLR and contained trenches deep enough to walk in. It was fortified with reinforced bunkers and could accommodate from approximately 150 up to about 180 fighting men. Thirty-nine years later, 11 veterans from around the country decided to hold a reunion at Fort Stewart GA to honor of the Outpost Harry Siege. It was decided at that time to meet yearly around the anniversary date of June 10th to commemorate those that defended and preserved the outpost and to those who made the ultimate sacrifice. Thus the Outpost Harry Survivors Association was established. Since that first reunion meeting, The Outpost Harry Survivors Association has grown to over 250 members.

Acknowledgements:

The material in this journal was provided by OPHSA member Bob Baker and covers events which occurred during the defense of Outpost Harry during the period from 31 May to 30 June 1953.

EXCERPTS FROM 15th INFANTRY S2/S3 JOURNAL 31 MAY to 30 JUNE 1953

14 JUNE

- 0010 OP George rpts that Harry is getting short friendly VT rounds.
- 0020 OP Harry is getting 120mm mortars from a back azimuth 6400.
- 0023 Harry rpts short frdly arty still coming in.
- 0205 OP Harry suspects CCF around position.
- 0220 OP receiving SA fire from right. Request increased illumination and FPF fires be laid to left and front.
- 0255 Est 75 CCF coming up left side of OP Harry.
- 0315 A Company/ I 5th rptd seeing something moving up left rear of Harry. 81mm fire requested.
- 0405 OP George rpts AW fire from left rear of Harry. Unable to determine position.
- 0435 Harry reports bunker burning on left rear of OP
- 0500 G/15th departed MLR for Harry
- 0505 2nd Bn/15 relieved by 1st Bn/15. 5th RCT assumed responsibility for left of battalion sector and OP Tom.
- 0745 G Company relieves C/5th RCT on Harry.
- 2045 Bn switchboard reports land line to OP Harry out. Commo accomplished through A Company.
- 2220 Since 2050 there have been 3 casualties on Harry due to enemy mortar.

15 JUNE

- 0030 Land line to OP Harry reestablished.
- 0125 Harry reports CCF in trenches. Request FDF
- 0130 E Company counterattack force is alerted to move out. Tanks order to move out immediately.
- 0135 Main attack is on the right side of Harry.
- 0147 Bunker burning on left rear of Harry. Requests more litter bearers immediately.

- 0151 OP Harry requests all outer defensive fires.
- 0155 Land line to Harry has been knocked out.
- 0159 Small arms fire has almost stopped.
- 0210 E Company departed MLR for counterattack.
- 0217 1st Platoon, 15th Tank Co arrived at Bn CP in preparation for counterattack.
- 0224 Bn CO to A Company to remove mines from road leading to Harry.
- 0218 OP Harry is receiving fire from Old Charlie
- 0227 Major Dennison, 2nd Bn XO, directed to take command of OP.
- 0238 Flares are too far to the left for Harry.
- 0242 There is still SA fire and hand to hand fighting on forward portion of hill.
- 0243 George Company reports LT Walker, CO, wounded. LT Yomoshito assumed command. Flares are in right position but a little too high.
- 0245 Bn S 1 I reports approx 20 casualties have arrived at forward aid station.
- 0249 MAJ Thomas order commo personnel to relay land lines to OP Harry.
- 0252 Tanks departed MLR
- 0315 Easy Company is now on Harry.
- 0315 Major Dennison departed MLR to organize and command hill. Still some sporadic SA fire from Hill
- 0315 Request from Harry to lift FPF, fire only outer ring of defensive fires.
- 0332 Secondary explosion from burning bunker on OP
- 0345 B/15th departed for 2nd Bn area for possible counterattack on Harry. Harry requests more litter bearers, have 10 casualties to be evacuated.
- 0350 Major Dennison reports all CCF cleared from OP Harry and hill is secured. Requests medical

- assistance.
- 0400 OP Harry requests counter mortar on Star and Bunker Hill and Counter battery on Mushroom and Henry hills.
- 0420 It was estimated that 100 CCF were in night's action on Harry. 25 CCF KIA, no WIA estimate as yet.
- 0504 MAJ Dennison requested a few fresh people to help in reorganization of OP Harry. Also requested KSCs (Korean laborers) be dispatched.
- 0525 Land line to Harry reestablished.
- 0700 Lead elements of G Company departed Harry.
- 1530 Lead elements of A/15th Inf departed MLR to relieve E Company on Harry
- 1910 A Company/15th completed relief of E Company/15th on OP Harry.
- 2225 Harry requests illumination. Heard noises.

16 JUNE

- 0217 OP Harry reports sighting of undetermined number of CCF moving northeast vic CT517429. Arty being placed.
- 0930 P Company, GEF, completed relief of A Company on Harry.
- 0935 GEF Battalion completes relief of 2nd Bn/15th Inf
- 1945 35 to 40 CCF advancing in trench from Star Hill. Arty fired. Est 30 CCF casualties. There were 4 WIAs from incoming rounds: 1 GEF, 2 houseboys, and 1 sergeant from smoke generator team
- 2258 OP Harry heard noises vic CT509424. Flares fired. No enemy sightings reported.

17 JUNE

- 1445 39th FA reports est 50 CCF in the trench line in front of OP Harry. Arty being placed.
- 1745 GEF (Hallis) rptd 40 CCF in trench at CT519435. Arty fired. Est 6 KIA, 20 WIA
- 2140 SGT Thanos reptd Harry receiving Arty and mortar fire for past hour.
- 2210 SGT Thanos reptd OP Harry receiving direct fire around CP bunker and FO bunker.
- 2301 OP Harry reports 40 CCF at CT506425. Arty notified. (This message was relayed by William Dannenmaier, author of We Were Innocents: An Infantryman in Korea)

18 JUNE

- 0028 OP George reports estimated two enemy battalions attacking from NE and NW
- 0030 SGT Thanos rpts unknown number of CCF moving south off Star Mass toward Harry. Requests final barrages.
- 0035 OP Harry under heavy mortar and arty shelling. Company N 81s and 75s ordered to fire supporting. Flare ship on way.
- 0040 CCF advancing up right slope of Harry
- 0050 AW fire down left front and left rear of Harry
- 0100 COL **Koumanakos** estimates CCF force Attacking OP Harry at 2 battalions.
- 0116 Bn OP reptd incoming arty rounds decreasing on Harry.
- 0150 OP Harry requests continuous arty fire and continuous illumination.
- 0158 LT Pappas rptd as of now no CCF actually on OP Harry, requests continuous illumination.
- 0205 GEF Bn 6 (Koumanakos) states P Company has

- a great number of casualties. N Company is being committed
- 0210 Orange FO on OP Harry was under attack but enemy came only to within 10 yards of trench, maybe 1 or 2 got in trenches.
- 0218 Harry rpts 100 150 CCF massing to right of CT5064425. (about 100 yards downslope of Harry) Mortars placed.
- 0238 Spartan 6 repts 1 platoon of N Company has reached Harry. Asks for continuous illumination. Chinese have reached the barbed wire.
- 0240 Pappas repts the Chinese are at HG range.
- 0245 Spartan 6 (**Koumanakos**) Now is the most critical time. If we repel them, they will not have time to organize another attack. CCF attacking from North and right of Harry. Heavy arty and mtrs falling on Harry and MLR.
- 0313 CCF in trenches on north nose of Harry. Hand to hand combat.
- 0330 N Comp now counterattacking on OP Harry. 1 platoon of N Company with tanks in valley. 2nd and 3rd Platoons of N Company on way to Harry.
- 0420 LT Pappas rpts all CCF driven off OP Harry. OP is secure.
- 0600 Spartan 6 estimated that 3 enemy bns attacked OP Harry during the night.
- 0700 SGT Thanos, Est friendly casualties were 30 WIA and 6 KIA (incomplete)
- 0900 Est enemy casualties for nights action on Harry was 120 KIA and 480 WIA
- 0910 Friendly casualties for nights action were: GEF Bn 21 WIA, 4 KIA; US personnel 4 WIA, KATUSA, 3 WIA, KSC, 2 WIA
- 1500 N Company completed relief of P Company on

Harry and assumes responsibility for the mission.

- 1730 P Company closed assy area vic Hill 312.
- 1800 R Company completed relief of O Company in right company sector on MLR. 1 platoon of O Company attached to R Company. 2nd Platoon of O Company remained on MLR until daylight as counterattack force for Harry.
- 2130 Hvy Mtr Co repts 8 CCF moving toward Harry.
 Mtrs fired with unknown results

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I am sorry to have to offend a colleague, but the historic truth is more expensive than a dubious friendship.


Andreas Koumanakos

Ret col. Eng. Corp Greek Army.



Ret. Col. Koumanakos Andreas in front of the desk of the Pesident of Korea Rock Li, sitting between his wife and the Greek Minister of Defence Polythoras..

Leonard A. Spirito



A Brave fighter. A sincere amd truthful Offiser. He participated to the counter attack with his Heavy Tank platoon, acting on the right flank of Harry Sector. The following posting of his is an answer to the inacuracies of Mr Pagomenos and Cpt Scaltsas..

Leonard A. Spirito

When the Greeks were assigned to man the OP, their colonel (Koumanakos I think) asked our Regimental Commander for help in placing .50 machine guns on the hill. Regt tasked the Tank Co. and the Company Commander tasked me.

So armed with my handy "Go-No-Go" gauge, I went up to Harry with the Greeks. Believe me when I say I've never seen so many .50 cal. machine guns in one unit. The Greeks specialized in swiping them especially from the 73rd Tank Bn. and occasionally from our company. Anyway, I spent the day adjusting head space and figuring fields of fire (and taking photos).

As you know, we did not pre-test weapons on the OP because the CCF would spot their location and target them for "pole charges." It also permitted me to reconnoitre the terrain on the east side of the OP because I was to take my platoon out there if there was an attack. The mission was to cover the slope leading from Star to the forward loop of the OP.

There was an attack and we did go out. We had a platoon of Greeks with us as ground security and received a fair amount of mortar and artillery fire during the fight. Two of the Greeks with us were wounded and I had the headlights "cleaned" off of the forward slope of my tank.

Then, just before dawn when things quieted down, we loaded the wounded Greeks on to our tanks and returned to the MLR

(www.ophsa.org/Len_Spirito/Outpost_Harry/Enlarged_004.htm)

04/23/07 James C. Hafer



Jim Hafer

Jim has added his experience as Platoon Leader of the 4th platoon, 3rd Infantry Division, 15th Regiment Heavy Tank Company during the defense of Outpost Harry.

I was born and raised in Guthrie Oklahoma. I enlisted in the U.S. Army in February 1951, in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma and was assigned to the 45th Infantry Division – 45th Military Police Company, Camp (Fort) Polk, Louisiana. From Camp Polk the Division was shipped to Hokkaido, Japan and trained until replacing the 1st Cavalry Division in Korea – December 1951. I returned to the United States in 1952 and attended The Armored Officers Candidates School (Class #9 – Company I) at Fort Knox Kentucky. Upon graduation, I volunteered for a tour of duty – Far East Command. On

April 15, 1953 I was assigned to the 3rd Infantry Division, 15th Regiment Heavy Tank Company and served as Platoon Leader, 4th platoon and later as Company Executive Office.

I returned stateside in April 1954 and spent 16 months at Fort Hood, Texas – 1st Armored Division – 13th Heavy Tank Battalion and served as Company Commander of Company B. I requested, and was granted, release from active duty in August of 1955.

It was a great four and one half years of military duty, and would not have had it any other way! I have always, and remain now, extremely proud to have been a member of the 3rd Division and especially the 15th Regimental Tank Company.

It was a distinct privilege to have been granted assignment to provide tank support for the Greek Expeditionary Forces, and exceptional and gallant Battalion.


The 3rd and 25th mottos could not be more appropriate – a "CAN DO" Regiment in a ROCK (of the Marne) Division. I will be more than pleased if these web pages are of interest to you!


Notice from the Author:

Jim Hafer has posted several pictures on the internet while he was with his armor platoon attached to the Greek Battalion









Soldier George Pagomenos who was on the OP Harry told me through his son Mike, that there was not any Command Post of the Greek Bn, behind OP Harry, as well as that there was no tank close to the hill 420. These pictures of Lt. Hafer, let be the answer to their lies.

Outpost Harry

Orrin Charles orichalch@yahoo.com
Sun, 15 Dec 2002 22:16:49 -0800 (PST)

I found Regnard Addison (RAB) Burgess, Frt.'s account of events at Outpost Harry in the Korean War Veterans National Museum and Library quite interesting:

"Outpost Harry was different from anything else. The dead bodies, the smell the destruction. The Greek soldiers probably said it best. "It was like being sent to hell." We repaired and ran new telephone lines across the flat behind the MLR and Outpost Harry. It seems like we were on O.P. Harry two or three times a day while the Greek Bn. was here even after the siege ended 18 June 1953. Peter (3rd) Company of the Greek Bn. was there the last night of the siege. 1st Lt. Peter B. Mavradies and Cpl. Shaw were the Recon. Team (F.O.) from the 39th FA Bn. The uniforms rotted off of our backs since we didn't have a bath or change of clothes for about six weeks. We had better food being with the Greek Bn and we slept 45 minutes to an hour and half a night.

The siege stopped. The rain stopped. Only a few incoming artillery, mortar rounds and small arms fire. It was almost pleasant. Then we went back to regroup, retrain, rearm, etc... However we didn't get there. Instead we went to Kumsung Valley. I went with Lt. Bitsis Recon. Section (Forward Observer)

with Nan (1st) Company of the Greek Inf. Bn. On the way to Nan Company I carried batteries to Peter Company of the Greek Bn. As I went to Nan Company it became very dark and I could hear the Chinese talking very close around. I pushed on and ran into a patrol of Greek soldiers from O (2nd) Company. After much talk they let me come in. My knowledge of the Greek language isn't that good, then or now. Peter Company had lost contact. Lt. Col. George Koumanakos, Greek Inf. Bn. Commander and 1st Lt. Peter Mavrides, Liaison Officer of Section #244 were impressed and put me in for the Silver Star Medal. I received the medal about twenty years later, no orders with it. It just came through the mail. I spent the rest of the night with O Company of the Greek Bn. I found out I was reported missing in action. I called back and got the MIA report stopped before it was sent to my mother in Arkansas.

The next morning I had a pleasant stroll over to "N" Company, Greek Bn. Lt. Bistis and I went out the next day and called in some fire missions. He was then satisfied I could perform as a forward observer.

The 30th Capitol ROK had run and left Kumsung and Kumwha valleys open. After the CCF made a mass attack the 555th AFA n. of the 5th RCT lost 16 of their 18 self propelled guns to the CCF. The CCF fired on us with the 55th AFA guns (155mm) and ammo. The Third Infantry division had been sent in

to plug the breakthrough. We held the ground until 27 July 1953 and cease-fire.

'N' Company Greek Bn. was surrounded for six days in the Kumsung Valley. The Greek Captain exclaimed "no surrender. Fight to the last man". On the last night the Air Force napalmed the CCF and we walked out. We ran out of food and water but had plenty of ammo. Sometimes every man in the company was firing and the Chinese were firing back/CCF bodies were piled up all around the company. We settled in a new position and I think we stayed there until the cease fire. After the cease fire we went back to the Greek Bn. . . We had no detail or guard, plenty of good food and drink. It was my best time in the Army.

The last night Col. Koumanakos called me off to one side and told me I would receive the Greek War Cross. In the fall of 1953 we were told that President Eisenhower wouldn't let us receive the Greek medals."

http://www.theforgottenvictory.org/old/battles.htm

^{*}excerpted from:



Lt Col George Koumanakos was fighting in Korea until the last day of the war. July 26 1953. Although his replacement had arrived and had surrendered to the administration from July 20, he remained with the new Battalion Commander as the Battalion was involved in battle. Finally he left Korea at the 19th of October 1953.

HELLENIC FORCES



HEADQUARTERS
GREEK EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
G.A.P.O. 5800

15 Sept. 1953

SUBJECT: Honorary Membership

TO

Captain Martin Markley Cheynne, Wyo. U.S.of America

It is a distinct pleasure to me to appoint Captain Martin Markley, U.S. Army, an honorary member of the Greek Expeditionary Forces Battalion in acknowledgement of his services offered to this gallant unit.

The sincere co-operation of Captain Martin Markley and his utmost contribution to the successful accomplishment of the missions assigned this Battalion are greatly appreciated by every Officer and Men of the Greek Expeditionary Porces and reflects great credit on himself and the United States Army.

Effective this date Captain Martin Markley, an honorary member of the heroic GEF Bm, is entitled to wear the "HELLENIO FORGES" Patch

Commanding GEF Bn.

KOUMANAKOS GEORGE

Lt.Col.



After his return to Greece Lt Col Koumanakos was promoted. Here, as a Brigadier General during a national holiday..

Emory Walker



(Click the picture for a larger view)

Emory Walker

Denver, Colorado Korean War Veteran of the United States Army

"Following are some of my memories of my time involved with OP Harry during those critical days. This was written some time ago as part of an autobiography for my daughters.

- Emory Walker

OPHSA (Out Post Harry) Memories...

I reported to the army and was sworn in on January 5, 1951. After processing in San Antonio I was sent to the Atlanta General Depot in Atlanta, Georgia. There I spent six weeks of Signal Corps basic training in the 579th Signal Depot Company. That was a laugh - I had learned more about army basics in high school ROTC than there. Anyway, when that stint was finished My CO called me in to see what signal corps school I wanted to attend since I had qualified for anything the army offered in that vein. I told him that I had been accepted for OCS but had not yet received my orders. He placed me in a radar repair school in Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey but the OCS orders caught up with me before Leaving for New Jersey. I did manage a three day pass tacked onto a weekend and got a hop courtesy of the Air Force to Dallas and a bus ride to El Paso. The objective was to get my car and drive back to Atlanta which I did. My next assignment was to Fort Jackson, South Carolina for infantry Leadership Training School. Because I had not been in infantry basic training I was assigned to a basic training company in the 28th Infantry, 8th Infantry Division.

My time in the 28th Infantry was in a trainee capacity for a week or two after which I was transferred to another regiment as cadre. One night I was the CQ (Charge of Quarters) and I was looking through various stuff in the office. I ran across the name of an old friend, Oscar T. Buchholz (who had been a member of St. Mark's Methodist Church in El Paso and had worked for MST & T Co. when I was a frameman). He was listed as the Field Officer of the Day. I called him and he asked where I was. I told him and he came over to my company. It was really funny, before Buck arrived my company

commander, a 2nd Lt. came into the office. When Buck arrived with his gold leaves and the FOD arm band my CO about died. Buck said he didn't want to see the Lt. but had come to visit Emory instead. We saw quite a lot of each other while at Ft. Jackson and I often went to their house for dinner after church. Buck had been recalled after service during World War II. A little more about him later

When I reported to the Leadership Training School I was really surprised to find my friend, Buck, was the commanding officer. Upon completion of that school there was an automatic promotion to corporal involved so I never was a PFC. When my orders for OCS arrived it included an automatic promotion to staff sergeant so I was a



Photo taken by James Jarboe July 27, 1953

very short term corporal. I remember the first sergeant of whatever company I was in at the time couldn't understand how someone could be promoted so fast after so short a time in the army. I reported to Fort Benning, Georgia in October of 1952 as a member of OC Class 11A *

Until graduation day on April 21, 1952, I had experiences like I could not imagine. Because of how tall I was I was assigned to the first platoon. Too bad! The platoon leader and tactical Officer was a 2nd Lt. William H. Tyler, an

SOB if ever one lived. He had just graduated from the Citadel that spring and had just completed his advanced infantry class at Ft. Benning. He knew all of the ways to make officer candidates eat dirt, and he did. He was probably the most despised individual among the company because he took sadistic delight in harassing every member of the company regardless of which platoon the individual was in.

Fairly early in our tenure in OC Class 11A the company commander put together a team to write and edit a class yearbook of sorts. I was very fortunate to be named the photographer for that effort. I requested permission to do all of the processing, printing, etc. of all the photographs and he agreed. This meant that I had to have a class A pass to get off the post where we were stationed to go to the main post photo lab to do the work. What a deal! OCS with a class A pass. The class book staff had a special room assigned to it which was never to be inspected by order of the commanding officer. That proved to be heaven. Bob Andrews was the editor (and we were room mates for quite a while) and had an affinity for bourbon having been an INS reporter in Dallas prior to the army.

Having a car and a class A pass proved to be a real benefit. I could make a run to the main post, do some photography work and swing by a nearby package liquor store. Of course, those bottles stayed in that never inspected room. Working on that class book was a real opportunity to meet and get to know everyone in the company. We had decided early on that our class book would be individualized rather than like some of the boiler plate stuff others had done. One thing this meant was a candid photo of every member of the class to appear along side his graduation picture. I still have my copy of the book and really cherish it.

The experiences of those six months in OCS are far too

numerous to mention here but a few highlights will have to suffice. The fall of 1952 was mostly spent in the basics of map reading, tactics, marksmanship, etc. The only remarkable thing was that I was top in the class with the M1 rifle, the carbine and the BAR having made the highest qualifying scores. With the .45 pistol I was lucky if I could hit the ground. I did respectfully well with the other weapons, light and heavy machine guns, mortars (60 mm, 81 mm and 4.2"), and even artillery. When Christmas time rolled around there was a question of whether we could go home or not. The decision was finally a YES. What a welcome break to some very serious tension. I managed to get back to El Paso via an air force hop and returned to Ft. Benning via train.

We had to report in no later than midnight on January 1, 1952. I remember I arrived in town that afternoon and fooled around until evening when I got back to the company. It took Lt. Tyler no time at all to begin the harassing again, even before we had to report back. We finally got to bed after midnight and to some very welcome sleep. I think it was about 4:00 or 4:30 in the morning when we were all aroused to be greeted with a major obstacle. It was customary to begin each day with calisthenics but this day was to be special. Double timing was common and running was not out of the question. This day, however, was both. At our early morning formation we were told we were going on a fourteen mile excursion. For the first seven miles we double timed and stopped for about a fifteen minute break. We then double timed for two or three miles on the way back but were

stopped and told we would run the rest of the way. Anyone who failed to return with the rest of the company would be automatically expelled from OCS. We lost about one third of the class left at that time. (Several had been expelled for various reasons during the first three months.)

It wasn't too long after surviving that awful January 2nd that all of a sudden we were slated for an inspection by none less than General Mark Clark, Chief of Staff of the U S Army. What an honor? It seemed necessary to our Tac Officers that the company area needed some sprucing up and a new coat of paint. Of course, that was the order of the day (I really should say nights because that is when all the work was done) except we had no paint. That meant we "contributed" some of our meager pay with which to buy paint. Needless to say, that company area was a knockout when General Clark arrived. In fact, he was quite impressed. Somehow after that episode we managed to get a few coveted, weekend passes.

One of the things stressed during OCS was physical fitness. Every morning we did calisthenics and a lot of double-timing, running, etc. We had a couple of practice physical fitness tests on which I was only about average. Then came the three tests which were for the record. Those were really stressful but I managed to ace them. It seems that on the Saturday morning of our first record test I had two wisdom teeth pulled. It was pretty obvious, even to Lt. Tyler, that there was no way I could do very well on that test. When the second record test day arrived, another Saturday, guess what? I had the two remaining wisdom teeth pulled. Even with that I did manage to show some improvement over the first test so that was good. Improvement was the main goal. When the final

test arrived I was near the top of the class in improvement because I had no more wisdom teeth to come out.

One of the evaluation techniques was to send candidates before an officer evaluation board. This was a dreaded experience because that board could summarily kick one out of OCS, send him back to another company or pass him along to continue with the class. My board experience was a real trying time. It seemed that most, if not all, of our platoon were sent before the board for any reason Lt. Tyler could dream up. I managed to survive and did graduate with my class. From that point on my one big goal in the army was to outrank Lt. Tyler, and I almost made it. More on that later.

April 21, 1952 was a BIG day. What was left of OC Class 11A were brand new 2nd Lieutenants, absolutely the lowest form of life in all of the army. That probably goes for the Marines and Air Force, too. Several of my class mates stayed on at Ft. Benning to attend parachute school. At that time I wanted nothing more to do with Ft. Benning so did not volunteer for that training. That is probably the biggest regret I have concerning my five years in the army - not learning to jump out of airplanes. I have regretted that decision ever since.

I was assigned to Ft. Leonard Wood, Missouri to the 94th Infantry Battalion (Separate) as a platoon leader. This was an interesting and good experience for a brand new 2nd Lt. This unit was one of the last segregated units in the army with all black troops and about two-thirds white officers. The reason that training was so good was that everything that could happen did happen in that unit. We always had the best of everything on the post - best day room, best mess hall, best supply room, etc. On the other

hand every problem that could come up in the army probably happened there. We had AWOL as a matter of course, summary courts martial of all kinds, many crimes both on and off post, general courts martial, and more company punishment that one could imagine. They were either very good or just terrible.

One of the nice side benefits of being assigned to this unit was the battalion commander. It seems he had a girl friend in Kansas City and wanted to spend the weekends with her. As a result he would always arrange for a night training exercise during the week and give everyone Saturday morning as compensatory time off. That was just great. Some of us from the BOQ had gotten acquainted with the Haggadorns who owned a lodge, or resort, on the Lake of the Ozarks. Bill Haggadorn had a problem in that the lodge had a great many single girls from Kansas City and St. Louis who would spend a week or two at the lake. Bill's problem was a shortage of young men for these girls to square dance with or whatever kind of dancing was to go on at the time. He also needed young men to escort these women on some of the hayrack rides, etc. So naturally, he encouraged us to spend our free time at the lake and to further encourage us he gave us everything at half price. Not a bad deal. I did meet some very nice girls this way but nothing developed in a very serious vein. It was during this period that I received my one and only proposal of marriage. Some girl thought I was what she wanted in a husband. I do not even remember her name or what she looked like. I guess it made only a small impression on me.

Another benefit of being stationed in the 94th Infantry Battalion (Separate) was that I got to go to Alaska. One of the platoon leaders had volunteered for Summer Arctic

Indoctrination Training but was involved in an auto accident and could not go. At the last minute I volunteered to take his place and was soon on orders to proceed to Great Falls, Montana to connect with a flight to Alaska. In those days the train was the way to get around so I was off to Montana via Denver (the first time I remember ever being in Denver and then only to see the city from a train). I remember when we got to Billings, Montana they set the Pullman car on a side track and said we were welcome to sleep there for the night, a Saturday, as I remember. I know I left the train to wander around Billings and to have dinner somewhere. I was really shaken to see vast numbers of drunk Indians lying on the sidewalks, passed out. We were off to Great Falls early the next morning to meet our flight on Monday.

The trip on an air force C-54 was uneventful. We did stop in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada for refueling before proceeding to Big Delta, Alaska. The arctic indoctrination school was located in Big Delta which is about 90 miles or so south of Fairbanks. As I recall the first couple of weeks was spent teaching us technical climbing, that is using ropes, pitons, etc. This was really a blast because I had always done quite a bit of climbing in younger days.

We then had a weekend on TDY (temporary duty) to Fairbanks so we could see the sights. Two things really impressed me. First was the museum at the University of Alaska where an enormous Kodiak bear, stuffed and standing on his hind legs, greeted one as he entered the building. That bear must have been at least fourteen or fifteen feet tall as he was displayed. The second thing I remember well was a large sign over the bar in the officer's club at the air force base which said "This air

force base has the highest birth rate of any air force base in the world." I also remember that downtown Fairbanks, which wasn't much, had board walks and beer cost \$2.50 per bottle.

The next couple of weeks were spent teaching us how to fish and run outboard motor boats called Tanana Freighters. These were specially built boats used primarily on the Tanana River for moving people, goods, etc. and were quite long and fairly narrow. It was at this time that I learned to catch and eat grayling, a cousin of the trout. They are delicious and far better than any American trout I have ever eaten. We also caught a lot of northern pike, another delicious fish. You must understand this was all in the line of duty!

When this part of the training was over the last part of the training involved climbing on a glacier, in this it was the Black Rapids Glacier, a rather formidable one to say the least. The snout or end of the glacier loomed more than 200 feet deep and the whole area of the snout was filled with many crevices. This training led into simulated attack and defensive maneuvers which involved both tanks and aircraft. The planes used were really interesting. They were P-51 Mustangs except two of them had been converted into two engine planes that looked something like the P-38 Lightning.

This was a most rewarding experience and I fell in love with the kind of training done there. I talked to the base commander at Big Delta to see if he needed any instructors. He said he did and would like to have me join his staff. He told me to make a formal application for transfer to Big Delta and he would at the same time

request a new 2nd Lt. Instructor and name me as the one he wanted. Good idea? Wrong!

Some things I particularly remember about my Alaskan experience was learning about the temperature extremes. Near where I was, the record low and record high both occurred. If I remember correctly, the record high was a bit over 100 degrees while the low recorded was around 90 below. Quite a range! With Alaska being so far north it is truly the land of the midnight sun. I remember coming out of a movie theater some time around eleven o'clock and finding the sun still brightly shining. I remember the day we left Big Delta the sun was coming up and it was around three-thirty in the morning. I also remember what a terrible flight that was. We were in a C-54, not too bad an airplane, and ran into a ferocious storm over the northern Rocky Mountains. That plane rode like a bucking bronco and everyone aboard got airsick, including the pilot and crew. It was awful.

At that time any request for a transfer involving a change of station required that the request include three choices. My first was Big Delta, the second Europe and the third was for FECOM (Far East Command, which translated to Korea). Guess which one I got.

Upon returning to Ft. Leonard Wood just in time for the Labor Day weekend I was anxiously awaiting orders to go back to Alaska. One of the things I had to do was set up some training exercises to demonstrate what I had learned in Alaska. We did some minor technical rope work and I taught the troops how to rappel, which is great fun.

Training was a very big thing and my favorite class to instruct at that time was unarmed defense against a bayonet. When one learns how to do it the danger of being stabbed is absolutely minimal. I learned how to do this very well and did a lot of teaching. I remember one day one of the GI's was very sluggish and lackluster in his training and the attention he was not giving to me, the know-it-all 2nd Lt. He would not perform the exercise properly so I started picking on him until he was really getting mad. This worked to my advantage but he didn't know it. Finally, I told him to stab me with his bayonet which was attached to his M-1 rifle. I knew if he really tried I had him. As it turned out I kept nagging him until he made a serious lunge with the full intention of killing me. He didn't. I easily disarmed him and in doing so accidentally hit him in the ribs with the butt of his rifle and broke a couple of his ribs. From that moment on those troops never had a problem paying attention when I was the instructor.

By this time things were all over between Anne Marsh and me so when I got home on leave before going to Korea I managed to date a couple of other girls. One I remember was Barbara Banner whom I had known in high school. I remember taking her to an affair at the Ft. Bliss Officer's Club where I was to meet someone I had known before in the army. I cannot remember who we met but I do remember only dating Barbara a couple of times. She was one of the girls I also knew at Trinity Methodist Church.

I had to leave El Paso in early December to go to Ft. Lawton, Washington for transportation to Japan. It was almost three weeks before we sailed which was a surprise to me. Usually they flew 2nd Lts. to Japan because there was such a turnover and replacements were in short supply. But the USS Marine Phoenix was my mode of travel. We sailed on the worst possible date, December 24, 1952. I doubt if you can imagine what it was like to set sail on Christmas Eve. But sail we did! The people of Seattle had a custom of welcoming servicemen home from Korea when a troop ship arrived. This was the exception since, if you will remember, there were many protests about the Korean "Police Action." Anyway, on this Christmas Eve the reverse was true. People turned out in droves to wish us well and give out over four thousand Christmas presents. What a send off!

With the holiday season at hand one might well imagine there was more than a small amount of liquid refreshments on board that troop ship. It was well hidden until someone caught the troop commander with a bottle. That did it and the booze flowed from that time onward. The trip was pretty dull except for one thing - a major northern Pacific storm which lasted for three weeks. The captain of the ship tried to sail around the storm but to no avail. We went south to just north of the Hawaiian Islands and then to just about the Philippines Sea to get to Japan. I was one who got seasick going to Catalina Island but this voyage didn't faze me. Since I was one of the few not seasick I was made the mess officer. Not too pleasant a task with so many ill troops. We did spend quite a bit of time playing Canasta, cribbage and a lot of poker during the trip. We eventually made it to Japan none the worse for all the travails of that crossing. It was quite a sight to see Yokohama and Mount Fuji and some seas without 30 foot waves.

Aboard ship, one of my roommates turned out to be quite a valuable acquaintance. It seems his father was a very

senior officer of a New York bank which had a branch office in Tokyo. When we arrived at Camp Drake he contacted the branch manager who in turn furnished him with a car and driver who spoke good English. Camp Drake was a replacement center and we were required to report in twice each day to see whether we had orders. The rest of the time was ours. With the availability of the car and driver, four of us had the run of Tokyo, Yokahama and as far south as Kokura (sp?), and we really took advantage of that. Not much worth seeing was missed. It is hard for me to realize just how fortunate I have been all of my life and this was just another example.

Towards the end of January I was assigned to Korea but with no specific assignment yet. Sometime before I had left the states Buck Buchholz had told me to look him up when I got to the far east. I called him from Camp Drake. He was then assigned to the POW camp on Koji-Do (sp?), I think as commanding officer. (By then he was a Lt. Colonel.) Anyway, Buck asked me if I would like to be assigned to Koji with him but I declined and said I wanted to take my chances elsewhere, and besides, I told him I wanted to outrank my Tac Officer in OCS. That was the last time I ever talked to Buck; we completely lost track of each other and have never reestablished a link since.

Again, instead of flying to Korea I went via MSTS, this time the USS Marine Lynx. It was only an overnight trip so not much happened on that short crossing of the Sea of Japan to Korea. The pipeline, the vehicle for processing replacement personnel, soon had me assigned to the Third Infantry Division. This was and still is an old and very proud division with an impeccable record from both

World Wars I and II. My assignment then was to the 15th Infantry Regiment, another old and proud unit with a distinguished record for a great many years with the motto "Can Do". This motto came from the 15th's days in China during the later part of the 1800's. The 15th Infantry was commanded by Colonel Richard Stilwell (he retired as a four star general) who briefly greeted the new arrivals upon reaching the his HQ. I was assigned to the 2nd Battalion of the 15th as a Platoon Leader of the 3rd platoon of Company F.

The 2nd Battalion consisted of companies E, F, G, H, and HQ and was commanded by Major John K. Singlaub (who ended his army career as a two star general). My company commander was Captain Kless von Guysen and the other platoon leaders were John Mitchell, Jim Baker and ????. The Executive Officer was ????. Our company was located on a part of the MLR (main line of resistance) immediately behind Outpost Harry. Our regimental sector had responsibility for Outposts Tom, Dick and Harry. Tom was located on the edge of the Chorwan valley while Dick was just to the east. Harry was a company size outpost but at the time I joined Company F we had only a reinforced platoon there.

My first days of combat resulted in nothing happening except for lots of patrols. My platoon would get a patrol assignment about every fourth night or so and were of the ambush type of patrol. We were not to look for trouble but rather be a point of first contact with the Chinese if they were to launch anything. At some point my platoon rotated out to Outpost Harry for a stay of a few days. Those episodes were pretty routine except that occasionally the Chinese would lob a mortar round or two just to keep us on our toes. I never really heard a shot

fired in anger except for the friendly artillery that was fairly constant. My days as a platoon leader were days devoted to developing strong friendships with my fellow officers and the men in my platoon.*

When I took over the 3rd platoon I was warned that I would have a difficult time replacing Lt. Hutchinson, a West Pointer who was adored by the men. Fortunately, for me, that was never a problem. When I was at Ft. Leonard Wood my company commander had just returned from Korea. When I asked him for advice he gave me two pieces - take along a one burner gasoline stove and a large coffee pot. This I did and was that ever good advice! My platoon sergeant was about to rotate back to the states and was worthless as a platoon sergeant so I gave him one order, the coffee pot was to be full at all times. This was especially true after a patrol because the patrol members were mighty glad to have hot coffee when they came in from freezing their butts. This gesture really endeared those men to me.

During the long nights when we had a patrol out everyone was on a 100% alert and often when there was no patrol. During some of these times John Mitchell undertook to write a poem about our experiences. That poem follows:

Korea - early 1953

Tired, cold, scared - The fear obvious in their steps and eyes.

Men, maybe; boys mostly The boy from Michigan who skis
The boy from Brooklyn who wants to fight but is scared to death --- talk only-

This one loads and reloads a thirty round clip, curved to be held.

"When I get back to Virginia, man, all I want is a girl and my bakery truck."

Here's one - Calm, steely eyes -

He hates patrols, his guts twist inside him -

two-seven-zero Jackson Heights Chorwon -

"Yea, I'm ready" - "Everybody got grenades?" "Yes, Lieutenant"

Another Lieutenant - the seventh, no, sixth, - - they move so fast -

Fourth Platoon, Battalion, Rotation, (yea, Quartermaster Rotation).

Dig all day - - Patrol all night

Dig Patrol Dig Patrol Dig - Just five more points.

There stands the Lieutenant, new Lieutenant,

Shiny (no, not shiny now, serious; scared too; doesn't show it much, though) sort of a nice guy - - likes to laugh - No brass on the collar now, no green-gold bar - Just like a G-I;

almost.

Password - - Mae West Call Sign - - Suffering Succotash Pyrotechnics: Green Star - Amber Parachute - Red Star cluster

Check Points - Obvious

Anxious

and, Damn - - can't remember -

"Joe Chink's not going to get Coco!" -

"Not tonight or ever, Coco - - we go out as a unit - come back as a unit - "Yea"

"O.K., Let's go. -

Jose (doesn't speak much English, but sure can fire that

AR) crosses

himself - Quiet, confident, a good soldier, R.A.

Black, Dark, Night, Deep, - Deep, Dark, Black, Night.

Safe Lane, damn, be quiet.

Barbed wire Barbed wire

Barbed wire Concertina

Concertina Barbed wire Barbed wire

Point man moves - stops - listens - looks - Patrol moves -

There it is! Artillery moonbeam - There! Now we can see

- Cross the creek, up the path -

"Wire, commo wire - must be a million miles of the stuff in this damned safe lane."

Step easy -- Walk slow -- Bet we sound like a Battalion to the Chinks - -

Quad fifty cracks overhead - Deadly Christmas Tree

Lights

Red, rosy, friendly - Red, angry, tearing

Slow, move, stop, move -

Ambush site up ahead (ours or theirs?)

Eyes and ears strain - damn those people -

Who? Everybody in this stinking country.

KATUSA (small Korean, can't pronounce his name -

Mim Jung Ki or

something.) Moves out behind the commo-man (boy

from Michigan

(likes to ski).

STOP

The lieutenant moves out into the darkness, two men

cover him as he

moves - Hope we're here first.

THE CHINESE SOLDIER IS WELL TRAINED, WELL EQUIPPED AND CRAFTY

Move, the troops are watching -

"Fool! - just five more points - no more patrols - just dig - More sukoshi - HOME -

Don't like this place - just like Two-seven-zero - Jackson Heights -

Chorwon

Damn Lieutenant doesn't know how -- good ambush site though.

Cold, wet, cold, cold, cold - Mickey Mouse boots, number one

Hands cold, feet warm - Mickey Mouse gloves, havano! --Wake up that damned medic - Chinese can hear him snore across the

valley -

Sleep, warm, comfortable - Cold, wet, cold, cold, cold. Sit here, wait, freeze, sit.

The tank fires, splitting the air, everyone jumps.

Come back - maybe -

Time - slow, cold time, short, fast sleep - long cold wait.

Move out - No chinks tonight - Quiet - God Damn - Quiet -

Wake up everybody -

Slowly - - not so fast - - easy. Down the path - Cross the creek -

Into the safe lane and now - -

HALT

The bolt goes back. Snaps forward

Mr. Browning's machine gun is now fully loaded -

Voices - - Dark -

Mae - - - an AR bolt goes back in the patrol - - - - West.

O.K.

Move in - count noses - back to the platoon - Tell the old man, - - go to bed, - Bed! Sleep!

No more for a couple of nights -
Damn - - just gotta get five more points by Lt. John A. Mitchell; Co. F, 15th Inf.

I remember only one specific patrol with any clarity. Most were simply ambush patrols but one was special. It was what was known as a combat patrol. This meant we went out specifically to try to find and engage the Chinese. Before the patrol was to go out I requested an aerial reconnaissance of the area we were going to cover. This was done in an L-19 airplane, a small two seater. I remember the pilot must have been married with several kids because he had no thought of going low enough for me to see anything.

Eventually I convinced the pilot the Chinese slept during the day and he should make one pass down the valley we were going into so I could see. We made that pass to the east of Outpost Harry and right down the adjoining valley. Just as we crossed the Chinese MLR they opened up with a machine gun and managed to stitch a few holes in our tail. No damage done and there were no injuries. When we came roaring down that valley we crossed immediately over the position of my platoon. My troops had my Texas flag out on the top of my bunker and we couldn't miss seeing it. That flag was a gift from the Mitchell Brewing Co. in El Paso, something they did for anyone going to Korea.

When we got back to the airstrip I returned to my regimental headquarters and greeting me there was an

Episcopal chaplain, Major Marsh. He told me he understood what I was about to embark on and offered a prayer for our safe return. It worked!

Another interesting patrol involved taking a 2nd Lt. from the division G-2 along with a war dog. These were dogs trained to warn the handler of a potential problem. That dog really saved us by alerting us of a Chinese patrol across a small valley. We were able to call in some mortar fire on them and they dispersed. Since that was right in front of the Greek position they sent out a patrol to mop up.

I so remember coming in from one of the early patrols I took out and having a real problem. When we came in we had to cross through a safe lane and clear our weapons. This night was bitterly cold and it had snowed. When we started to clear our weapons we found all the bolts were frozen closed. Had we run into any Chinese that night we could each have fired only one round. Even the pins on our hand grenades were frozen in and could not be readily pulled.

My platoon position was the right flank of the entire 3rd Division tied in with the Greek unit on my right. Infantry training always teaches that where two diverse units are joined at a point, that is a source of real weakness because of communications, etc. Because of this the Assistant Division Commander, Brigadier General Dunkelburg, spent a lot of time in my area making sure that all was well. Over a few weeks I became well acquainted with the general and he with me. It was probably sometime in about March when I received the finest compliment of my army career. General Dunkleburg told Major Singlaub and Captain Guysen that mine was the best platoon in the entire 3rd Division. Talk about brownie points, that really did it!

It wasn't long after that I was transferred to Company H as the Recon Officer. General Smyth, the 3rd Division Commanding General had decided we needed to fortify a mountain immediately behind the Greek positions and my job was to direct the Greeks in doing this. I was assigned an interpreter, Lt. Vakalopoulos, who proved to be a very fine gentleman and friend. He was about as tough an officer as I had ever known. One night the Greeks were involved in a pretty serious fire fight with the Chinese while both were on patrols. One of the Greeks killed that night was a Lieutenant who was a boyhood friend of Lt. Vakolopoulos and the two of them had served together in the Greek army for some time. I expressed my sorrow to my interpreter who was pretty philosophical about his friend's death. He said this is war and these things must be expected. Army friendships are not easy!

An interesting sidelight about my time in H company was quite a bit of poker playing. Captain Rizzo, Lt. Huddleston and some of the platoon leaders plus some officers from the 5th RCT joined us on occasion. When ever there was no alert we could play and that happened fairly often during that time. I was incredibly lucky with my playing and one night I had held a few pat hands and won the pot. Everyone was getting a little more than exasperated at my luck. In one hand late in the game I was dealt three aces and the joker plus a garbage card. Since I had won so many hands with a pat hand I discarded the garbage card and drew the other ace. Needless-to-say, I simply laid down my hand and won the pot, again. Great fun! I won enough during those days to make a \$500.00 down payment on a car later. It was during my time with company H that Outpost Harry was hit with a small Chinese probe. Company F

had the responsibility for the outpost on that night and Jim Baker was the platoon leader. They were able to drive the Chinese off the outpost and Jim distinguished himself in a true John Wayne style, shooting a light machine gun from the hip. For his bravery and daring that night Jim received the Distinguished Service Cross, the second highest decoration for valor. Jim and I have kept in contact with each other these many years via Christmas cards and a visit with each other a couple of times. He remained in the Army Reserves and eventually retired as a Brigadier General.

While working with the Greeks I received a call from the 2nd Battalion Adjutant telling me to report to Battalion HO. Of course I did just that as fast as my little old jeep would permit. When I got there I was almost ignored. Major Singlaub made some small talk and we had a cigarette or two along with coffee. Eventually, a cloud of dust approached and out of it came General Dunkleburg who together with major Singlaub pinned the silver bars of a 1st Lieutenant on my collar. Boy was I one surprised GI. When I got back with the Greeks my interpreter noticed the promotion and that called for a party. *It seems that in the Greek army a promotion is almost unheard of, one must do something special to rate one. The Greeks had a great advantage over the American troops in that they were allowed to have liquor on the line. That party is where I was first introduced to Greek liquors, both Metaxa and Ouso. I still like Metaxa to this day and enjoy it once in a while. I remember that the Greeks had some of the finest bread one could ever eat. I do not know how they obtained the ingredients and raw materials, but they really did eat well. So did I at that party.

Colonel Stilwell had been reassigned and was replaced by a Colonel Russell Akers. Colonel Stilwell (no relation to general Vinegar Joe Stillwell) was such a fine officer it was a shame to have him leave. His replacement was Colonel Russell Akers who was an alcoholic. Col. Akers was not one to leave his regimental headquarters but rather to stay in that relatively safe environment. It seems that it might have been in May when there was another fire fight on Outpost Harry. Major Singlaub was always a hands on type of commander and during this engagement he was very busy organizing a relief of Harry. Col. Akers called him to ask what was going on and the good major didn't have time to talk to him. Major Frank Hewitt, the battalion executive officer told Col. Akers that the battalion CO didn't have time to talk to him so Col Akers relieved Major Singlaub on the spot. Interestingly, it was only a few weeks after this unfortunate incident that it became Lt. Col. Singlaub.

It was during my stint in Company H that I found out where the hated Lt. Tyler was stationed. I called him and learned he had beat me to 1st Lt. by only a few weeks. It seems he spent the normal 18 months as a 2nd Lt. while my promotion came in a year and nine days. I also learned that his time in Korea was as a platoon leader only so I think I really outdid him.

It was in late May that Col. Akers got a bee in his rum soaked brain that I should be on his staff as an Assistant S-3 and had orders cut to that effect. I was livid to think I would be stuck in some HQ with an alcoholic CO so I called General Dunkleburg to see if anything could be done about the orders. My overwhelming desire was to outrank Lt. Tyler. At that time a company commander who was a 1st Lt. could be promoted to Captain after

ninety days so that was my route! (The general had told me to call him if I ever needed anything, so I did.) A day or two later the orders were rescinded and replaced with orders naming me as company commander of Company G which had just come off line into a regimental reserve area.

Captain Atkinson had been the CO of Company G and had been relieved along with his 1st Sergeant. I never did learn what they did but the good thing was that I had become a company commander. This was in the period in the army where companies had a Warrant Officer as a Unit Administrator. Mine was a WOJG Jug Black who was an old timer in the army. I told Jug his first job was to find us a First Sergeant and suggested he scour the regiment for someone who had been a Master Sergeant for awhile and who would like a crack at being "first soldier." Jug found someone who fit the requirements and I had him transferred to Company G. Company G was really in a shambles with poor morale, little discipline and in need of a lot of work. One of my first moves was to fire the Exec officer, the supply sergeant and the mess sergeant. It was simply intolerable for me to have such incompetents around.

Company G had been pulled into a regimental reserve area where we did some small amount of training and started to get reorganized. This is when I learned the true value of a scrounger. WOJG Jug Black was a scrounger of the first order and could really get things done. We were very short of the thirty round magazines for carbine rifles so I asked Jug if he could get us some. He asked what I had to trade and said some kind of souvenir would be best. I did have a cap from a dead Chinese soldier which still had its small red star on it so I gave that to Jug

and he was off. A couple of hours later he returned with as many magazines as could be loaded into a jeep.

Being in a reserve area electricity would be nice so again I asked Jug what he could do about a generator. Again the question about trading material came up and this time it would take something pretty good. We had just received our class VI ration so I had some liquor and could use that. I gave him a couple bottles of scotch and away he went. When he got back he did indeed have a generator behind a 2 1/2 ton truck, and a trailer to move it with, and gasoline, and electric wire and whatever else two bottles of scotch could obtain. We did have electricity!

We had the new generator only a day or two when the battalion commander came through the company area on an inspection trip. When he saw that generator he just about flipped. He wanted to know where I had gotten it, etc. I told him and he said that I didn't even have a vehicle capable of moving it and I agreed. He said he had a small generator which could easily supply my company while my generator could supply the entire battalion headquarters and, he could move it, so we traded. We were both happy with that deal!

During this time I developed an intense hatred for the Red Cross and whatever it stood for. It seems that one of the sergeants in the company received a letter from his mother telling of a heart attack that his father had. In the letter she said she had contacted the Red Cross to try to arrange an emergency leave for the son. The telegram to the Red Cross representative in our regiment was never delivered to me so I could authorize the emergency leave. A couple days later the sergeant received another letter from his mother saying his father had died and she could

not understand why he had not gotten home to see his father. My investigation proved to be incredible. The Red Cross representative was an alcoholic who never bothered to do anything with the telegrams about the sergeants father. Had I gotten the information in time he could have gotten home and seen his father before he died. After a death there was no provision for an emergency leave at that time so he could do nothing. I know a lot of men in that company stopped any contribution to the Red Cross because of that incident. I know that I did.

It was on June 10, 1953 the Chinese launched an all out offensive to take Outpost Harry. General Maxwell Taylor, the commanding general of the Far East Command said this outpost was a hold-at-all-costs position. It seems that Harry occupied such a commanding position that to loose it would have necessitated our MLR being shifted almost seven miles south. With the so-called peace talks going on at the time that was not a good idea. Company K received the initial assault by about 3,600 Chinese. The company held but suffered almost 100% KIA and WIA. Captain Martin Markley was the CO and I later met him for the first time at Fitzsimmons Army Hospital.

On June 11th the Chinese launched a rare daylight attack with about a battalion size attack but were soon repulsed. On the 12th another assault, this time with a Chinese regiment attempted to take Harry but could not. I think it was on the 12th that Company G was ordered into a support position behind Outpost Tom and I had a platoon of tanks attached. That was the first time I had ever had to contend with tanks and fortunately I didn't have to use them

The 13th Harry was pretty calm with only a company sized attack and then came the 14th. Company G was ordered to Harry under the operational control of one of the battalion commanders of the 5th Regimental Combat Team and I was to return to a once very familiar piece of ground. Wrong! That outpost looked like nothing I could remember. On the way out to Harry we passed by immense piles of Chinese bodies. Climbing up Harry we saw countless pieces of both Chinese and GI's body parts laying all over the place. The trenches were mostly caved in from all of the intense shelling that had been going on. I later learned that the Chinese had fired about 89,000 rounds larger than 81 mm in size to support their attacks while our forces fired over 368,000 similar size rounds. (I understand this amount of large caliber ammunition was more than was fired by both sides during the entire Battle of the Bulge in World War II.)

We spent all the day of the 14th trying to refurbish the trench lines and bunkers which were by then guite devastated. The first thing I did when I got to the top of the once familiar Outpost Harry was to remove all radio antennas. I had learned that the Chinese zeroed in on antennas. One of the smart things I ever did in regard to combat occurred that day. I had my communications team bury four separate land lines for our telephones along the sides of the trench leading back towards the MLR. After the lines were buried I had them buried further and covered with steel pickets used for barbed wire. This meant that we should have decent telephone communications for a while when the Chinese started their TOT. It did indeed work out that way. The other good thing I did that day was something Major Singlaub had preached about - VT on our positions. I arranged defensive artillery and mortar barrages to begin on a

timed sequence. Unless ordered to cease fire, the last barrages were to be VT on top of us. I feel very confident that last stage saved G Company from being completely overwhelmed.

In the early evening of the 14th an artillery sergeant from the 39th Field Artillery attached to my company along with a forward observer decided he was going to wage his own private war when the Chinese came. He got up on the top of the CP bunker and built a sandbag emplacement where he said he could fight any Chinese who came that way. As he was nearing the completion of his position the Chinese started shelling with their 61 mm mortars



This was OP Harry on June 15th when I was wounded. Of course, the outpost is the large hill in the center of the picture.

Photo courtesy of Jim Jarboe, Combat Photographer, 3rd Infantry Division (Click the picture for a larger view)

The sergeant was hit and very badly wounded. His left arm had been blown off. I went to the top of the bunker and managed to get him out of the mortar barrage and back into the relative safety of the trench outside the bunker. He was unconscious and bleeding profusely. We got the battalion surgeon on the phone and he told me what to do to try to save him. I managed to get a tourniquet on the stump of his arm and our medics got him off the outpost and to the battalion aid station. A little later the doctor called me and said in spite of all our

efforts he did not make it. For the life of me I cannot remember his name. Very early on the 15th of June the Chinese started their initial barrage. The incoming mortar and artillery in the volumes they were using is impossible to describe to anyone who has not experienced anything like that. It was devastating. I very foolishly started to make the rounds of my platoon leaders to make sure all men were inside their bunkers when the barrage started. In spite of the trenches for getting around in I was wounded guite severely within just a few minutes. I remember being temporarily deafened by the noise and was crouched down in a trench. My arms were supporting me by holding onto the sides of the trench when I was hit. It was in the left arm and my hand was left attached by only two shreds of skin on either side of my wrist. I never knew for sure what got me but I strongly suspect it might have been a mortar fuse or possibly a hand grenade. I eventually made it to our medic's station which I had placed at the bottom rear of Outpost Harry in what was left of a bunker. The medic was unable to stop the bleeding enough for me to get back to my CP and about the only thing he did was to give me an unwanted shot of morphine which caused me to be unable perform any duty. An armored personnel carrier evacuated several of us to the battalion aid station where Doc Merrifield along with John Mitchell was more than busy. Several ambulances started the trek to the 44th MASH and I was such a bloody mess that chaplains managed to give me last rites on three different occasions before I got to the MASH. (Much later, after reading General Singlaub's book Hazardous Duty, I learned that the 44th MASH was the model for the TV series M*A*S*H 4077) Isn't it interesting what things come to mind when writing something like this? Previously, during my short army

career I had donated blood on five separate occasions. From the time I arrived at the battalion aid station until I left the MASH I had received back six pints. I guess that is why I was such a bloody mess during those first few hours after being wounded. I remember asking a doctor if they were going to amputate my arm. His answer was no, if they could restore circulation to my hand. It seems that was the criteria to

amputate or not.

I remember that after the surgery under a general anesthetic at the MASH I had just regained consciousness. There were three generals waiting to talk to me; I think it might have been Lieutenant General Jenkins who asked me how we had managed to maintain telephone communications for such a long time through the Chinese shelling. When I told him he said that was rather an expensive but very



MG Eugene Ridings (3ID Commander) and LTG Rueben Jenkins (Corps Commander) was taken by James Jarboe at Division Headquarters.

effective means. The other generals were Ridings and Dunkelburg.

I was in the MASH for only a day or so and was evacuated to the 121st Evac Hospital where I spent another couple of days waiting transport to Japan. It was from the MASH to the 121st that I had my first and only helicopter ride. I was in one of those carriers attached to the side of the chopper

on the landing struts. From the 121st I was sent to the Osaka Army Hospital in Osaka, Japan.

While in Osaka the doctors did an operation called a debridement which was a procedure to remove dead and/or infected tissue. They also changed bandages and casts a couple of times and started antibiotics. One thing I particularly remember from Osaka was a typhoon. I have never seen so much or so intense rain before or since. Each drop must have been a quart or so. I know that all of the wounded in the orthopedics ward where I was experienced very severe pain because of the drastic drop in the barometric pressure. As soon as the storm reached us the nurses were on their rounds with shots of morphine. One really funny thing happened while at Osaka. I had been taken back to my room from recovery and was still quite groggy. My roommate later told me that when I started to come around I was singing The Eyes of Texas and told him to stand at attention when he heard the national anthem. He swore that really happened. Another thing I recall is going to the officers club with a nurse for a dinner. It was kind of strange since I had no uniform, only hospital clothes but they let me in anyway. The only thing I remember about her was she was very nice and was either Amish or a Mennonite and had volunteered for nursing duty in the army.

While at the hospital I was able to complete a call home to tell the folks that I was in pretty good shape. Those telegrams from the War Department are pretty stiff without very much information. I know the call lasted about fifteen minutes and cost three dollars per minute. I said I would call from Hawaii to let them know I was on the way home and they said to call collect.

I had recovered my savings from my poker games from our battalion safe before I left the MASH. I remember John Mitchell was hopping mad because he couldn't bring the money to me at the MASH. Anyway I did get it and used it as a down payment on a new 1953 Plymouth sedan to be picked up in Detroit after I got home. There was some kind of a problem with the person who handled the automobile sales and the CID contacted me about my arrangement. I had made the contact through the hospital so there was no problem there. I know a CID agent took me some place to identify that person which I did. There was no problem for me and I picked up the car later. Apparently, some people had been taken for their down payments and never got their cars. I was very fortunate! Only a few days were spent in Osaka before starting the trek back to the states via the MATS (Military Air Transport Service). We flew from Osaka to Tokyo to meet up with others to be evacuated back and were at the Tokyo hospital for only a few hours until our flight left. I remember the plane was a C-54 equipped with stretchers all over the place. There were nurses and a doctor on board to look after all of us. The trip, for the most part, was uneventful. Our first stop was on Midway Island for refueling. I was ambulatory and could walk around Midway for a couple of hours. I wish I had had a camera! Watching those Gooney birds (a kind of gull) was hilarious. To take off they would run as fast as their short legs could carry them flapping their wings furiously. Most often they would tumble head over tail and not get airborne. Usually it took a bird several tries to get into the air. Once up they were very graceful but their landing was just the opposite of their takeoff. They would coast down to the ground as graceful as could be but as soon as the touched down they tumbled for several yards getting stopped. Our next stop was in Honolulu, Hawaii. We landed at the Air Force base there and were taken to

Tripler Army Hospital to spend the night. As soon as we landed there was a swarm of Red Cross types with fresh pineapple juice. That had absolutely no appeal to me because it had been months since I had any fresh milk. I asked if such was available and it was. I cannot remember anything tasting so good as that glass of cold, fresh milk. The other thing I particularly remember about Tripler was waking up the next morning. My room was loaded with fresh flowers. Eventually I arrived at Fitzsimmons Army Hospital in Aurora, Colorado on July 15, 1953 just a month after being wounded. I was to remain at Fitz until I was retired on December 31, 1955 with a 60% disability. As I was nearing the end of my hospitalization I was assigned to Fort Carson in Colorado Springs to recuperate and await one final surgical procedure. That assignment was for about five months or so and was not very interesting since I was assigned to a Personnel Center. I did luck out again and got the job as coach of the Ft. Carson rifle team.

Fitzsimmons was an excellent hospital with outstanding care. One good thing about my time there was that between surgeries I had many convalescent leaves or could live in a BOQ. In all I had fourteen surgeries including two bone grafts and a lot of other repairs. It took a lot of time and the result was I had a hand on the end of my arm instead of a hook. It is not very useful but looks far better than any artificial one.

In all, in spite of the trauma my five years in the army were rewarding and have provided many good memories. Most who have had similar experiences tend to remember the good or unusual and forget most of the bad. This is how it is with me.

Emory Walker

Bob Dornfried

The following story, as told by Maura Gaffney of the Berlin CT Citizen, is an account of Bob Dornfried's experiences on Outpost Harry during 1953.

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Dornfried honoured friend who didn't make it back

By Maura Gaffney, Special to the Citizen (Citizen Veterans features stories about our local U.S. military veterans as a tribute to their service and sacrifice.)

There's a saying among soldiers: "When a combat infantryman dies, he goes straight to heaven, because he's already spent his time in hell." Bob Dornfried was an infantryman in the Korean War, and he went through hell with his fellow soldiers on a hill named Outpost (OP) Harry in 1953. Dornfried, 73, still thinks about his experiences in the 'Forgotten War' quite often, and he has never forgotten the soldiers with whom he served or the heroes who never came home.

Dornfried enlisted in the Army in 1952, three years after graduating from Berlin High School. He recalled, "After 16 weeks in basic training, I went to Seattle, and then I got a boat ride to Korea." He was assigned to the 3rd Infantry Division, Fox Company, 15th Regiment.



Sergeant Dornfried, a machine gunner (and later squad leader), was sent with his unit to defend OP Harry, a hill located in front of the Main Line of Resistance (MLR) in an area called the Iron Triangle. The Communist Chinese

Forces were positioned only a few hundred yards away on a hill called Star Hill, and Dornfried learned quickly that the enemy was determined to capture OP Harry. "It was the biggest hill from there to Seoul," he said. "The Chinese really wanted that hill."

Less than an hour after Dornfried arrived at the MLR, near the base of OP Harry, he heard an announcement over a loudspeaker. "Welcome Fox Company," it said. The greeting came from the enemy. The woman's voice continued, "It's nice to see you guys. Stay alert! We'll be over to see you some night."

A few nights later, OP Harry was attacked. Dornfried recalled that when the battle began, he and a fellow machine gunner, named Eugene Young, were in position on top of a bunker at the top of the hill. He explained, "At nighttimes, we would take machine guns out of the bunker and put them on top. Every hour, one of us had to call in to the command post (CP) to check in. So just before 11 p.m. that night, I went down from on top of the bunker and went into the bunker to radio the CP. As I was calling, the bunker lit up. Mortar and artillery rounds were coming in heavily. The Chinese were right at our position. I never made it back to the top of the bunker. They came in right underneath us. I was firing my carbine from the trench line. That fellow, Eugene Young, I never saw him again."

An estimated 1,200 Chinese soldiers participated in the attack that night, and Dornfried's unit defending the hill consisted of only 80 men. The battle lasted all night and into the next morning when the Chinese finally withdrew.

"We suffered 70 percent casualties," said Dornfried.
"There were only 20 of us left. That was my initiation.

"The fighting was all at night," explained Dornfried.

"We also did a lot of patrols at night. We were situated up on the hill (ed: correction by Dornfried: 'We did the patrols while stationed on the MLR - not from OP Harry), so on patrols we would go out into no-man's land, down into the valley." One night, he and another soldier went out on patrol stepping over dead bodies as they walked. Dornfried heard gunfire and quickly turned to see that his buddy had shot a Chinese soldier. He said, "The Chinese man had been faking, and he had gotten up on his knees to shoot us. My buddy probably saved my life that night." In addition to the artillery and mortar rounds that were fired frequently at Harry, the Chinese launched psychological attacks on a regular basis as well. Dornfried recalled, "They made announcements or played music over the loudspeaker just about every night. One Sunday in May, they said 'What are you boys doing over here? This is not your war. Your buddies are back home

Dornfried spent four weeks on OP Harry, and the memories have stayed with him for a lifetime. "I used to have nightmares. I saw guys get their heads blown off," he said, and he remembers the sound of men screaming at an aid station. One night he helped carry a wounded soldier down off the hill on a stretcher. "The wounded man said, I hope 'I never have to go back on that damn hill," recalled Dornfried. He paused and then added, "He didn't make it."

riding with the top down with your girls!' And then they played Cruising down the River on a Sunday Afternoon.

(a hit song recorded in 1949)."

"There was never a safe time to be on Outpost Harry," wrote a fellow OP Harry veteran. "The Greeks had a

name for it, and it was called 'Death Place'. If you served on Harry, you knew that was true."

"It really wasn't any picnic over there, but I got through it all," said Dornfried. When he returned home to Berlin after the war, he discovered that one of his friends, Thomas O'Connell, did not make it through. He had been killed in action in June 1953. "I was friends with Tommy O'Connell in high school," he said. "I lost track of him, and when I got back (from Korea) I found out that he was killed a few weeks before the end of the war."

Dornfried never forgot about his friend, and when he later became a builder and was hired to build homes in a subdivision off Orchard Road in Berlin (in the 1990s), he decided to honour his friend in a special way. He named the street O'Connell Drive as a tribute to the young hero. "I named the street after him, because he was a friend of mine. We were in the same war. He was the only fellow from Berlin who lost his life in the Korean War," he said. Dornfried was fortunate to survive the war having only received a 'minor wound' from shrapnel in his leg. He doesn't consider himself a hero, but for his 'meritorious service in military operations in Korea' he received the Bronze Star medal. The medal reads in part, "Sergeant Dornfried's aggressive leadership qualities, resourcefulness and calm manner while under fire were

an incentive to his men and gained for him their unwavering confidence and cooperation. The smooth operation and dependability of the platoon in combat were largely a result of his relentless efforts and sound, decisive judgment."

Many of Dornfried's fellow soldiers on OP Harry received military honours as well. "We had some real good men in our company," he said proudly. He was honoured to serve his country with such a fine group of

men and noted that his unit "had the distinction of never losing an inch of ground."

"With courage, tenacity and faith... we held!" is the motto of the Outpost Harry Survivor's Association (OPHSA). The veteran's group was created "to keep all men who were involved in the battles to hold Outpost Harry bonded together in common memory of that action and to honour the many sacrifices made by our comrades." Many OP Harry veterans write about their horrific experiences on the group's website (www.ophsa.org) or share their personal stories at the annual OPHSA reunions.

At the 2005 reunion, one OP Harry veteran told a story about a recent trip to the local hardware store. When the veteran brought his items to the register, the clerk noticed scars on his arms. She asked about them, and the veteran told her they were from Korea. The clerk briefly thanked him for his sacrifice, and then the veteran went outside, sat in his car and cried.

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Second Lt Fakos and Tsafsidis



Second Lt Fakos and Second Lt Tsafsidis were interpreters for the needs of GEF. They were with Col. Koumanakos until the armistice was signed. They narrate.

Lt Fakos: Koumanakos never used me as an interpreter. He was speaking English quite fluently. He gave me a M1 and used me as an infantry officer. Actually he was the commanding Officer and used to sign the most papers until his departure.

Lt Georg Tsafsides: Col. Koumanakos had a very good knowledge of the English language and he never used me. He used to send me to represent the Battalion whenever there was a need for our unit to be present as an allied representative. On the 20th of July, Koumanakos changed in the Commanding of the Battalion by Lt Col Prokos Hlias.



Nick Meletis.

Greek Army Corporal 3rd Company, 493 Comun. Battalion,

I went to Korea with the 14th supple-menting mission, on February 1953 and we arrived to Pusan after a sea trip that lasted thirty days. The same night of our arrival we left for Seoul by train and then by military trucks, we continued to our unit. We all were about 400 men. I was posted to the Commanding teem, as a radio operator. This helped me to be close to the Commanding of the Greek Battalion. The Battalion Commander was Lt Col

Koumanakos George a very able, clever and fearless man.

At that time GEF was defending Sector THE NEST OF EAGLE. This Sector was North of MLR, on the right of Sector Harry and very close to the CCF. As they used to attack against our positions during the night, we always had a bad night. We had to send out night patrols and listening posts. I arrived there at the middle of March and the weather was extremely cold. We had to wear heavy cloths and it was an additional difficulty to our movements. On the days I arrived there was a bloody fight between a CCF Company and a Greek aggressive reconnaissance patrol. Second Lieutenant Sideris and his men didn't hesitate to attack and simultaneously notify GEF Battalion, Lieutenant Sideris and six soldiers were killed but really they all were brave men. Their sacrifice must be estimated from the result. They gave to the battalion the time to answer to the CCF in a proper way.

On the 15th of May 1953 GEF battalion, moved to defend Sector DIC. Then we started to improve the trench line and the bankers of the sector. On the 10th of June, we accepted a CCF attack. At the same time CCF attacked to Sector Harry, next on our right. We won CCF, but they could enter the trenches of O.P. Harry. Americans won it again in the morning. So the battle of Harry had started. This tactic lasted for three more nights. Americans to loose the Hill 420 by the night attack of CCF and win it again in the morning. The next two nights

CCF tried to gather their dead soldiers, and sent for that purpose the power of one Company. Americans reacted and forced them to return to their positions. American Battalions suffered heavy casualties. So on the 15th of June the Regimental Commander assigned the Spartan's Battalion (GEF), leaving the sector DIC, and take responsibility of sector Harry until 0930 Hours of 16th of June. So we did. Company P was designated to defend on hill 420, and they had two days and two nights to repair the damages with the help on American engineers and Korean labours

Early in the morning of June 18, the CCF attacked but they *broke their faces*. ¹⁴ The orevious nights, regimental Commander was sending on the Outpost a company. Now the entire battalion was around the hill. This is why Greeks won without casualties. Our CO Koumanakos was running around the entire sector Harry giving orders.

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¹⁴Greek expretion. It means "They failled ot their intent"

IV General George Koumanakos as a retired Officer.

In 1986 General Koumanakos with eight more superiors Generals from all over the world, made a film under the title "The Generals" With this film they express their agony for the uncontrolled use of the atomic energy,



and their nope for the manking to understand it and to abolish nuclear weapons.

They started to give lectures all over the world concerning to the above subject. Because of this, some not sympathizing him, accused him as a leftist. It is untrue and unfair. General G. Koumanakos was an anticommunist and fought bravely against communist guerrillas during Greek civil war (1945-1949) and then in Korea against the international communism (1953).

Athens under the Stars and Stripes

(AD 1949 - 1974) By John L. Tomkinson

In March 1950 elections were held to demonstrate to the UN that Greece was a functioning democracy. Previously governments had effectively been appointed. Intimidation was not resorted to in the towns, with the result that the Liberal Party and the centre won the elections. Plastiras became prime minister. This mattered less than it seemed, since the centres of real power lay in the American Embassy, CIA Headquarters, the royal palace at Tatoi and the Greek Pentagon.

The forms of parliamentary democracy were a sham. The dominant figure in Greek politics, until his death in 1955, was General Papagos. In 1952 the Greek Ambassador insisted upon changes to the electoral system to enable Papagos and his Greek Rally to win the election, which he did in November 1952, when he became prime minister.

At the end of the civil war Greece could hardly claim to be an independent country. Between 1951 and 1957 Greece received \$1,491,000,000 in aid, of which \$1,150,000,000 was in military aid. Although corruption was rife, and there was no doubt some "trickle down effect", little remained for any kind of aid which would directly benefit ordinary people.

In 1955 Greece became a member of NATO, as much an empire as the Delian League had been more than two milennia previously. The Hellenic Raiding Force was set up as a crack commando unit to suppress any opposition. Its officers were trained in the USA, and in many cases actually paid by the CIA.

A Greek espionage agency, the KYP, was set up and funded by the CIA. In addition to spying on Eastern bloc radio traffic, it was employed against the population, being used to detect subversive elements in Greece. Many of its members were also paid by the CIA.

By 1961, when the KYP had files on twenty per cent of the population, the CIA kindly provided computer facilities to enable better handling of their "intelligence". Greece did participate in the economic recovery which followed the Second World War, but having entered later from a lower position, the results seemed more impressive.

The person most associated with this "economic miracle" was the Macedonian politician, Constantine Karamanlis. A hitherto obscure politician, he was promoted above senior colleagues at the insistence of Alan Dulles, US Secretary of State. Andreas Papandreou described him as "an American product." However, the benefit to Greece of the "economic miracle" was limited. It was designed to suit the needs of the often foreign entrepreneurs, and not the long term development of the country. Significant profits were confined to a few very

wealthy people and their dependants. Much of it was exploitative, by companies which, like the wealthy Greek shipowners, promptly moved their profits abroad. Thus education was underfunded, and based upon rote learning to foster uncritical acceptance of authority. There was rise in the standard of living, but after war, occupation and civil war, that was only to be expected.

In 1961 the CIA and army officers conducted extensive enquiries about voting intentions, and when they had digested the results, they put into operation the ironically-named "Pericles Plan" to ensure a conservative victory. They located the key marginal constituencies, and organised the systematic intimidation of the voters. The leader of this plot, General Dovas, was then appointed by the king caretaker prime minister during the voting to ensure "fair play". They were assisted in their work by IDEA, a group of right-wing officers, mostly former Nazi collaborators, who regarded all nonconservatism as communism Support for Karamanlis' right-wing National Radical Union (ERE) in the election was exactly one hundred per cent in the army, while 200,000 fictional voters were conjured into existence to support the right in Athens. Some polling stations did not have voting papers with the names of non-ERE candidates on them. In one village in Crete the ERE candidate received more votes than there were citizens eligible to vote. It is hardly surprising that on 29th October, the ERE won a clear majority of seats in

the parliament. The plan backfired. Both centre and left rejected the legitimacy of the resulting government, and criticised the right's subservience to the Americans, its favouritism towards big capitalists, its support for social inequalities, and employment of wartime collaborators and repression of dissent.

After a period of prolonged unrest, pressure for elections proved overwhelming, and they were set for spring 1967. Everyone expected an overwhelming victory for George Papandreu. The key marginal constituencies were identified, as had happened in the Pericles Plan, and a scheme drawn up by CIA station chief Maury for the character assassination of his son Andreas Papandreu, and the funding of politicians opposed to him. But in any case, the CIA knew that the generals had no intention of allowing elections to go forward and had long been planning a coup.

The chief of the General Staff, Grigorios Spandidakis, had decided to ask the king to implement a NATO plan to seize power, but the king vacillated over the date. The 16th April had been chosen to coincide with a left-wing rally, but it was cancelled. The 24th May was then chosen, but postponed on 20th April. Then a cabal of middle-ranking army officers led by CIA employee Colonel George Papadopoulos, Nicholas Makarezos and Brigadier Stylianos Pattakos, decided to go anyway, acquiring the patronage of Spandidakis, and

implementing the NATO Prometheus Plan, officially originally devised to counter "communist insurgency".

In the early hours of the morning of 21st April 1967, they seized control of the state. The CIA trained Hellenic Raiding Force took over the Pentagon in Holargos, and Colonel Pattakos' tanks left Goudi barracks for central Athens. The cover of democratic forms was to be removed

This was the first time that a Western country in Europe had fallen to a dictatorship since the Second World War. During the night of 21st April 1967, soldiers arrested leading politicians, including the Prime Minister and leading politicians. Citizens of Athens awoke to the rumble of tanks in the streets. From the radio came a stream of orders, proclaiming a "revolution", forbidding people to leave their houses, threatening to shoot any civilian seen on the streets, announcing that all homes could be searched with impunity, outlawing strikes and meetings. The telephones were out of action. The explanation was that the king had requested the army to intervene to "protect" the state from imminent danger. The newspapers of that day appeared with identical headlines, leading articles and commentaries supplied by the military Press Service. Over the first night and the next few days, some six thousand people were arrested and interned in prisons and concentration camps. The King was initially alarmed. The US Defence attache called on him at Tatoi and was told: "Incredibly stupid

ultra-right wing bastards, having gained control of tanks, have brought disaster to Greece." He asked for a helicopter invasion of US marines from the Sixth Fleet to crush the Junta, but the State Department merely told Talbot that if the matter was raised again, he was to "disabuse him of any hope on that score." The king calmed down as his own arrest appeared increasingly unlikely.

Soon the US embassy was able to reassure the State Department that the coup leaders "declare themselves one thousand per cent pro-American." The king duly swore in the ministers of the new government. The issue about US involvement in the coup is not whether the US Government was involved, but only how deeply and how intimately it was involved. Although the CIA probably did not actually organize and direct the overthrow of democracy, the plotters used American weapons and a plan which had been devised by NATO to ensure Western control of Greece, and the coup leader, a former member of the Security Battalions, had been in receipt of CIA pay since 1952, and was chief liaison officer between the Greek KYP and the CIA.

Moreover, the CIA knew of the plots of both the king and the generals and the colonels a month beforehand. Moreover, they were in close contact with the colonels. <u>In fact, Greece's most decorated soldier, General George Koumanakos</u>, had been approached as early as 1965 by a senior official of the US embassy

why he was not "coming in with us?" It looks as though the CIA wished to pre-empt a royalist coup by people under British influence with their own coup organized by people on their own payroll. Initially, the Colonels found few respectable politicians prepared to collaborate with them, but they did find a compliant king to swear their government into office.C. M. Woodhouse wrote in The Spectator (28 June, 1969): "One of the distinctive things about the coup of April 1967 was that it was carried out by officers below the highest rank. Another distinctive thing about them was that they had almost no experience as fighting soldiers. Most of the whom they displaced had fought with generals distinction: in Albania, in the Greek Army of the Middle East, in the civil war against the communists, in Korea. The ex-colonels had a different sort of career one in the military police, another in the security battalions (which the Germans formed to resist the resistance), and so on. To most of my Greek friends it is discreditable that not one of them took any part in the resistance during the German occupation (when they were all in their twenties): to the excolonels themselves it is a matter of congratulation. The slogan "Greece of the Christian Greeks" embodies their ostensible claims to represent nationalism and Orthodoxy.

Paradoxically, "the Colonels", as they came to be known, regarded themselves as the guardians of the traditional values of Greek Christianity. They condemned long hair and short skirts, cutting the hair of male tourists whose locks were deemed long enough to offend Christian sensibility. Flag raising ceremonies were enforced in schools, with church parades on Sundays. Yet the real purpose of the Junta was the systematic subordination of Greece to US interests. Greece quickly became the US spy HO for the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near and Middle East Torture became commonplace. Prisoners were beaten, hung suspended from their wrists. There was jumping on the stomach, pulling out finger nails, use of electric shock. In addition psychological torture. Prisoners was threatened with being maimed, raped and killed, and there were mock executions. People who had been tortured were told that it would be repeated at a certain time. Among the most feared places were the Security Police HQ, conveniently within hearing of the US embassy, and military hospital 401, where doctors continued the torture. Many more people simply lost their jobs, or had their pensions revoked. In the autumn of 1973, large-scale student demonstrations, provoked by repression in the universities and a drastic increase in inflation, openly defied the regime's ban on public meetings. In November, students began a "sit-in" in the Polytechnic University, and transmitted clandestine radio broadcasts calling upon the people to rise up against the tyranny. On the night of 16-17th tanks were sent in. They bulldozed the locked gates and, covered by sniper fire

from buildings opposite, armed police swarmed into the grounds behind them. The students' radio station broadcast appeals for doctors and priests, but none turned up. At least twenty students were killed. Ironically, these events led immediately to a worse state than before. decided that Senior officers Papadopoulos incompetent, so the blame for the Polytechnic massacre was laid on him, and he was removed from power in what amounted to a second coup. He was replaced by the sinister Brigadier Ioannides, head of the military security police, vet another CIA agent, who Papadopoulos and installed a puppet of his own in his place. Under his leadership, repression increased in efficiency and ruthlessness. Ioannidis wanted rapid action on Cyprus. He decided on a coup in which Archbishop Makarios would be assassinated. The US knew about the plan, Ioannides had made it clear to his CIA contacts, but for his own purposes Henry Kissinger wanted nothing done to prevent it, so he received a very mild halfwarning not to go ahead, with a wink. Makarios escaped, but this gave the Turks the pretext to invade, and appropriate the northern third of the island. that Kissinger had been looking for.

The Turkish invasion of Cyprus spelled the end for the junta in Athens. Three days afterwards, Ioannides allowed himself to be sidelined as President Gizikis and senior officers of all three branches of the armed forces, appalled at the national disaster which the junta had brought upon Greece, invited Constantine Karamanlis to return to restore the rule of law and democracy. The French President, Giscard d'Estaing, placed a plane at his disposal, and he flew into Athens, landing at Athens Airport at 2.00 am on 24th July. It seemed as if the entire population of the city had turned out to greet him. The Karamanlis who returned was very different from the US puppet who had left Greece years beforehand. He withdrew Greece from the NATO military command, legalised the Communist Party, distanced himself from the Americans, and secured Greece's entry into the European Community of Nations.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

STATEMENT BY INTERNATIONAL ADMIRALS AND GENERALS

December 5, 1996

We, military professionals, who have devoted our lives to the national security of our countries and our peoples, are convinced that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons in the armories of nuclear powers, and the ever present threat of acquisition of these weapons by others, constitutes a peril to global peace and security and to the safety and survival of the people we are dedicated to protect.

Through our variety of responsibilities and experiences with weapons and wars in the armed forces of many nations, we have acquired an intimate and perhaps unique knowledge of the present security and insecurity of our countries and peoples.

We know that nuclear weapons, though never used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, represent a clear and present danger to the very existence of humanity. There was an immense risk of a superpower holocaust during the Cold War. At least once, civilization was on the very brink of catastrophic tragedy. That threat has now receded, but not forever -- unless nuclear weapons are eliminated.

The end of the Cold War created conditions favorable to nuclear disarmament. Termination of military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States made it possible to reduce strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and to eliminate intermediate range missiles. It was a significant milestone on the path to nuclear disarmament when Belarus, Kazakhastan, and Ukraine relinquished their nuclear weapons.

Indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty in 1995 and approval of the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty by the UN General Assembly in 1996 are also
important steps towards a nuclear-free world. We
commend the work that has been done to achieve these
results. Unfortunately, in spite of these positive steps,
true nuclear disarmament has not been achieved. Treaties
provide that only delivery systems, not nuclear warheads,
will be destroyed. This permits the United States and
Russia to keep their warheads in reserve storage, thus
creating a "reversible nuclear potential."

However, in the post-Cold War security environment, the most commonly postulated nuclear threats are not susceptible to deterrence or are simply not credible. We believe, therefore, that business as usual is not an acceptable way for the world to proceed in nuclear matters. It is our deep conviction that the following is urgently needed and must be undertaken now:

First, present and planned stockpiles of nuclear weapons are exceedingly large and should now be greatly cut back;

Second, remaining nuclear weapons should be gradually and transparently taken off alert, and their readiness substantially reduced both in nuclear weapon states and in de facto nuclear weapon states;

Third, long-term international nuclear policy must be based on the declared principle of continuous, complete and irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons. The United States and Russia should - without any reduction in their military security - carry forward the reduction process already launched by START: they should cut down to 1000 to 1500 warheads each and possibly lower. The Other three nuclear states and the three threshold states should be drawn into the reduction process as still deeper reductions are negotiated down to the level of hundreds. There is nothing incompatible between defense by individual countries of their territorial integrity and progress toward nuclear abolition.

The exact circumstances and conditions that will make it possible to proceed, finally, to abolition cannot now be foreseen or prescribed. One obvious prerequisite would be a worldwide program of surveillance and inspection, including measures to account for and control inventories of nuclear weapon materials. This will ensure that no rogues or terrorists could undertake a surreptitious effort to acquire nuclear capacities without detection at an early stage An agreed procedure for forcible international intervention and interruption of covert efforts in a certain and timely fashion is essential. he creation of nuclear-

free zones in different parts of the world, confidence-building and transparency measures in the general field of defense, strict implementation of all treaties in the area of disarmament and arms control, and mutual assistance in the process of disarmament are also important in helping to bring about a nuclear-free world. The development of regional systems of collective security, including practical measures for cooperation, partnership, interaction and communication are essential for local stability and security.

The extent to which the existence of nuclear weapons and fear of their use may have deterred war - in a world that in this year alone has seen 30 military conflicts raging - cannot be determined. It is clear, however, that nations now possessing nuclear weapons will not relinquish them until they are convinced that more reliable and less dangerous means of providing for their security are in place. It is also clear, as a consequence, that the nuclear powers will not now agree to a fixed timetable for the achievement of abolition.

It is similarly clear that, among the nations not now possessing nuclear weapons, there are some that will not forever forswear their acquisition and deployment unless they, too, are provided means of security. Nor will they forgo acquisition if the present nuclear powers seek to retain everlastingly their nuclear monopoly.

Movement toward abolition must be a responsibility shared primarily by the declared nuclear weapons states -

China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States; by the de facto nuclear states, India, Israel and Pakistan; and by major non-nuclear powers such as Germany and Japan. All nations should move in concert toward the same goal. We have been presented with a challenge of the highest possible historic importance: the creation of a nuclear weapons-free world. The end of the Cold War makes it possible. The dangers of proliferation, terrorism, and a new nuclear arms race render it necessary. We must not fail to seize our opportunity. There is no alternative. **Signed**,

INTERNATIONAL GENERALS AND ADMIRALS WHO HAVE SIGNED STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

CANADA Johnson, Major General Leonard V.. (Ret.)

Commandant, National Defense College

DENMARK. Kristensen, Lt. General Gunnar (Ret.)

former Chief of Defense Staff

FRANCE. Sanguinetti, Admiral Antoine (Ret.)

former Chief of Staff, French Fleet

GREECE. Capellos, Lt. General Richard (Ret.)

former Corps Commander.

Konstantinides Kostas, Major General (Ret.), former Chief of Staff.

Koumanakos George, Lt. General (Ret.) former Chief of Operations.



George Koumanakos, as Brigadier General.

The Free Lance-Star - Jun 27, 1969

By ROWLAND EVANS and ROBERT NOVAK

Greek Tyrants Mistreat Hero

ATHENS — The true nature of the Greek military dictatorship is revealed in the fate of Maj. Gen. George E. Koumamkos, who gained international renown fighting Communists on the field of battle and is now completing his 17th month of imprisonment by the colonels who claim they have saved Greece from communism.

The Koumanakos case is another example, dismally frequent in this generation, of Kafua come to life. No formal charge is pending, no trial is scheduled, no fixed limit has been put on his captivity. Underlining the Kafakesque touch, Koumanakos had kept scrupulously free of political connections — unlike many fellow Greek officers.

Why then is he imprisoned? For precautionary reasons, Koumanakos, a living legend in the Korean war as the fearless commander of the Hellenic Expeditionary Forces, is a patriot who some day conceivably might oppose the present tyrants. Thus, the junta took no chances with a potential rebel.

Koumanakos is one of many. The distinguished Adm, Athanasios Spanides, 66, is beginning his 14th consecutive month of detendion in a Greek village, A brigadier, one of the army's most daring officers, is in poor health after suffering head injuries (supposedly in a diving accident) while in captivity. A highly respected retired major general who responded to his recent early morning arrest by slapping the face of the arresting officer was beaten bloody by security troops.

But the case of Koumanakos is perhaps closest to Kafka because of his valorous and wholly non-political career. As a youth





Evans

No ak

in World War II, Koumanakos von a battlefield commission and later escaped the Nazi occupation to join Free Greek bombing squadrons. He was in combat against the Communists throughout the bloody Greek civil war of 1947-49, winning special commendation from Lt. Gen. James Van Fleet as the conqueror of Mount Clerkis.

But Koumanakos's greatest fame as a soldier came in the mountains of Korea in exploits that inspired his U.S. comrades, in an official report of March 25, 1953, Koumanakos's American superior officer, Col. R. E. Akers, Jr., said:

"The Greeks are truly fierce soldiers...yet all their individual courage and resolution is best symbolized in their commander, Lt. Col. Koumanakos. He has constructed for himself an outlook...which is higher and nearer the enemy than any other post of a senior commander in Korea. Col. Koumanakos is my eagle. He goes to his battle position high above his soldiers each evening. ..Col. Koumanakos would welcome a Communist attack."

After winning the U.S. Silver Star and Legion of Merit, Koumanakos commanded the Greek military detachment on Cyprus in the 1960 crisis, headed general staff operations in 1964-65, and then retired. So circumspect was he about keeping out of politics that he purposely went abroad in the spring of 1967 to avoid the national election campaign that was cancelled by the colonels' coup of April 27, 1967.

Assuming that he had nothing to fear from anti-Communist fellow officers, Koumanakos re-turned to Greece May 17, Seven days later he was arrested at his home without charge. The general was held for five months at the police station, then transferred to a small, damp prison cell for common criminals where he suffered a heart attack three days later. After a week in the prison hospital, Koumanakos was released in a Christmas ampesty. The charge, made five months after his arrest and never sub-stantiated, was a misdemeanor; "calumniating another officer in 1963,"

Koumanakos lived quietly after his release, still refraining from politics. Nevertheleas, he was pulled from his bed last Aug. 13 and rearrested following the assassimation attempt against Col., George Papadopoulos, the prime minister. Charged only with being "dangerous for his country's socurity," Koumanakos has spent nine months in closely-guarded exile in three villages.

He is now at Deskati in north-

He is now at Deskati in northern Thessaly, sometimes confined for days to his room in a peasant house. He is forbidden to talk to officers or foreigners and the local gendarmerie warns the villagers not to talk to the general. He is given a private

MOSCOW FORUM AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

Author: Karen KHACHATUROV MOSCOW FORUM AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE Prof. Karen KHACHATUROV, D. Sc. (Hist.)

The International Forum for a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity, held in mid-February this year in Moscow, was an outstanding event in the history of the massive anti-war movement. At no other meeting of this kind ever held before has the search for ways of freeing mankind from the nuclear nightmare been so profound. The history of its convocation is quite unusual. It all started with a meeting of scientists, mostly physicists, last July in Moscow to consider the possibilities of ending nuclear tests under strict international control. As is known, such a possibility arose after the Soviet Union announced a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions. A group of natural scientists who advanced the idea of holding such a forum was received by the Soviet leadership.

This steering group concluded that this way of discussing the most burning problems of our time, suggested by outstanding scientists, is highly effective. In November last year the members of this group met in Hamburg to discuss the most urgent problem of today-how to build a nuclear-free world. Their idea was backed up by scientists in other fields and also by cultural workers, businessmen, clergymen, and retired generals. This gave rise to the idea of simultaneous separate common-interest round table discussions with a common noble goal. The Soviet government agreed that such a meeting be convened in Moscow and provided conditions required for its effective work.

The purpose of the steering group was consonant with the most sacred wishes of all Soviet people. For example, on the eve of this international meeting the Institute for Sociological Research under the USSR Academy of

Sciences conducted an opinion poll on topical issues related to disarmament and a nuclear-free world. More including 1.000 people, students. questions at 26 polling centres in three districts of Moscow. According to the generally accepted methods, this representative opinion poll of the economically active population ensures approximately a 3-per cent accuracy of the results. When asked whether they thought the deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space would increase the risks of the accidental use of these weapons and if complete elimination of nuclear weapons is the only way to avoid a nuclear war, 93 per cent answered in the affirmative; and 96 per cent said they placed the interests of mankind's survival above any other interests, and that there was no way of justifying the use of nuclear weapons.

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MOSCOW FORUM AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE 83

The forum in Moscow was rather unusual. Let us consider first an outward impression of the event and some basic statistics. The round table discussions were attended by over 1,000 very competent delegates from more than 80 countries-natural scientists, physicians, scientists. workers political in culture and businessmen, and clergymen. Later the sociologists separated from the political scientists. Ecologists, too, held separate round table discussions. They were united in the new movement Ecoforum for Peace, which formed last year at a conference in Bulgaria and was soon 32 countries and 11 supported by international organisations.

The Moscow forum was a vigorous and creative movement of people concerned over the nuclear threat, people from most diverse social strata, including those who only recently joined the peace fighters, as, for

instance, retired generals. Among the participants in the eighth and the last round table discussion were members of the West European group Generals for Peace and Disarmament, consisting of former NATO commanders, who were invited to the Forum by public group Soviet Generals and Admirals for Peace and Disarmament. At the beginning of that unusual meeting the delegates were shown the anti-militarist film "Generals", which Soviet TV audiences are familiar with. The characters in the film being present at the showing Portuguese Marshal Francisco da Costa Gomes, Italian General Nino Pasti, Brigadier-General Michael Harbottle of Great Britain, Major-General Gert Bastian of the FRG, Norwegian Major-General Johan Christie, and General Georgios Koumanakos of Greece.

The delegates held meetings on the weekend in four different parts of Moscow-in the modern Kosmos Hotel which was always bustling during the forum, or in the quiet of an ancient private residence. The forum had no emblem, there was no opening ceremony, and no final documents were adopted, though individual round table groups issued appeals. Thus, a large group from the USA, among them Professor Frank von Hippel, a physicist, political scientist Richard Stanley, physician Albert Sabian and film star Gregory Peck, said in a statement: "Our journey to Moscow symbolizes the great desire of all Americans

soldiers pay of 17 drachmae (about 60 cents) a day for food and shelter.

Col. Nicholas Makarezos, a key member of the junta who served under Konmanakos against the Communist guerrillas, has privately expressed shock at his imprisonment but has done nothing about it, When Koumanakos's wife appealed to the U. S. Embassy, she was toformed by a high-ranking diplomat that this was not an American concern. Koumanakos has refused to write his old American comrades-in-arms because he does not want to criticize Greek officers to foreigners.

Those sentiments reveal an officer of the old school, which may be why the colonels have imprisoned him. But the precautionary detention is producing one side effect. Gen, Koumanakos's friends and family for a generation have viewed the Communists as their blood enemies, but now see their real foes as the colonels reigning in Athens. The profound implications of that change in outlook are yet to be felt.

General George Koumanakos as a Hero of Korean War in a project of an American College



Second Place Nicholas Clutter, Calem Morris "Koumanakos: A Hero Unrecognized"

Hi, my name is Nick Clutter.

I am a student at Mt. Spokane High School in Spokane, Wa. For the last 5 months I've been doing research and a History Project on your uncle and I have had a lot of trouble finding information on what did before and after the Korean War, such as where he grew up, if he was ever married, any children. Stuff along those lines. If you don't mind, could you email me back with some information or a link to find such information.

Hi Andreas, thanks for responding!

Well so far I and my History Day partner have mainly the basics about George Koumanakos. We have information on George and his role at Outpost Harry but we really want to know things about him from before and after the war. Was he ever married? Did he have any children? What kind of medals did he receive for his service in the Korean War? Anything will help! I also wanted to know if you lived near Washington State, U.S. because I would really like to do an interview, but if not, information by email is just as great.

Thank you Andreas

That information will help a lot!! Well, what I'm doing is a project for a national History Day Event that has to do with an individual in History and their actions and legacies. If me and my partner do well enough at districts on Feb. 28th, then we go to State, and then Regional's in Washington D.C. I have created a poster board and model of Outpost Harry so far and I have permission to include

a short interview with someone! Would you happen to know anyone that I could interview about George that lives near Spokane WA.? I would really like to have a video on George, thank you.

Education | Special Programs | Eastern Washington State Regional ...

Nick Clutter, Calem Morris, "George Koumanakos: A Forgotten War, An Unknown Hero." Mt. Spokane
High School, coaches Jeff Naslund, Luke Thomas. "
www.northwestmuseum.org/.../Education_Special_Progr
ams_Eastern_Washington_State_Regional_H... First Gentleman's Award, sponsored by the Office of
the Governor. Recognizes outstanding entries on military
history with a private tour of the Governor's Mansion.

· Nick Clutter, Calem Morris,

«George Koumanakos: A Forgotten War, an Unknown Hero.»

Mt. Spokane High School, coaches Jeff Naslund, Luke Thomas. Senior Group Exhibit.

Mount Spokane High School. Regional Winners

<u>Senior Group Exhibits</u>



First Place Jessica
Levy, Alyssa DraperDehart "May Hutton:
A Liberated
Individual"
Second Place
Nicholas Clutter,
Calem Morris
"Koumanakos: A
Hero Unrecognized"

A trully sincere post

My squad was with the Greeks on outpost Harry. I never saw such crazy guys when the fighting got close. Im glad I was ON THEIR SIDE. THEY WERE GREAT

Posted by: Bill Triplett | 07 November 2008 at 05:38 PM

And a post unbelievable

I was at the Greek battalion forward HQ the morning after their stand on OP Harry. There was a Greek soldier tied with commo wire near the bunker door-weeping. I asked why, and the US liaison Lt. told me he had run from the fight the night before and was to be executed that day. Tough bunch.

by William J. McLean April 24, 2009

Posted by: William J. McLean | 24 April 2009 at 09:52

The blogger's answer...

Mr. McLean,

Thank you for your service and for taking the time to offer this comment.

Posted by: Stavros | 27 April 2009 at 11:10 PM

This comment and the answer of Stavros astonished me. How could they believe such incorrect events? Then I answered to them.

The answer of Col Andreas Koumanakos:

I fear that Mr William J. McLean is not a real person or was invented by Mr. Stavros. STAVROS is suspected of rapid response to thank William J. McLean for his historically inaccurate story against the Greeks. In any case, another is their purpose. They both, with this story, try to accuse the Administration of the Greek military unit. But in the end, both are revealed as liars. In no document there is anything about what Mr William J. McLean writes, and none of the soldiers who returned to Greece narrated something relevant.

The Greek officers in Korea were brave and loyal to the laws and the Greek tradition. Further, at the time of the Battle of Harry, a senior Greek officer (Brigadier Vlassis), was present on the battlefield as an observer. During the Korean War in the Administration of the Greek Battalion, an officer of the Military Justice was servicing there. Besides the Greek Battalion was not acting as an independent unit, but under the Commanding

of the 15th Infantry Regiment, III Division U.S. Army. Here is the report of the Division Commanding General Ruben E. Jenkins.

October 1, 1953

Dear General Tsigounis,

On 10 August regretfully surrendered command of IX US Corps and the Greek Expeditionary Forces Battalion to my successor. I was reassigned to my present command which has command and operational supervision of the three ROK Corps, composing the Korean Army in the field. I am departing this command for the US within a few days, I would fail my duties my self, and the Greek armed Forces if I did not, prior to my departure comment upon the character of service rendered by your Expeditionary Forces which served under me.

This command, true to Greek tradition, more than lived up to what you and I both expected of it. Never during the ten and one—half months under my command did any member of the Greek Bn come to my ufavorable attention for any disciplinary administrative or combat operational reason. On the other hand I never heard any comment other than of the highest praise for all members of this Battalion in every qualification that goes to make up the soldier and the fighting unit. Nor at any time did I observe anything other than qualities of the highest order. And I might remark in passing that I was a most frequent visitor to the Greek Battalion both while in reserve and in the front line. It was particularly outstanding in a crisis several of which occurred during periods while it was holding front line positions, the most noteworthy of which occurred in the middle of June during the Battle of "Harry". On this occasion one Company of this Battalion, successfully withstood three of the most violent attacks launched against this position in rapid succession during

darkness, by no less than two ful1-strength Communist Battalions. This feat alone marked this command for what it is, a fine, courageous and determined representative of the Greek Army as you and I knew it in the last campaign in the Vitsi and the Grammos. To them I can pay no higher tribute. I cannot say too much for the outstanding leadership disp1ayed by your Battalion commanders. I have previously written you concerning Colonel Tamvakas. Now I would like to comment briefly upon Colonel George Koumanakos.

I have previously endorsed an Efficiency Report rendered upon Colonel Koumanakos by his Regimental Commander, Colonel Akers of the 15th Infantry which, I hope, has reached you by this time. In this Efficiency Report both the Regimental Commander and I stated categorically that Lieutenant Colonel Koumanakos was one of the most outstanding and courageous Battalion Commanders of our experience. I wish to repeat that assertion personally to you! The outstanding manner in which he administered the affairs of the Greek Battalion and the courage and determination which he instilled into his subordinates of all ranks by personal precept and personal example are, in my opinion, the factors which contributed most to the great success of the Battalion during the critical periods while under my command. I cannot say too much for his personal and professional qualification which is thoroughly in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service. This Officer can command an Infantry Regiment and perform the duties of a Brigadier General Assistant Division Command with high credit and distinction. He can, with little experience command an Infantry Division in a similar fashion. I wish to recommend him to your personal attention and to the personal attention of who may follow you. later in your

high Office to the end that he may reach General Officer Grads for which he is now fitted, as early as possible. I would like also appreciate it if you would bring this matter to the personal attention of the Chief of the National Defense General Staff and, to the attention of His Excellency the Prime Minister Field Marshal Papagos. Although my contacts with Lieutenant Colonel Koumanakos successor, Lieutenant Colonel Prokos, have been few because of my change in assignment, I have been assured by his present Division Commander that he measures fully up to the standard as set by his predecessors. As one of my last official acts in Korea I wish to convey to you as Chief of Staff, Greek Army, to the Chief of the National Defense, General Staff, and to Field Marshal Papagos my deeply—felt gratitude for providing me with such outstanding representatives of the Army with which I served in 1948, 1949, 1950 and 1951. Please convey my very best wishes to Field Marshal Papagos to Kitrilakis, Grigoropoulos, Tsakalotos, Manidakis, Balodemos, Dovas, Zaimis, and my many other friends in the Greek Armed Forces who are too numerous to mention. To yourself, my personal thanks and highest professional regards. Faithfully yours, REUBEN E JENKINS Lieutenant General, USA

Posted by: Andreas Koumanakos Lt. Col. Eng. Corp. Greek Army <u>24 May 2010 at 02:16 PM</u>

The answer of the blogger

Col. Koumanakos,

With all due respect, I think you need to relax. No one is impugning the job that the Greek battalion did in Korea. take comments here at face value. I am in no position to verify what happened in Korea. I think the point Mr Maclean, who I don't know, was trying to make is that they were a "tough bunch." His comment hardly merits your thin skinned response and accusations. You should be rightfully proud of your relative's accomplishments. Accomplishments which are celebrated on this blog but forgotten in Greece. I appreciate your input and apologize for any misunderstanding.

Posted by: Stavros 24 May 2010 at 03:07 PM



Ret. Col. Koumanakos Andreas and General George Koumanakos in the sitting room of his house, during a social activity in 1990.

Tr. Kiryanines LAS North 0983. 22097

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A handwritten notice of General Georg Koumanakos to the writer Col Andreas Koumanakos.

July 27, 1953.



The War is over. General Mark Clark is signing the armnistice

..but this book will never come to the end. Everybody who has something real, can send it.

It will be wellcomed. I will include it in the very next issue. (This book will be revised from time to time.)

The author
Andreas Koumanakos

Email to: andre.kouman@Gmail.com